MARKET FLASH:

"It seems the donkey is laughing, but he instead is braying (l'asino sembra ridere ma in realtà raglia)": si veda sotto "1927-1933: Pompous Prognosticators" per avere la conferma che la storia non si ripete ma fà la rima.


domenica 10 dicembre 2017

Enron 2.0? ECB, Global Banks On The Hook For $21 Billion In Steinhoff Implosion

Earlier last week has been reported that as part of the stunning, unexpected collapse of South African retail giant Steinhoff, which also owns France-based Conforama furniture chain, Mattress Firm in the U.S. and Poundland in the U.K., none other than the ECB was unveiled as owning an unknown amount of its recently issued €800 million in 2025 bonds, which plunged from 85 to as little as 41 cents on Wednesday when the news hit...
 

... and which was said would be sharply downgraded in the coming days as the rating agencies - once again painfully behind the curve - caught up with reality. That's precisely what happened late on Thursday, when Moody's cut its Baa3 rating by four notches deep into junk territory, highlighting "the uncertainties and implications for the company's liquidity and debt capital structure."
 After the downgrade- much to the humiliation of the ECB which has to explain why as part of its economic revitalization efforts, i.e. QE it is holding this pile of steaming garbage - Steinhoff bonds extended losses on Friday as the world paid increasingly more attention to the accounting scandal that's threatening the survival of the global furniture and clothing retailer.
Meanwhile, whispers of Enron 2.0 have emerged as the investing community begins to appreciate the potential implications of Steinhoff's implosion. For South Africa, the collapse of the company which employs 130,000 people worldwide, already has systemic implications. As Bloomberg reports, South African Finance Minister Malusi Gigaba said he's "mindful" that many retirement and savings funds will be hurt by the loss in value and has asked the PIC to prepare a report on the extent of the exposure.
Still, unless South Africa is willing to fund a state bailout, the fate of Steinhoff, which has appears to be sealed.
"I think it is the end," Simon Brown, Johannesburg-based chief executive officer of trading company JustOneLap, told Bloomberg. "The end will be a break up. There are lots of decent businesses that others will want to buy and it's likely they'll fetch decent prices. so staff will mostly be fine, except in head office."
"There's no way back," David Shapiro, deputy chairman of Sasfin Wealth in Johannesburg, said in emailed comments on Friday. "The worry is that there are a huge number of operating companies within the stable – if you were a supplier to these businesses would you sell goods on credit? I reckon they should file for Chapter 11 or business rescue and try and salvage what they can."
That outcome would be a disaster not only for the ECB, which as showed is a proud owner of an unknown amount of the company's plunging bonds.


The fallout from the spectacular implosion also means that U.S. and European banks with billions of dollars at stake were told they'd have to wait another week to confront the global clothing and furniture retailer that's engulfed in an accounting scandal, Bloomberg reported on Friday.  
The company on Friday delayed a meeting with lenders to Dec. 19 from Dec. 11, citing that full-year earnings that are typically discussed in the annual gathering haven't been published. The owner of chains such as Mattress Firm in the U.S. and Conforama in France didn't say whether it planned to report financials before Dec. 19.
Finding themselves in limbo, and in a communication lockout, is hardly good news for lenders who stand to lose massive amount should Steinhoff liquidation. Total exposure to lenders and other creditors was almost 18 billion euros ($21 billion) as of the end of Marchwith Bloomberg reporting that "long-term liabilities were 12.1 billion euros and short-term liabilities 5.87 billion euros." Those are the most recent Steinhoff results available after it indefinitely postponed publishing full-year financials on Wednesday. The latest numbers will likely be even greater to account for the July issuance of the company's 2025 bonds.
But the real dangers is what is not reported on the books: "The great unknown is the funding of the off-balance-sheet structures, which could spill over into fresh bank liability," Adrian Saville, chief executive officer of Cannon Asset Managers in Johannesburg, told Bloomberg on Friday. The short-term debt could "fall over if the business fails," he said.
It is unclear which banks are on the hook although in South Africa, Steinhoff has relationships with Standard Bank Group, Investec and a unit of FirstRand. Globally some of the lenders include Citigroup, Bank of America, HSBC and BNP Paribas.
Banks also have exposure to Steinhoff through loans provided to Chairman, billionaire Christo Wiese's investment vehicles. Last year, the billionaire and largest shareholder of the company pledged 628 million of Steinhoff's shares in collateral to borrow money from Citigroup, HSBC, Goldman Sachs Group Inc. and Nomura Holdings Inc. That was to participate in a share sale in conjunction with the acquisition of Mattress Firm and Poundland, according to a company statement. It's unclear whether Wiese has repaid part of those loans since, Bloomberg notes. The value of all shares pledged as collateral is now 365 million euros, down from 2.2 billion euros a month ago.
Meanwhile, in a desperate attempt to salvage value, Steinhoff said after the market close on Friday that it had appointed a new sub-committee to improve corporate governance at the company.
The three non-executive directors are all existing board members, and are led by Johan van Zyl, the co-CEO of financial services firm African Rainbow Capital Ltd. Steve Booysen, an ex-head of lender Absa, and Heather Sonn, a former investment banker, make up the trio.
Steinhoff also said it was considering boosting liquidity by selling assets worth at least 1 billion euros. It also said one of its African subsidiaries would refinance long-term liabilities amounting to another 1 billion euros, while the possibility of recovering assets for around 6 billion euros was being investigated. All of these measures may help recoup some of the money owing to banks and investors, and while a complete loss on the $21 billion in exposure is unlikely, it seems virtually guaranteed that the banks will suffer steep haircuts on their Steinhoff exposure.
As will the ECB, which on Friday was rumored it was considering selling its Steinhoff bonds. It is not exactly clear how this would take place, since the ECB's QE by definition only buys, not sells, at least for now.
One thing that is certain, however, is that this is just the beginning of the ECB's balance sheet woes: as we showed on Wednesday using UBS data, the ECB now holds no less than 26 "fallen angel" equivalent bonds, amounting to €18 billion in notional exposure; both numbers are set to soar when the next recession hits and the bulk of the ECB's holdings shift down in quality, leaving Mario Draghi and his henchmen dealing with countless credit committees in bankruptcy court as the European central bank finds itself the post-reorg equity holder of countless European companies.

Six Ways US Stocks Are The Most Overvalued In History



US large cap stocks are the most overvalued in history. Let's investigate six ways.

C. Capital claims US large cap stocks are the most overvalued in history, higher than prior speculative mania market peaks in 1929 and 2000.

Their 25-page presentation makes a compelling case, with numerous charts. It's worth your time to download and investigate the report.

Six Ways Socks Most Overvalued in History

Price to Sales
Price to Book
Enterprise Value to Sales
Enterprise Value to EBITDA
Price to Earnings
Enterprise Value to Free Cash Flow


Here are a few snips from the report.


Bear Market Catalysts

There are many catalysts that are likely to send stocks into bear market in the near term. A likely bursting of the China credit bubble is first and foremost among them. Our data and analysis show that China today is the biggest credit bubble of any country in history. We believe its bursting will be globally contagious for equities, real estate, and credit markets. The US and China bubbles are part of a larger, global debt-to-GDP bubble, which is also historic in scale, and the product of excessive, lingering central bank easy monetary policies in the wake of the now long-passed 2008 Global Financial Crisis. 

These policies failed to resolve the debt-to-GDP imbalances that preceded the last crisis. Now, easy money policies have created even bigger debt-to-GDP imbalances and asset bubbles that will precipitate the next one.We are in the very late stages of a global economic and business expansion cycle with investor sentiment reflecting record optimism typical at market peaks, a sign of capitulation at the end of a bull market. Crescat is positioned to profit from the coming broad, global cyclical market and economic downturn that we foresee. We strongly believe that our global equity net short positioning in our hedge funds will be validated soon.


Cyclical PE Smoothing

It is critical to use cyclical smoothing to accurately gauge market valuations in their current and historical context when using P/E.Yale economics professor, Robert Shiller, received a Nobel Prize in 2013 for proving this fact so we hope you will believe it. 

The problem with just looking at trailing 12-month P/E ratios to determine valuation is that it produces sometimes-false readings due to large cyclical swings in earnings at peaks and valleys of the business cycle. For example, in the middle of the recession in 2001, P/Es looked artificially high due to a broad earnings plunge. P/Es can also look artificially low at the peak of a short-term business cycle, which can produce what is known as a "value trap", such as in 2007 during the US housing bubble and such as we believe is the case today in China, Australia, and Canada.

Shiller showed a method for cyclically-adjusting P/Es using a 10-year moving average of real earnings in the denominator of the P/E. Shiller's Cyclically-Adjusted P/E, called CAPE multiples have been better predictors of future full-business-cycle stock market returns than raw 12-month trailing P/Es. Shiller showed that markets with historically high CAPEs lead to low long-term returns for long-only index investors. Shiller CAPEs are fantastic, but they can be improved by including an adjustment for corporate profit margins which makes them even better predictors of future stock price performance and therefore even better measures of cyclically-adjusted P/E for valuation purposes. 

.Shiller's CAPEs simply need an adjustment for profit margins because margins are a key element of earnings cyclicality. We can understand this by looking at median S&P 500 profit margins in the chart below. For example, even though profit margins were cyclically and historically high during the tech bubble, they are even higher today. In the same spirit of Shiller's attempt to cyclically adjust earnings to determine a useful P/E, CAPEs need to be adjusted for cyclical swings in profit margins.


When we multiply Shiller CAPEs by a cyclical adjustment factor for profit margins (10-year trailing profit margins divided by long term profit margin), we get a margin-adjusted CAPE that is not only theoretically valid but empirically valid as it proves to be an even better predictor of future returns than Shiller's CAPE!



Credit goes to John P. Hussman, Ph.D. for the idea and method to adjust Shiller CAPEs for swings in profit margins.As we can see in the Hussman chart below, margin-adjusted CAPE, shows that today's P/E ratio for comparative historical purposes is 43, the highest ever! The 1999 peak P/E was 41 and the 1929 P/E was 40. Once again, we can see that today we have the highest valuation multiples ever for US stocks, higher than 1929 and higher than 1999 and 2000!


Margin-Adjusted CAPE


It's easy to discard such talk, just as it was in 2000 and 2006. People readily dispute CAPE, concocting all sorts or reasons why it's different this time. The most common reason is interest rates are low. We also hear "stocks are cheap to bonds" which is like saying moon rocks are cheap compared to oranges. I do not know when this all matters. And no one else knows either. What I am sure if is that it will matter.


How?

I don't know when, nor am I sure "how" it happens. It could play out as a crash or stocks can decline over a period of 6-10 years with nothing worse than a 15% decline in any given year, accompanied with several sucker rallies leading people to believe the bottom is in.


History Lesson

Some might ask: If you don't know when or how, of what use is such analysis.The answer is that history shows this is a very poor time to invest in stocks. That does not mean, they cannot go higher(and they have).

History also suggests that people who invest in bubbles, start believing in them. People believe in bubbles because they have to, in order to rationalize their investments. Others know full well it's a bubble but they think they can get out in time. Historically, few do because they are conditioned to "buy-the-dip" philosophy, and keep doing so even after it no longer works.

Yesterday, I noted Oppenheimer Predicts PE Expansion, Most Bullish S&P Forecast Yet. So if you are looking for a reason to stay heavily invested in this market, you have one. But don't fool yourself, this is the most expensive market in history.