Five Charts That Show We Are on the Brink of an Unthinkable Financial Crisis

Bonfires are fun to watch, but they eventually burn out.

Human folly apparently doesn't, so we just keep adding to the absurdities. The volume of daily economic lunacy that lights up my various devices is truly stunning, and it seems to be increasing. Let's take a look at a series of charts I received from my "kitchen cabinet" of friends.

The Economy Is More Deleveraged Than Ever

First up is Grant Williams who sent me a monumental slide deck. Here is just one example of craziness.

Source: Grant Williams

This chart is straightforward: It's outstanding credit as a percentage of GDP. Broadly speaking, this is a measure of how leveraged the US economy is.

It was in a sedate 130%–170% range as the economy industrialized in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. It popped higher in the 1920s and 1930s before settling down again. Then came the 1980s. Credit jumped above 200% of GDP and has never looked back.

It climbed steadily until 2009 and now hovers over 350%.

Absurd doesn't do this situation justice. We are mind-bogglingly leveraged. And consider what the chart doesn't show. Many individuals and businesses carry no debt at all, or certainly less than 350% leverage. That means many others must be leveraged far higher.

While lending has been a very lucrative business in recent decades, it's hard to believe it can last. At some point we must experience a great deleveraging. When that happens, it won't be fun.

Cash Allocation Is Lowest Since 2007

"Contrarian" investors believe success lies in going against the crowd, because the crowd is usually wrong. My own experience suggests one small adjustment: Pay attention not to what the crowd says but to what it does. Words are cheap.

This next chart is a prime example.

We see here the amount of cash held by Merrill Lynch clients from 2005 to the present, as a percentage of their assets. The average is about 13%.

Source: Fasanara Capital

The pattern is uncanny. In 2007, as stock indexes reached their peak, cash holdings were well below average. They rose quickly as the crisis unfolded, peaking almost exactly with the market low in early 2009.

In other words, at the very time when it would have been best to reduce cash and buy equities, Merrill Lynch clients did the opposite. And when they should have been raising cash, they kept their holdings low. I don't think this pattern is unique to Merrill Lynch's clients; Market timing is hard for everyone.

The disturbing part is where the chart ends. Merrill Lynch client cash allocations are now even lower than they were at that 2007 trough. Interest rates are much lower, too, so maybe that's not surprising.

Central banks spent the last decade all but forcing investors to buy risk assets and shun cash. This data suggests it worked. But whatever the reason, investor cash levels suggest that caution is quite unpopular right now.

So if you consider yourself a contrarian, maybe it's time to raise some cash.

Michael Lewitt's Reality Check

Michael Lewitt's latest letter came in this morning. He began with the marvelous Ralph Waldo Emerson quote that I used at the beginning of this letter, and then he helpfully contributed this list of absurdities:

Anyone questioning whether financial markets are in a bubble should consider what we witnessed in 2017:

• A painting (which may be fake) sold for $450 million.

• Bitcoin (which may be worthless) soared nearly 700% from $952 to ~$8000.

• The Bank of Japan and the European Central Bank bought $2 trillion of assets.

• Global debt rose above $225 trillion to more than 324% of global GDP.

• US corporations sold a record $1.75 trillion in bonds.

• European high-yield bonds traded at a yield under 2%.

• Argentina, a serial defaulter, sold 100-year bonds in an oversubscribed offer.

• Illinois, hopelessly insolvent, sold 3.75% bonds to bondholders fighting for allocations.

• Global stock market capitalization skyrocketed by $15 trillion to over $85 trillion and a record 113% of global GDP.

• The market cap of the FANGs increased by more than $1 trillion.

• S&P 500 volatility dropped to 50-year lows and Treasury volatility to 30-year lows.

• Money-losing Tesla Inc. sold 5% bonds with no covenants as it burned $4+ billion in cash and produced very few cars.

This is a joyless bubble, however. It is accompanied by political divisiveness and social turmoil as the mainstream media hectors the populace with fake news. Immoral behavior that was tolerated for years is finally called to account while a few brave journalists fight against establishment forces to reveal deep corruption at the core of our government (yes, I am speaking of Uranium One and the Obama Justice Department). In 2018, a lot of chickens are going to come home to roost in Washington, D.C., on Wall Street, and in the media centers of New York City and Los Angeles. Icons will be blasted into dust as the tides of cheap money, cronyism, complicity, and stupidity recede. Beware entities with too much debt, too much secrecy, too much hype. Beware false idols. Every bubble destroys its idols, and so shall this one.

The Fed's Balance-Sheet Unwind Spells Trouble

The next absurdity is absurd because it is so obvious, yet many don't want to see it. Too bad, because I'm going to make you look.

This comes from Michael Lebowitz of 720 Global. It's the S&P 500 Index overlaid with the Federal Reserve's balance sheet and the forecast of where the Federal Reserve intends to take its balance sheet.

Source: 720 Global

The Fed and other central banks have practically forced investors into risk assets since 2008. You can see the relationship very clearly in this chart. The green segments of the S&P 500's rise occurred during quantitative easing programs.

Correlation isn't causation, but I think we can safely draw some connections here.

Ample low-cost liquidity drives asset prices higher. That's not controversial. It makes perfect sense that the withdrawal of ample low-cost liquidity would also impact asset prices in the opposite direction.

The Fed has even given us a schedule by which it will unwind its balance sheet. Michael's chart gives us a sense of how far the S&P 500 could drop if the Fed unwinds as planned and if the relationship between liquidity and stock prices persists. Either or both of those could change; but if they don't, the S&P 500 could fall 50% in the next few years.

Volatility-Linked Hedges Won't Deliver in a Flash Crash

Many investors see all these warning signs but think they can keep riding the market higher and hedge against losses at the same time. It doesn't really work that way.

Wall Street firms have rolled out all kinds of volatility-linked products that purport to protect you from sudden downside events. Most of these products are linked to the Volatility Index, or VIX.

Volatility has been persistently low as the market has risen in recent years. That has made it cheap to buy protection against a volatility spike. However, it's not clear if the sellers of this protection will be able to deliver as promised.

My friend Doug Kass has been concerned about this for some time. He believes the risks of a "flash crash" are rising, and those who think they are hedged may learn that they are not.

He shared this Morgan Stanley graphic of how many VIX futures contracts would have to be bought to cover a one-day market drop.

Between hedgers, dealers, and ETP sponsors, a one-day 5% downward spike in the S&P 500 would force the purchase of over 400,000 VIX futures contracts. This was in October, and the figure has probably risen more since then. Doug isn't sure a market under that kind of stress can deliver that much liquidity.

I suspect the various VIX-linked products will disappoint buyers when the unwind occurs.

High-Yield Debt Might Be a Trigger for the Next Crisis

Doug also shared what will be the final graph for this week and observed, "This is the dreaded alligator formation, and the jaws always close."

It's just a matter of time. It could take another year and get even sillier, but when that gator snaps its jaws shut, a lot of people will get bitten.

I personally think the bubble in high-yield debt, accompanied by so much convenant-lite offerings, will be the source of the next true liquidity crisis.

Source: ZeroHedge

The amount of money available to market makers to use to maintain some type of order in a falling high-yield market is absurdly low. Investors in high-yield mutual funds and ETFs think they have liquidity, but the managers of those funds will be forced to sell into a market where there is no price and there are no bids.

Oh, the bids will show up at 50% discounts. Distressed-debt funds and vulture capital will see opportunities, and they will be there. Talk about blood in the streets

The Moment The Market Broke: "The Behavior Of Volatility Changed Entirely In 2014"

Earlier today we showed a remarkable chart - and assertion - from Bank of America: "In every major market shock since the 2013 Taper Tantrum, central banks have stepped in (even if verbally) to protect markets. Following the Brexit vote, markets no longer needed to hear from CBs as they rebounded so quickly that CBs didn't need to respond." As a result, buy-the-dip has a become a self-fulfilling put.

The immediate result of this dynamic has been two-fold: i) investors now buy every dip, or as Bank of America notes, "Investors no longer fear shocks, but love them, as it is an opportunity to predictably generate alpha.", and ii) selling of vol has become a self-reinforcing dynamic, in which lower VIX begets more vol-selling by "yield-starved investors", leading to even lower VIX as the shock that can reset the feedback loop is no longer possible, and thus the strike price on the Fed's put can not be put to a market test.

These observations prompt BofA's derivatives expert Benjamin Bowler to ask the rhetorical question: "volatility: new normal or bubble?" and answer: "It's a bubble." Indeed it is, but absent the abovementioned market-clearing shock, it is difficult, if not impossible to anticipate what can burst this bubble.

In the meantime, the market has spawned some spectacular distortions, including the following observation: "As one measure of volatility, the Dow Jones Industrial Average traded in its tightest trading range since 1900 this year." Here is Bowler:

While asset valuations are not at life-extremes, volatility is. In 2017 the Dow traded in a 110yr record tight trading range, the VIX hit all-time lows, and US equities reversed from sell-offs at near their fastest pace in 90 yrs. Investors no longer fear risk but love it, as it's another opportunity to harvest "dip-alpha". Volatility across asset classes has decoupled from uncertainty. Even if seemingly irrational, apathy to all risk has been the right trade and an impossible trend for most to fight – the definition of a bubble.

A bubble, he adds, "induced by years of heavy handed central bank influence, where investors have learned that it has not paid to panic." Bowler asks readers to consider the following:

As one measure of volatility, the Dow Jones Industrial Average traded in its tightest trading range since 1900 this year

Near 90yr records are occurring in the speed that US equities are recovering from dips

The VIX is near 26yr lows despite political & policy uncertainty recently near 26yr highs

Gold call options price less than 1 in 100 chance of rising North Korean tensions in the face of rising North Korean tensions

The above leads Bowler to concludes that "while there is active debate about whether risk-assets like equities and credit are overvalued, it is much harder to argue that currently depressed volatility levels are unsustainable when near 100yr records in terms of low vol and the lack of persistence of any shock are being recorded."

So when did the market "break", and when did the behavior of volatility change so dramatically?

This overarching question has been plaguing Wall Street strategists for much of 2017. In July, we presented one answer from Deutsche Bank's Aleksandar Kocic who pointed out the divergence between the economic policy uncertainty index and the VIX, which took place roughly in 2012, prompting the derivatives expert to conclude that something "snapped" roughly around that time, or as Kocic said, sometime in 2012 it was as if the markets "lost their capacity to deal with uncertainty."

Bank of America takes a somewhat different approach, and instead of looking at the divergence between volatility and news - or shock - flow, highlights the moment BTFD became religion.

According to Bowler, "the nature of volatility since 2014 has entirely changed, with volatility shocks retracing at record speed. Investors no longer fear shocks, but love them, as it is an opportunity to predictably generate alpha." This is demonstrated in the following stunning chart which not only shows that every VIX dip is now just an opportunity to buy it, but that the market's "fragility" is at an all time high based on the surging frequency of vol spike events, which in turn, and paradoxically, reassure investors that a central bank backstop can not be too far away.

BofA is hardly the first to point out this phenomenon: almost exactly one year ago, it was JPM's "quant wizard" who highlighted precisely the same, if not through the perspective of VIX but the overall market response to recover from "shock" events:

It appears that the time horizon of macro traders has shortened, likely as a result of increased participation of machines and algorithms that are quicker to adjust to significant events and can eliminate trading activity of slower investors. Consider for example the US elections - traders in Japan registered a 5.4% Nikkei drop on the 9th, followed by a 6.7% rally on the 10th, while S&P 500 investors did not register a significant close-to-close move over the election (due to market hours difference). These two days were enough to shift the volatility regime (usually calculated from closing returns) for the whole of 2016 for the Japanese equity market, and leave it unchanged for S&P 500 (e.g. think of rebalancing needs of a hypothetical risk parity fund, or a short volatility strategy based on Nikkei vs. one based on S&P 500). We also noticed that for a number of significant catalysts this year (Brexit, US Election, Italy Referendum) broad expectations were wrong both on the outcome and the directionally forecasted impact. It is possible that the lack of market reaction (or a reaction that went against the accepted narrative) was in part driven by investors' reluctance to transact ("two negatives equal a positive").

Ah yes, the infamous "investor reluctance to transact", which has only gotten worse as we hinted in our "trader paralysis" post, and which Goldman demonstrated vividly just last month when the bank showed that hedge fund turnover has now dropped to an all time low as virtually nobody trades anymore.

Whatever the reason behind the broken market, however, whether it is central banks, machines, algos, risk parity funds, vol-targeting strategies,  self-reinforcing "Pavlovian" dynamics, or simply traders no longer trading, the question is what comes next? While we will have a more detailed breakdown in a subsequent post, here are Bowler's three questions, and several answers of what to expect in 2018:

As we enter 2018, three questions are top of mind when it comes to volatility:

Is 2018 the year when vol begins to normalize, or is this the "new normal"?

As low vol threatens to sow the seeds of the next crisis, how will this end?

Where does vol go in the longer-run; can we ever see the old-normal return?

Vol likely to rise off extreme lows; '87 crash unlikely, but so is VIX averaging 20 While we will look at each question in more detail in turn, the short answers are:

Higher not lower vol: We think 2018 is most likely to see higher (not lower vol) as the Fed builds more "ammunition" in terms of rate-hikes leaving them less sensitive to financial market conditions (i.e. pushing the Fed put strike lower), and as CB balance sheets peak in 2018.

Vol bubble more likely to deflate than explode: While the risk of "fragility" shocks due to positioning and feeble liquidity is high, we think the level of leverage today, which is lower compared to the last time vol was this depressed (2007), does not present the same risks as then.

Vol to remain low vs. long-run average: However, to the extent we remain in a low inflation/low rates environment, we may also remain in a lower than normal vol environment. So while VIX near 9 is an unsustainable bubble, VIX at 20 (the long-run average) may also be unsustainable in a slower growth world.

And BofA's conclusion:

What to watch for? In a world slaved to rates, inflation remains key

From a macro perspective, we continue to believe unexpected inflation is the kryptonite for volatility. Inflation presents a "triple whammy", first driving economic vol higher, destabilizing bond markets (and putting bond/equity correlation at risk), but importantly handcuffing central banks from being as sensitive to financial markets. In other words it both drives fundamental risk higher and significantly impairs the protection markets have become dependent on. Rising rates vol is key to watch.

How bad can it get? From here Aug-15 shock likely but '87 crash is improbable

Interestingly, while the world is hyper-focused on how big the "short-vol" trade is, history shows that any liquidity shock large enough to create an equity bear market (20% fall in equities, similar to 1987 or LTCM crisis) provides a forewarning in terms of rising volatility first (look for S&P vol to double from 10 to 20). Fragility shocks (similar to Aug-15) that happen without warning remain the bigger risk today in our view.

So, how do you trade this? Long "vol beta", cheap options for direction

The most important question is, how do you trade this environment where investors have given up on risk (or have learned to love it as buying dips has been "free money"). Evidence of a "bubble in apathy" is strong, and we believe it is unsustainable. However, the problem with any bubble is not recognizing you are in it but rather timing its end. Hence the key is finding trades that will profit from a change in environment but carry well and hence don't require perfect timing. The beauty of today's low vol is that it can be cheap to own optionality (for example for upside stock replacement) which affords the benefit of not having to time when markets may peak.

Does this mean short vol is a bad idea? No, but it needs to be smartly managed

Importantly, believing that today's low vol is unsustainable does not mean all short vol positions are bad. Don't forget, owning any risk asset (equity, credit etc.) is a short-vol trade. The key is finding the best short vol opportunity (highest risk-adjusted returns), while managing downside risks appropriately. Harvesting rich vol risk-premia is key to funding cheaper long vol positions elsewhere.