MARKET FLASH:

"It seems the donkey is laughing, but he instead is braying (l'asino sembra ridere ma in realtà raglia)": si veda sotto "1927-1933: Pompous Prognosticators" per avere la conferma che la storia non si ripete ma fà la rima.


lunedì 21 maggio 2018

Why The Soaring Dollar Will Lead To An "Explosive" Market Repricing: A Flow Chart

Something curious took place one month ago when the PBOC announced on April 17 that it would cut the reserve requirement ratio (RRR) by 1% to ease financial conditions: it broke what until then had been a rangebound market for both the US Dollar and the US 10Y Treasury, sending both the dollar index and 10Y yields soaring...

... which led to an immediate tightening in financial conditions both domestically and around the globe, and which has - at least initially - manifested itself in a sharp repricing of emerging market risk, resulting in a plunge EM currencies, bonds and stocks.

Adding to the market response, this violent move took place at the same time as geopolitical fears about Iran oil exports amid concerns about a new war in the middle east and Trump's nuclear deal pullout, sent oil soaring - with Brent rising above $80 this week for the first time since 2014 - a move which is counterintuitive in the context of the sharply stronger dollar,and which has resulted in even tighter financial conditions across the globe, but especially for emerging market importers of oil.

Meanwhile, all this is playing out in the context of a world where the Fed continues to shrink its balance sheet - a public sector "Quantitative Tightening (QT)" - further tightening monetary conditions (i.e., shrinking the global dollar supply amid growing demand), even as high grade US corporate bond issuance has dropped off a cliff for cash-rich companies which now opt to repatriate cash instead of issuing domestic bonds, with the resulting private sector deleveraging, or "private sector QT", further exacerbating tighter monetary conditions and the growing dollar shortage (resulting in an even higher dollar).

And while the latest incarnation of the dollar's "impossible trilemma" - rising dollar, rising oil, rising yields (not to be confused with its more conventional Chinese variant) makes a short, if perplexing appearance, ultimately it's all about the value of the dollar, and its impact on downstream assets and volatility.

This is the point made by Deutsche Bank's derivatives expert Aleksandar Kocic, who in his latest report writes that in the context to the Fed's normalization and monetary policy fine tuning, the "USD is emerging as the key variable -- it presents a compact summary of the underlying macro risks that could destabilize the current Fed path." In other words, the last thing the Fed wants right now as it accelerates its balance sheet normalization, is a sharp spike in the dollar. And yet, that's precisely what is happening. Kocic explains:

A strong USD corresponds to generally hawkish Fed in an environment where the US is recovering fast while the rest of the globe is still too slow or recessionary, or that the Fed is pushing rates above the neutral and causing excessive tightening of financial conditions and potentially triggering recession. A weak USD path, on the other hand, can materialize either as an inflation or credit (twin deficits) risk, a troubling possibility to which there is no adequate policy response.

For Kocic, the relative strength of the dollar is the exogenous event that could awake markets from their peaceful slumber, resulting in a violent reassessment of monetary conditions as the Fed quietly undoes the biggest monetary experiment in history, or as he puts it, "although unwind of stimulus and Fed exit continue without disrupting the markets, the underlying stability remains local, threatened potentially by the tail risk."

For now, the DB strategist notes, "the current market configuration appears to be cooperating with the Fed's efforts in either scenario" and "market positioning and flows are likely to cause offsetting pressure to each macro risk and therefore help stability of the system."

In particular, strong USD, which is bullish for bonds, in terms of global sponsorship, is also bearish for EM currencies and reserve managers there are likely to defend local currencies by selling US assets, which goes against macro. Similarly, their response to weaker USD would stabilize bear steepeners on the back of defending their exports through stabilization of EM currencies and support for the US long end.

The bigger problem, one discussed by Kocic previously, and which also takes the shape of the yield curve in consideration, is that with every passing day of normalization manifesting itself in bear flatteners, the market gets closer to the tipping point of duration decrease in which a rotation from risk assets into the short-end of the curve threatens a forced "price discovery" of the new "Fed put" (which Kocic recently calculated was in the 2,300-2,400 range).

So in this context of a creeping bear flattener, Kocic observes that together with the stronger USD, these two discrete trends have a potential to create more volatility and discomfort across all market sectors than bear steepeners if they both remain localized and do not trigger tail risk.

How does this look schematically? Luckily, the Deutsche Banker has come up with a handy flowchart showing the next steps in how the stronger dollar could lead to an "explosive" move in not only the front end of the curve, but across all markets:

Causality chain of strong USD and its potential knock-on effect is shown in the chart. We start at the lower left corner. Fed hikes and strong USD open up the EM dilemma: Facing the outflows or defending the currency at expense of stifling the growth. This implies both, more volatility and potential sell off in EM, and bearish pressure on the long end of the UST that would offset the underlying bid for US bonds (strong USD is bullish). Turbulence in EM could have a knock-on effect on risk assets in the US.

Why is the above critical? Because if the cycle were to play out, it would result in the same set of conditions which led to a global bear market back in 2015 in the aftermath of China's devaluation (odd, there's China again precipitating a global market crisis):

An example is the 2015 episode where asset managers faced redemptions due to EM losses and had to sell the best performing assets (US equities) to cover those costs. This means more turbulence in developed markets and possible tightening of financial conditions, which could question the strength of the USD and possibly push Fed to take a pause.

But the real punchline is just how trapped the Fed now is, because should Powell "relent" and hint that the Fed may take a break in order to spare EMs and stocks, well the result would be an avalanche of short covering in the Eurodollar market, one which would lead to an even more dramatic, or as Deutsche calls it "explosive" move in the short end:

Given record shorts on the Eurodollar curve (Figure), Fed pause is likely to trigger unwind of these position which could be explosive and the front end of the curve could rally hard.

The punchline: the dollar surge, catalyzed by the April 17 PBOC RRR cut, has launched a feedback loop which, very much like the Chinese 2015 devaluation, culminates in one of two possible unpleasant - for the Fed - outcomes: a collapse in EMs should dollar strength not be arrested, which then morphs into a broad-based liquidation of all risk assets (the most likely result of this is Fed intervention, in the form of sharp rate cuts and/or more QE) or if the Fed verbally relents again, as it did in 2016 with the Shanghai Accord, and suggests that financial conditions are now too tight, it threatens to crush the biggest ED spec short position ever, leading to trillions in paper losses, and an unprecedented collapse in the short end:

The EPFR data reflecting the ETF and Mutual Funds Flows show continued outflows from the emerging markets and inflows into the short end of the UST curve, which is only increasing the stress in this sector. So, although we should see continued stability at the long end of the curve due to offsetting pressures between macro and flows, a slow grind of the front end, if persists, could morph into a volatile whipsaw. Further strength in the USD and the front end sell off on the back of more hawkish Fed could be potentially bearish for risk assets and act as a trigger for rates reversal.

In short, while the Fed has found itself trapped before, it was only the recent spike in the dollar (thanks China) that has forced the Fed to act, with either decision - either further hawkishness or a dovish relent - leading to major market pain. And the longer the Fed delays making the key decision, the more painful the outcome will eventually be.

Italy Is Forming The Epicenter Of The EU's Fateful Shift

Clarity is here in Italian coalition talks.  And the markets hate what they see.  So does Brussels.

Five-year Italian debt blew out over 1%, CDS spreads have moved over 20 basis points in a week. The markets are trying to scare these outsiders now in charge in Italy to soften their stances on reform and maintain a status quo which is destroying a great country and culture.

The League and Five Star Movement leaked demands for $250 billion in debt relief from the ECB.  There was also a demand for developing a mechanism for countries to leave the euro, according to a, now discredited, report from Reuters.

The final proposal doesn't have any of this inflammatory language, but don't think the leak wasn't part of their negotiating strategy or part of where they are ultimately going to push things.

Because the rest of the proposal is already hostile enough to Brussels (see below).  And with ECB President Mario Draghi now signaling the need to consolidate European sovereign debt under its umbrella, it isn't necessary at the moment.

Here's Martin Armstrong's take:

So everyone else understands what this is about, the ECB President Mario Draghi has come out and proposed interlocking the euro countries to create a "stronger" and "new vehicle" as a "crisis instrument" to save Europe. He is arguing that this should prevent countries from drifting apart in the event of severe economic shocks. Draghi has said it provides "an extra layer of stabilization" which is a code phrase for the coming bond crash. [emphasis mine]

That tells me that Draghi understands how bad things truly are and that Italian leadership knows they have the upper hand in debt negotiations.

They are prepared to push Brussels hard to get what they want.  And well they should.  League leader Matteo Salvini understands how ruinous the euro as administered by Germany has been for Italy and most of Europe.

So, to him, if the price for Italy to stay in the EU is to force the northern countries to accept debt consolidation and write-down then so be it.

If they won't agree to that, then Italy's new leadership is prepared to back to the people and say, "We tried.  Screw them. Let's walk."

All of this says to me they sand-bagged the press and the political establishment to get to this point.

Reconciling Divisions

The coalition proposal is a mishmash of right and left policy prescriptions that will drive the IMF and Brussels mad.  But, these two very different parties have to come to some agreement if they are to wrest control of Rome from the insanity of the status quo in Europe, which serves no one's ends except the globalists which stand behind the public faces of the EU – Juncker, Merkel, Tusk, Macron, etc.

The League is a former secessionist party that served the northern regions of Veneto and Lombardy with talks of fiscal responsibility and far lower taxes.  The while Five Star Movement has grown out of the hollowing out of Southern Italy's economy and social fabric from political rot emanating from both Rome and Brussels.

One is calling for lower taxes and regulation, the other wants generous pensions and universal income.  These are not easy differences to overcome. But they have, to no one's satisfaction. That, however, is the price for such an eclectic mix of policy positions.

That said, they are clearly together on the two most important issues facing Italy's future, immigration and Italy's place within the EU.

Both parties want to put Italy first.  And the legislative program now proposed looks to be in that vein, while not looking (at first glance) too radical. From Zerohedge's writeup this morning:

  • Seeks 15% and 20% tax rates for companies and people
  • Seeks guaranteed minimum income for poorer Italians
  • Universal basic income of €780 per person per month, funded in part through EU
  • Seeks end to Russia sanctions
  • No mention of a referendum on membership of either the EU or the euro
  • Agreement to meet the goals of the Maastricht Treaty
  • No plans to ask the ECB to cancel debt
  • Calls for airline Alitalia to be relaunched
  • Seeks to scrap Fornero pension reform
  • Flat tax to become a dual rate with deductions
  • Seeks a strong contribution to EU immigration policy
  • Plan calls for redefining of lender Monte dei Paschi di Siena's mission

The highlighted ones are the most important, while the markets focus on the tax changes and universal income.

Forget those.  If Italy can get the EU to lift Russian sanctions, take immigration policy away from Angela Merkel and provide a blueprint for dealing with insolvent Italian banks those would be titanic wins.

These are the issues at the heart of the EU's foundational problems – its lack of banking cohesion and anti-democratic bureaucracy.

The Soft Sell To Italeave

So, while all of this looks like they've caved on the most extreme positions, in effect, they have not.  Italy's budget is getting crushed by the cost of Merkel's Migrants.  Both parties obviously feel that growth can return to the Italian economy within the euro by radically lowering taxes to reprice Italian labor lower.  This would put it at an advantage relative to Germany while remaining within the euro.

Then issuing a new parallel currency, the Mini-BOT, to circulate domestically to lessen the need for euros within the domestic economy and free up Italy's budget issues with respect to its debt servicing needs.

What I'll say about that is with yields spiking, the Mini-BOT better get off the ground soon because Italy's debt servicing is extremely low thanks to the ECB's negative interest rate policy (NIRP).  And once the dollar begins rising here the decisions for debt relief and consolidation may be out of any one group's hands.

Merkel's Out of Time

The problem now is time.  Donald Trump's pressure policy on Iran and Russia is creating the kind of uncertainty no one can forecast.  It is forcing a decision on European leadership to come together and declare opposition to Washington's diktats and forge an independent identity while at the same time look to truly end the cultural divisions and distrusts which have led to this moment thanks to a lack of fiscal unanimity.

It is clear to me Italy's new leadership understands this with the sum and substance of these policy points.  It believes it can re-align Italy's domestic policies in Italy's favor while forcing Brussels to face the responsibility of leading Europe forward in a way which is far more equitable than in years past.

Perhaps that's why Angela Merkel visited Russian President Vladimir Putin for a second time in two weeks after only sending representatives for the past four years.  They weren't just talking about the Iran deal.

No that meeting was all about getting Germany out from under Trump's thumb while not incurring his wrath.  Putin's long-game of diplomatic patience was the right path from the beginning.  It's always bet to let your opponent bluff and bluster, beat their chests and make demands they can't enforce.

Eventually those watching realize it is all just hot air.  And as time passes the cost of resistance to the bully falls and the benefits of joining a new group rise.  For Germany it is energy.  Russian Gas and Iranian oil are necessary for Germany to maintain its competitiveness and Trump is undermining both of these with his lack of diplomacy.

Merkel's refusal of his proposed tariff concessions to ditch the Nordstream 2 pipeline and buy more expensive LNG from Cheniere Energy was more important than people think.  There's no reason for Merkel to believe that U.S. policy under Trump or any future president won't do an about face.  Meanwhile, pipelines are practically forever.

And Merkel is savvy enough to put her ego aside over having been outmaneuvered by Putin over Ukraine and hold the line on Nordstream 2.

The Big Reversal

Merkel has an out here. And Italy just handed it to her.  I'm not sure she's smart enough to see it.

The ECB wants debt consolidation and greater control.  For the EU to survive this is necessary.   Germans and the rest of the northern countries don't want to be seen bailing out the "Club Med" countries.  That would be interpreted as yet another submission to Washington and New York.  Merkel cannot go through horrific debt relief talks like she did with Greece in 2015.  It would destroy what's left of her political capital.  If she stands tall against Trump over Iran, however, she gains a lot.  The uncertainty over how Trump will react sends the euro down, pressuring the ECB to finally move on dealing with the debt.

Europeans want normalized relations with Russia and open trade, especially German industry.  There are tens of billions in investments in Russia and Crimea waiting for the sanctions to end to travel to Russia, especially with such a weak Ruble, thanks to Trump's moronic sanctions.

Only Poland and the Baltics don't.  But, they don't matter.  It only takes one finance minister to vote against extending Russian sanctions to end them.  If Merkel stands up to the U.S. on Iran, it makes it easier for Italy to force Germany to stop bullying everyone into maintaining them.

Italy drops the bombshell to end the Russian sanctions in July.  Merkel "reluctantly" goes along with this.  Nordstream 2 worries go away. The EU and Russia form a united front against more U.S. belligerence in Ukraine.

During Monte dei Paschi debt restructuring talks Merkel and Draghi introduce new mechanisms for debt consolidation as a model for the future.

Do I think this is the most likely scenario?  No. But it is one that could come to pass if Merkel reads the shifting political winds properly.  If she begins thinking in Germany's best long-term interests then some version of this is exactly what she'll do.

And she'll have the hated euroskeptics from Italy to thank for saving her legacy and Europe from further political and economic marginalization.

Earnings Estimates: Yardeni Asks "What Are Analysts Smoking"?

Earnings estimates keep rising and rising. What is everyone smoking?

A Tweet to a Linked-In article by Edward Yardeni caught my eye. Yardeni asks What Are Stock Industry Analysts Smoking?

I would like to try some of whatever industry analysts are smoking.You can compare my earnings forecasts to their consensus estimates on a weekly basis in YRI S&P 500 Earnings Forecast on our website. I say "tomato." They say "tomahto."

My earnings-per-share estimate for 2018 is $155.00 (up 17.4% y/y). The analysts continue to up the ante and are currently at $160.40 (up 21.5%). My estimate for 2019 is $166.00 (up 7.1%). Theirs is $175.72 (up 9.6%). Perhaps the analysts are just high on life.

Their growth estimate for next year seems too high to me since I expect 2019 earnings growth to settle back down to the historical trend of 7%.

Are They All High on Life?

Yardeni says "You can drive a truck between my earnings estimates and theirs."

Yet he still suggests "the stock market is likely to be at new record highs by the end of this year," even with his earnings estimate.

What Can Possibly Go Wrong?

I guess we can throw out a recession, earnings reversion to the mean, a global slowdown, a valuation scare, or simply a valuation reversion to the mean.

Asset Bubble Poised to Break

  1. Note that it has taken about $1 trillion in buybacks and dividendsjust to hold the the S&P 500 barely above breakeven on the year.

  2. Crescat Capital notes Fed Tightening Cycles Coincide With Bursting of Asset Bubbles.

Yardeni is still looking up.

Mirror Mirror on the Wall

When asking what others are smoking, perhaps one should look into a mirror to see if they are smoking essentially the same stuff, just less of it.

Addendum

A reader emailed asking "what make you so sure Yardeni is wrong?"

Another commented " If I had to choose between 1) a small increase in earnings and modest stock market appreciation, as Yardeni is suggesting or 2) a 60% drop over the next year, as is often referred to on this site, I would go with option 1. I do expect the economy and the market to slow a bit next year though."

Actually, I am not sure of hardly anything other than the given I will someday die. Yardeni could be right. Interestingly, he is positioned well. If the stock market tanks, he can blame the earnings miss and claim he was right.

As long as he is closer than the herd, he can make an "I was right" claim. History strongly suggests he will do better than the herd.

Yardeni made a "cleverly safe call".

In regards to 60% drop predictions, I am unaware of anyone suggesting a 60% drop in a year. Other than Prectorites calling for the DOW at 2,000 or whatever, the most bearish person I know is Hussman.

But Hussman is not calling for anything specific in a year. Rather he thinks we see a 67% drop, top to bottom, occurring over an unspecified number of years.

50% or so may be more likely, or not. Everyone is guessing.

Unlike some others, I have not called for a "crash". Rather, I side with Hussman that the market is ridiculously overvalued.

Something like a 15% decline followed by a 5% advance, followed by a 15% decline, another 5% advance, then two consecutive 10% declines, followed by an 8% rally then a washout 15% decline is more along the lines of what I expect. That does not total 67%.

But a crash (which I define as 35% in a year, totaling or 50% in 2-3 consecutive years) would not surprise me in the least.

"Given rich valuations and deteriorating internals, downside risks are increasing. But finger-waving about the risks of Fed tightening or QT, after the jackweeds at the Fed encouraged THIS, imagines one can avoid the inevitable consequences of a bubble that was wholly intentional," said John P. Hussman. 

Italy: An Anti-Euro Government Takes Power In the Heart Of The Eurozone

Ah, Italy. My people; fun to be around, a nightmare to govern. And now an existential threat to the European Union, the euro currency, and the global bond markets.

After suffering for over a decade under a monetary regime designed by and for efficient economies like Germany, the Italian people have finally said enough, giving a majority of their votes in this month's election to parties that promise relief – though rather different forms of relief – from the burdens of a stable currency. From last week's Guardian UK:

Italy's new government, likely to be formally confirmed within the next few days, sets a perilous precedent for Brussels: it marks the first time a founding member of the EU has been led by populist, anti-EU forces. From the EU's perspective, the coalition of the anti-establishment Five Star Movement (M5S) and the far-right League looks headstrong and unpredictable, possibly even combustible. Leaked drafts of their government 'contract' include provision for a 'conciliation committee' to settle expected disagreements.

Mainly it looks alarming. Both parties toned down their fiercest anti-EU rhetoric during the election campaign, dropping previous calls for a referendum on eurozone membership… But as they approach power, the historical Euroscepticism of the M5S and the League is resurfacing. An incendiary early version of their accord called for the renegotiation of EU treaties, the creation of a euro opt-out mechanism, a reduction in Italy's contribution to the EU budget and the cancellation of €250bn (£219bn) of Italian government debt.

It's important to remember that until very recently Italy's short-term government paper traded with negative yields. That is, if you wanted to lend them money you had to pay them rather than the other way around. This was largely because everyone assumed that the European Central Bank would give Italy effectively unlimited amounts of credit to ensure that it stuck around and played nice.

Now, not so much. Italian bond yields are spiking and spreads relative to German and other supposedly risk-free bonds are rising. And the ECB feels no compulsion to bail out this particular set of Italian politicians.

Italy 10-year bond yield

What exactly does this mean for the euro? Well, that depends on whether the new government follows through on its voters' desire to start prepping for a departure from the eurozone and a return to the lira – a currency that can be devalued at Rome's pleasure.

Were this to happen, Italian paper worth hundreds of billions of euros would …well…it's not clear what it would do. If Italy converted its outstanding debt to lira that would be a breach of contract, triggering a legal orgy with wholly unpredictable consequences, one of which might be its banishment from the global money markets. If Italy tried to leave the EU, we can take the never-ending Brexit quagmire and raise it an order of magnitude, and even then we're probably underestimating the disruption.

Is Italy Just Another Emerging Market?
It might be helpful to stop thinking of Italy – and several other "peripheral" EU members — as advanced developed countries and instead put them in the "emerging market" category. In which case they have lots of company. From Doug Noland's most recent Credit Bubble Bulletin:

Where to begin? Contagion… The Argentine peso dropped another 5.0% this week, bringing y-t-d losses to 23.7%. The Turkish lira fell 3.9%, boosting 2018 losses to 15.4%. As notable, the Brazilian real dropped 3.7% (down 11.5% y-t-d), and the South African rand sank 4.0% (down 3.0% y-t-d). The Colombian peso fell 3.0%, the Chilean peso 2.7%, the Mexican peso 2.7%, the Hungarian forint 2.3%, the Polish zloty 2.1% and the Czech koruna 2.0%.

EM losses were not limited to the currencies. Yields continued surging throughout EM. Notable rises this week in local EM bonds include 54 bps in Brazil, 27 bps in South Africa, 34 bps in Hungary, 36 bps in Lebanon, 25 bps in Indonesia, 28 bps in Peru, 14 bps in Turkey, 20 bps in Mexico and 11 bps in Poland.

Dollar-denominated EM debt was anything but immune. Turkey's 10-year dollar bond yields spiked 41 bps to 7.16%, the high going back to May 2009. Brazil's dollar bond yields surged 29 bps to 5.58%, the highest level since December 2016. Mexico's dollar yields jumped 18 bps to 4.64%, the high going all the way back to February 2011. Dollar yields rose 19 bps in Chile, 28 bps in Colombia, 19 bps in Indonesia, 14 bps in Russia, 14 bps in Ukraine and 167 bps in Venezuela (to 32.80%). Losses are mounting quickly for those speculating in EM debt.

Bonds throughout the euro zone periphery were under pressure. Greek 10-year yields surged 50 bps to a 2018 high 4.50%. Portuguese yields jumped 19 bps to 1.87%, and Spanish yields gained 17 bps to 1.44%. Elsewhere, Australian 10-year yields rose 12 bps to 2.90%, and New Zealand yields rose 14 bps to 2.86%.

There's a recurring "death spiral" element to emerging market debt, in which these countries temporarily stabilize their finances, get cocky, start borrowing in major currencies like the dollar on the assumption that their local currencies will continue to strengthen, thus allowing them to pay off their external currency loans with ease…and then fall prey to traditional overspending, corruption and inflation temptations, causing their currencies to fall and their debts to become unmanageable.

Here we go again, with the added twist of populist political parties rising around the world, promising to extricate their countries from the clutches of elite parasites.

If this has a "2008" feel to it, that's because crises frequently begin at the periphery and move towards the core. Initially the core markets and asset classes watch with smug amusement as the hinterlands burn while terrified capital flows to the center, actually boosting the value of core assets.

But in the end everybody (except for short sellers and gold bugs) pays a price for each generation's late-cycle hubris.

Convoy: "This Chart Has Been The Driver Of Asset Prices Over The Last Decade"

Tightening money supply

This year has been a process of normalization in financial conditions. Below I show the estimated money supply in the US, which rose fairly steadily before we saw a spike in 2008. That spike lasted until the end of 2014, after which the Fed began to withdraw money from the system. US money supply shrank for the first time in almost a century.

This chart has been the fundamental driver of asset prices over the last decade and will likely continue to drive the markets until the Fed normalizes their monetary policy. On average, more money chasing the same assets means higher prices while less money means lower prices. Below I show the relationship of growth in the US money supply to the long-term return of assets.

The falling money supply since 2014 is driven by a combination of rising rates and direct unwinding of quantitative easing. Below I show the duration adjusted Fed balance sheet. I believe the trend of shrinking money supply in the system will continue for some time to come. This adjustment is a painful but necessary process for healthier markets and economies.

Below I provide an update on a commentary I wrote on the subject of money supply and credit from a few years ago.

* * *

The price of anything is measured in the form of dollars per unit whether it is $/share, $/bond, $/house, $/barrel, etc
(or whatever your base currency is). The price of everything comes down to those two things, supply of assets and
the quantity of money chasing those assets. More money chasing fewer assets means higher prices, and vice versa.

Asset price = quantity of money/supply of assets

While there are some exceptions such as a disruption in oil production, the growth in supply of assets tends to be relatively stable in the short run. So it is changes in the quantity of money that drives short term asset swings. There are two main ways in which the quantity of money chasing an asset can change. To illustrate, I show below a simplified system with $100 in money and 2 assets, a bond and a stock. To start with, let's say the money is evenly divided between stocks and bonds and the price of each is $50.

First, money can flow from one asset to another because investor preferences change. For example, if growth numbers are bad, investors tend to incrementally move money out of stocks into safety assets like bonds. As money  flows out of an asset, there are fewer dollars chasing the same supply of assets and prices fall. In contrast, as money flows into an asset, more dollars chase the same set of assets and prices rise. This effect is fairly intuitive and is what most people think of when asset prices change. I illustrate this effect below through our simple system.

Second, net money can be added or taken out of the system. This concept is a bit more nebulous, but its effect has  dominated the markets in recent years. For example, during the multiple rounds of quantitative easing (QE), the Fed was essentially adding money supply through printing of cash as well as lowering of interest rates to promote additional credit creation. More money supply in the system tends to be bullish on average for all assets because regardless of investor preferences, there are simply more dollars chasing the same set of assets, increasing average asset prices. Alternatively, as the Fed ended QE and began to hike rates, money was taken out of the system and fewer dollars existed and average asset prices fell.

In our simplified example, QE would be akin to there being suddenly $200 in the system instead of $100. Given the same allocation between stocks and bonds, their average prices would double to $100.

Our world is of course far more complex than the illustration above, but asset prices fundamentally behave in the same way. Below I show again the more complex breakdown of global assets. Asset prices can change because of 1) flows of money from one asset to another and 2) aggregate change in the total money supply.

In most typical environments, it is the flow of money between assets that dominate price changes. I believe this is why most investors tend to focus on this mechanism of price changes. However, central banks have played an increasingly important role in markets by shifting the aggregate money supply. Now, both factors drive asset prices, often in opposite directions. This is part of the reason why asset movements have been more confusing than usual.

In the simplified example above, if I held either a stock or a bond, I'd be affected by both the flow of money between bonds and stocks and changes in aggregate money supply in the system. However, if I held a portfolio of both assets, I would not care as much about the flow of money between bonds and stocks and I'd only be affected by changes in aggregate money supply. This is largely true of our diversified portfolio. We are relatively agnostic to the flow of money between assets. Instead, our performance is largely driven by changes in the total money supply of our system.

So how would you measure money supply? When you go out and buy a house or a car, your total purchasing power is
the sum of the cash you have and the credit you can call upon. Therefore,

Money supply = cash + credit

M1 is a measure of all physical coins and currencies as well as demand deposits and checking accounts. I use M1 as a
rough proxy for cash in the system. Credit is a bit trickier but I use real interest rates as a rough proxy – as real
interest rates go down, credit creation becomes easier and vice versa
. Below I aggregate these two into a rough proxy of change in money supply. There are of course more sophisticated methods but this proxy will give a quick and rough overview.

In 2004 and 2005, money supply in the system went down as Greenspan began to tighten. In 2008, money supply went down dramatically as banks failed and credit creation ceased up.

The 3 rounds of QE in the following years saw accompanying spikes in money supply growth. In 2013, money supply dropped dramatically as Bernanke hinted at ending QE and tightening. Money supply fell in 2015 as the Fed finally tightened. Money supply continued to fall as QE tapering began in 2017.

Given asset prices are driven by 1) flows between assets and 2) changes in aggregate money supply, how much does 2) drive asset pricing? Below I show the year over year change in asset prices compared to the change in money supply. The price of almost everything you can buy is somewhat correlated to the change in money supply and vice versa. Of course, sometimes 1) and 2) can drive assets in opposite directions. For example, despite a dramatic decrease in aggregate money supply in 2008, bonds rallied because so much money flew out of stocks into bonds.

The relationship between a diversified basket of assets and money supply becomes clearer because you average out the confounding effects of money flows between assets. Below I show the year over year change in price of a broad basket of assets (stocks, bonds, commodities, credit, and real estate) compared to the change in money supply.

As you can see, aggregate money supply is the dominant driver of average asset prices. Central banks have a far reaching impact because they control the supply of money in which everything is measured against. The force that drove virtually every asset to outperform over the last decade is now reversing. Average asset returns have been muted over the last few years and will likely persist in the near term.