China Launches New Capital Controls: Puts $15,000 Annual Cap On Overseas ATM Withdrawals

Back in September 2015 - long before bitcoin became the "world's biggest bubble in history", and when it was still trading at just $200 - we explained not only that the primary purpose behind the use of the cryptocurrency was evading capital controls, but predicted that it would rise much, much higher as more Chinese, and not only, money launderers caught on to the real function of bitcoin and other cryptos, to wit:

... we would not be surprised to see another push higher in the value of bitcoin: it was earlier this summer when the digital currency, which can bypass capital controls and national borders with the click of a button, surged on Grexit concerns and fears a Drachma return would crush the savings of an entire nation. Since then, BTC has dropped (in no small part as a result of the previously documented "forking" with Bitcoin XT), however if a few hundred million Chinese decide that the time has come to use bitcoin as the capital controls bypassing currency of choice, and decide to invest even a tiny fraction of the $22 trillion in Chinese deposits in bitcoin (whose total market cap at last check was just over $3 billion), sit back and watch as we witness the second coming of the bitcoin bubble, one which could make the previous all time highs in the digital currency, seems like a low print.

A little over two years later, and several thousand percent higher, we were right on both counts: not only did bitcoin proceed to soar to meteoric highs, but the Chinese capital outflows were just getting started and only a series of draconian interventions by China in 2016 managed to briefly halt the hot money exodus which amount to roughly $1 trillion in Chinese reserve outflows.

We said "briefly" because despite its closed "capital account", no government can ever hope to halt the flight of nearly $40 trillion in deposits (and countless trillions invested across China's securities).

And while China has been doing everything in its power to halt the capital flight, or at least give the impression there no longer is one, going so far as the central bank directly manipulating the currency by directly crushing the shorts in terminal short squeezes and margin calls to telegraph to the world that there is no legitimate capital flight, actions out of China suggest otherwise, and it now appears that - in the latest good news for bitcoin bulls - China is once again cracking down on capital controls as hot money outflows have not only not stopped, but may again be accelerating.

According to the SCMP, to gree the New Year, Beijing will implement new limits on the amount of money people can withdraw from their Chinese bank accounts while overseas, "in the latest move by Beijing to tighten its capital account controls and curb money outflows."

Under the new rules individuals will be allowed to withdraw a maximum of 100,000 yuan (US$15,000) a year, regardless of how many separate bank accounts or ATM cards they have, China's FX regulator, the State Administration of Foreign Exchange said in a statement released on Saturday.

Under current rules, there is an annual ATM withdrawal cap of 100,000 yuan per bank card, but there are no rules to stop people having multiple cards attached to a single account or multiple accounts with different banks. So apparently, the PBOC finally figured out the oldest trick in the book that Chinese residents were using to game the regime.

Meanwhile, the existing cap on daily withdrawals remains unchanged at 10,000 yuan per card. People will still be allowed to hold multiple ATM cards but the annual limit will apply to the combined value of all withdrawals.

The annual cap of 100,000 yuan per person and daily limit of 10,000 yuan applies to all ATM cards issued by mainland Chinese banks, covering both yuan and foreign exchange accounts.

What is the punishment for violating the latest capital control? The foreign exchange regulator said that if any Chinese is found using mainland bank cards to withdraw more than 100,000 yuan from overseas ATMs within a calendar year, they will be barred from taking out cash abroad using any mainland bank card for the rest of the year as well as the following year.

The restrictions were a "necessary measure" to curb money laundering, terrorism financing and tax evasion, the regulator said.

"International experiences have shown that large cash transactions are often associated with criminal activities such as fraud, gambling, money laundering and terrorism financing," the statement said.

What SAFE really meant is that despite Beijing's best attempts, capital flight was continuing.

The regulator also said that "some" Chinese had been found to have used a large number of ATM cards to withdraw sums of cash overseas that far exceeded what was needed for "normal consumption", according to the regulator.

It also warned Chinese not to try evading the rules. "People should not borrow other people's bank cards or lend them to others to help get around the regulation," the statement said.

And just like every other time China cracks down on capital flight, it will merely force even more to use cryptocurrencies to circumvent attempts to halt moneyflows, which needless to say, is very bullish for the entire crypto space.

Putting China's closed capital account in context, China's capital controls are among the most restrictive of the world's major economies, and Beijing has tightened rules on outbound remittances and payments in the past two years as a way to defend the country's foreign exchange reserves and yuan exchange rate, something we have covered extensively in the past 3 years.

At the top-level, mainland Chinese can change up to US$50,000 worth of yuan into foreign currencies per year, but the regulator has set extra requirements within that quota including filling in forms and declarations for any purchases. Naturally, the $50K quota is only for mere mortals: Chinese political oligarchs, princelings and corporate barons are largely exempt from the rules, simply because they know the loopholes, chief among which remains use of bitcoin and other cryptos.

Separately, the regulator said the cap on foreign currencies would remain unchanged and the new rule should not affect ordinary Chinese wanting to travel and spend money abroad.

Some 81% of the overseas cash withdrawals made using mainland Chinese ATM cards last year totalled around 30,000 yuan per card, according to the regulator. It said the annual cap of 100,000 yuan should "both meet demand for normal cash withdrawals abroad and contain the large sums made by a few lawbreakers".

But before Vancouver and Toronto real estate agents panic and liquidate all inventory on fears the Chinese "hot money" flood will shortly cease, keep an eye on the price of bitcoin: with Beijing once again cracking down on conventional money transfer means, i.e., debit and credit cards, the only avenue left will be cryptocurrencies.

Come to think of it, it's about time the Chinese again regain their place as the world's largest marginal price setters of bitcoin, once again dethroning Japan and South Korea for the crypto-throne.

The Inescapable Reason Why the Financial System Will Fail

Modern finance has many complex moving parts, and this complexity masks its inner simplicity.

Let's break down the core dynamics of the current financial system.

The Core Dynamic of the "Recovery" and Asset Bubbles: Credit

Credit is the foundation of the current financial system, for credit enables consumers to bring consumption forward, that is, buy more stuff today than they could buy with the cash they have on hand, in exchange for promising to pay principal and interest with their future income.

Credit also enables speculators to buy more assets than they otherwise could were they limited to cash on hand.

Buying goods, services and assets with credit appears to be a good thing: consumers get to enjoy more stuff without having to scrimp and save up income, and investors/speculators can reap more income from owning more assets.

But all goods/services and assets are not equal, and all credit is not equal.

There is an opportunity cost to any loan (i.e. credit), as the income that will be devoted to paying principal and interest in the future could have been devoted to some other use or investment.

So borrowing money to purchase a product or an asset now means foregoing some future purchase.

While all products have some sort of payoff, the payoffs are not equal. If I buy five bottles of $100/bottle champagne and throw a party, the payoff is in the heady moments of celebration. If I buy a table saw for $500, that tool has the potential to help me make additional income for years or even decades to come.

If I'm making money with the table saw, I can pay the debt service out of my new earnings.

All assets are not equal, either. Some assets are riskier than others, with a less certain income stream or payoff. Borrowing to buy assets with predictable returns is one thing, buying assets with highly speculative returns is another; regardless of the eventual result of the investment, the borrower still has to pay interest on the debt, even if the speculative investment goes bust.

The basic idea here is the loan is based on collateral, that there is something of value that is anchoring the loan above and beyond the borrower's ability to pay principal and interest.

The classic example is a house: the lender issues a mortgage based on the market value of the house, i.e. what it can be sold for should the buyer default on the mortgage and the lender has to sell the collateral (the house) underpinning the loan.

The value of the collateral is obviously contingent on the market; the value of the house goes up and down depending on supply and demand, the availability and cost of credit, and so on.

If a lender loans me $500 to buy a new table saw, and I default on the loan, the table saw is the collateral. Unfortunately for the lender, the market value of the used tool is perhaps $250 at best. So the lender loses $250 even after repossessing and selling the collateral.

If the lender loaned me $500 to buy champagne and I default, there is no collateral at all; the loan was based solely on my ability and willingness to pay principal and interest into the future.

When I say that all credit is not equal, I'm referring to the creditworthiness of the borrower. 

Lenders make money by issuing credit to borrowers. The incentives are clear: the more credit they issue, the higher their income.

Given this incentive, it's easy to convince oneself that a marginal borrower is creditworthy, and that a speculative investment is a safe bet.

This is especially true if the government guarantees the loan, for example, a home mortgage. With the government guarantee, there's no reason not to take a chance on a marginal (risky) borrower buying a marginal (risky) house.

If we take some home mortgages and bundle them into a mortgage-backed security, we can sell the future income stream (i.e. the payments made by the borrowers in the future) as securities that can be sold worldwide to investors. I can make risky loans, skim the fees and pass the risk onto global investors.

All this debt is now considered an asset to investors.

There's one last feature of credit: liquidity. Liquidity refers to the pool of credit available to refinance or roll over existing debt. If I'm having trouble paying my credit card, for example, and there's plenty of liquidity in the credit system, I can obtain a larger line of credit and borrow enough to pay my monthly principal and interest on the existing debt.

If I can refinance my existing debt at a lower interest rate, so much the better.

Credit can be issued by private-sector lenders to private-sector borrowers, or by public-sector central banks to private-sector lenders. Central banks can buy public and private debt (government and corporate bonds, mortgages, etc.), effectively transferring debt from the private sector to the public sector.

These are the basic moving pieces of the credit expansion that has fueled both the "recovery" and the reflation of asset valuations, which have now reached historic extremes.

The Current (Flawed) Logic We're Pursuing

In response to the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2008, central banks lowered interest rates to near-zero to boost private-sector lending, and increased liquidity to enable private-sector lenders and borrowers to refinance existing debt and generate new credit.

They also bought assets: government bonds, corporate bonds and in some cases, stocks via ETFs (exchange traded funds).

The goal here was to prop up the collateral underpinning all the debt. If liquidity dried up, consumers and enterprises would default, handing lenders catastrophic losses, as the crisis had crushed the market value of the collateral that lenders would have to sell to recoup their losses.

And so central banks pursued heretofore unprecedented policies aimed at goosing private-sector lending and borrowing while boosting the markets for stocks, bonds and real estate—the collateral that supported all the debt that was at risk of default.

All this low-cost and easily available credit, coupled with the central banks' public messages that they would "do whatever it takes" to restore credit mechanisms and reflate the private-sector markets for stocks, bonds and real estate, worked: credit expanded and markets recovered, and then soared to new highs.

While these policies accomplished the intended goals, boosting both new credit and asset valuations, they also generated less salutary consequences.

By lowering interest rates and bond yields to near-zero, central banks deprived institutional owners who rely on stable, high-yielding safe investment income—insurers, pension funds, individual retirement accounts, and so on—of exactly what they need: safe, stable, high-yield returns.

In this "do whatever it takes" environment, the only way to earn a high return is to buy risk assets—assets such as stocks and junk bonds that are intrinsically riskier than Treasury bonds and other low-risk investments.

The Stark Conundrum We Face

Central banks are now trapped. If they raise rates to provide low-risk, high-yield returns to institutional owners, they will stifle the "recovery" and the asset bubbles that are dependent on unlimited liquidity and super-low interest rates.

But if they keep yields low, the only way institutional investors can earn the gains they need to survive is to pile into risk assets and hope the current bubbles will loft higher.

This traps the central banks in a strategy of pushing risk assets—already at nose-bleed valuations—ever higher, as any decline would crush the value of the collateral underpinning the titanic mountain of debt the system has created in the past eight years and hand institutional owners losses rather than gains.

This conundrum has pushed the central banks into yet another policy extreme: to mask the rising systemic risk created by asset bubbles, central banks have taken to suppressing measures of volatility—measures than in previous eras would reflect the rising risks of extreme asset bubbles deflating.