Deutsche Bank Explains The Five Biggest "Market Conundrums"

While pundits contemplate whether the bitcoin bubble is bigger, smaller or the same size as the dot com bubble, few are willing to admit that day to day events in the equity market are just as ridiculous, bubbly and bizarre as what takes place in the crypto realm. To address this lack of coverage, yesterday Bloomberg was nice enough to publish an article titled "What to Worry About in This Surreal Bull Market" which however only barely touched the surface of just how truly insane capital markets have become, a market which as Citi said last week, even central bankers are worried they have lost control over.

So overnight, as human traders no longer comprehend what is going on in a market dominated by machines and controlled by central bankers, and only know to BTFD, Deutsche Bank's Masao Muraki took it upon himself to explain five of the most prevalent, and confusing, market conundrums.

We present his analysis below in its entirety for the sake of (carbon-based) traders' sanity.

Market upsets: Rationally explaining five conundrums

Change in market tone since September: From 2016 through August 2017, global interest and forex rates and stock prices were strongly influenced by 10y UST yield movements. This led investors globally to focus on US rates. However, since September this simple landscape has changed, creating headaches for bond, forex, and stock market investors. In this report, we highlight five conundrums (questions) and our proposed explanations for them. Rationally explaining recent market moves will be essential to forecasting next year's market.

Our global financial research team's view is that "the current combination of strong economic conditions, low interest rates, low inflation, and narrow credit spreads are supporting a rise in value of risk assets.", "If the risks (such as difficulties with negotiating a higher US debt ceiling as 8 December approaches) do not materialize, and conditions remain stable (though the path would gradually narrow), then risk asset prices will likely keep rising."

The key focus for 2018 will be the sustainability of low interest-rate/spread/volatility conditions and the Goldilocks market

Five market conundrums 

Question 1: Japanese stocks' divergence from our approximation model (US stocks/forex) 

Question 2: Ongoing stock rally (rise in P/E due to decline in risk premium) 

Question 3: Ongoing yield-curve flattening 

Question 4: Ongoing decline in interest-rate and stock-price volatility 

Question 5: Ongoing tightening in credit spreads 

Question 1: Japanese stocks' divergence from our approximation model (US stocks/forex)

90% or more of Japanese stock movements through August were explainable via a multiple regression model using US stock prices and forex. Forex movements could mostly be explained by US interest-rate movements.

Since Japan's 22 October Lower House elections, Japanese stocks including financials have diverged upward from our approximation model. Japanese stocks fell sharply following the 9 November volatility shock, and by 15 November had returned to near our approximation model (Figures 3-4, 20). At that point, we noted that the focus was on whether stocks would revert to the trend implied by our model or diverge again. Recently volatility decreased, and stocks have begun to diverge upward from our model again.

See Figures 4-6. Since September, stock-market volatility has been a major factor behind TOPIX's divergence from our model. This appears to be because some of the funds that flowed into the market during this year's Japan stock rally (from macro hedge funds, CTA etc.) have adjusted risk positions (stock positions) based on implied volatility in option-marke . In our view, the determinants of present Japanese stock-price levels appear to be (1) US stocks (particularly the Dow Average), (2) USD/JPY, and (3) implied volatility of stock prices in US and Japan. We think the third factor in particular should be uppermost in investors' minds, though its sustainability is questionable.

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Question 2: Ongoing stock rally (rise in P/E due to decline in risk premium)

Japan and US stock prices continue to rise. This reflects the impact of (1) fundamentals, in the form of strong Jul-Sep results announcements, and (2) a rise in P/E amid the Goldilocks market conditions created by low interest rates and USD weakness.

Obviously, share prices are equivalent to EPS x P/E, and the inverse of P/E is earnings yield. As shown in Figures 7-10, the earnings yield in Japan, the US, and Europe can mostly be explained by the term premium observed in bond-market (the yield premium for long-term bonds due to price fluctuation and illiquidity risk) and the risk neutral rate (average forecast short-term interest rate over the next 10 years).

A one standard deviation decline in term premium causes stock prices to rise 2.5% in the US, 1% in Europe, and 5% in Japan. A one standard deviation increase in forecast short-term rate results in increases of 2%, 2.75%, and 7.8%. The recent decline in term premiums have led to a rise in P/E via a decline in risk-free rate and equity risk premium.

Question 3: Ongoing yield-curve flattening

Flattening European and US yield curves are a source of frustration for investors who had forecast steepening. Fed fund rate hikes amid structurally low interest rate conditions have (1) raised the average forecast short-term rate, but (2) have conversely lowered the term premium (Figure 11-12). Dominic Konstam from our Rates Strategy team estimates 2.25% as the fair end-2017 level for 10y yield.

Francis Yared from our Rates Strategy team sees US tax reforms as the main driver over the next 2-3 months. Our base scenario is for the passage of a mid-sized tax cut (increasing the fiscal deficit by $1.5trn) in early 2018. We expect long-term rates to rise due to the above factor and above-trend US economic growth. Matthew Luzetti from our US Economics research team estimates a neutral real short-term rate (neutral for economy) of 0.3% and a neutral real 10-year rate of around 1.5% (Figure 13). If we assume the Fed achieves its 2% inflation target, this would imply a neutral nominal 10-year rate of around 3.5%, suggesting ample room for long-term rates to rise.

Peter Hooper from our US Economics research team, does not expect the change in Fed Chair to have a significant impact on monetary policy. Chair-designate Powell is likely to be strongly opposed to the Taylor Rule or other limitations on Fed behavior. Powell lacks the specialist economic and monetary policy knowledge of previous Fed Chairs, but has front-line financial and capital market experience. He may also be more receptive to arguments about a structural decline in inflation than Chair Yellen. However, it is unclear whether he would continue to support an approach that combines a regulatory and supervisory response to monetary disequilibrium (excessive risk-taking) and monetary policy to optimize inflation and employment. Also, his biggest point of difference with Yellen is likely his stance on deregulation for largest banks.

Question 4: Ongoing decline in interest-rate and stock-price volatility

As shown in Figure 17, interest rate and stock-price volatility are both at all-time lows.

In Figures 15-16, US interest-rate volatility is approximated using (1) the percentage of MBS held by general investors (other than the Fed or banks), (2) neutral interest rate minus real Fed funds rate, (3) net inflows to bond funds minus net inflow to stock fund, and (4) repo positions on dealers versus debt securities outstanding. In our view, this model suggests that the fall in interest-rate volatility was led by (1) a decline in general investors' ratio of MBS holdings (they tend to buy volatility to hedge convexity risk), (2) a narrowing gap between the neutral interest rate and real Fed funds rate (which implies the required level of rate hikes; a contraction reduces future interest-rate policy uncertainty), and (3) fund inflows to bond funds (signifying expansion in bond index funds due to a graying population seeking stable income). Conversely, the decline in (4) due to tighter regulation should act to increase volatility.

In the stock market, we think a structural decline in volatility has resulted from (A) an increase in investors adopting a volatility targeting strategy (following volatility trends), (B) an increase in hedge funds and individual investors seeking option premiums and capital gains from selling volatility (shorting VIX or selling various option types) (Figure 19), (C) the shift of capital from active to passive funds (including AI funds), and (D) an increase in minimum variance investing as an alternative to bonds.

While we recognize the structural factors that are depressing volatility, we are also concerned about the risk of a sudden spike. We have noted a historical pattern of moderate volatility decline followed by sudden dramatic increase (normalization) in volatility (Figure 17). There is possibility of greater volatility amplitude than in the past because of the participation of less-experienced retail investors in addition to traditional volatility selling entities of hedge funds.

Question 5: Ongoing tightening in credit spreads

Since late October, widening corporate bond and CDS credit spreads (Figures 28-29) have been a subject of market debate. This trend has recently receded due to an excess liquidity and investors' search for yield.

The default rate (Figure 30) clearly shows that the corporate credit cycle reversed. The recovery in energy prices and stiffer competition for bank lending (relaxed lending conditions) are supporting a turnaround in bad corporate loans and credit costs. The SLOOS data released on 6 November showed that banks' lending stance has eased (Figures 33-35).

Nevertheless, corporate debt levels remain high. There are signs in areas such as subprime auto loans, credit-card loans, and CRE (commercial real estate collateral) loans that credit and economic growth may be nearing an end.

The $76 Trillion Bond Market Just Flashed A Major Warning...

This year, (2017) was the year that the financial system moved from fearing deflation to expecting inflation.

You can see this in the breakout in inflation expectations. From 2013 until mid-2016, the financial system's expectations of future inflation were in a downtrend. Mid-2016 this changed as expectations began to rise, breaking this downtrend in early 2017.

They've since continued to rally. Bouncing off support.

This trend has since strengthened with Producer Prices spiking in every major economy in the world.

H/T Jeroen Blokland

As you can see, Producer Prices are spiking in China, the EU, Japan and the US: four countries accounting for over two thirds of global GDP.

And the bond market has finally taken note, with bond yields rising above their downtrends in Japan, the UK, the US and Germany.

Put simply, BIG INFLATION is THE BIG MONEY trend today.

The Fed's Built a Financial "Maginot Line"

An economic meltdown at least six times the size of the subprime mortgage collapse...

The Fed's too busy fighting the last crisis to prepare for the next one...

There are three "snowflakes" that could trigger the next financial avalanche...

In the national defense community, military commanders are known for fighting the last war. They study their prior failures in preparation for the next conflict. The problem is that each war inevitably involves new tactics for which they're completely unprepared.

The most famous case was the backward-looking Maginot Line in the 1930s.

In response to Germany's rapid advances in WWI, France built a line of concrete and steel fortifications and obstacles on their border to buy time to mobilize if Germany tried to invade again.

Hitler made the Maginot Line irrelevant by outflanking it and invading France through neutral Belgium. The French were unprepared. A few weeks later, German forces occupied Paris.

The same mistake is made in financial circles. Financial regulators are no different than military commanders. They fight the last war. The last two global meltdowns, in 1998 and 2008, are cases in point.

In 1998, a financial panic almost destroyed global capital markets. It started in Thailand in June 1997 and then spread to Indonesia and Korea. By the summer of 1998, Russia had defaulted on its debt and its currency collapsed. The resulting liquidity crisis caused massive losses at hedge fund Long Term Capital Management.

LTCM were losing hundreds of millions of dollars per day. Total losses over the two-month span were almost $4 billion.

But that wasn't the most dangerous part.

LTCM losses were trivial compared with to the $1 trillion of derivatives trades we had on our books with the biggest Wall Street banks. If LTCM failed, those trillion dollars of trades would not have paid off and the Wall Street banks would have fallen like dominoes.

Global markets would have completely collapsed.

LTCM negotiated a bailout with the leaders of the 14 biggest banks including Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan and Citibank. Eventually, they got $4 billion of new capital from Wall Street, the Federal Reserve cut interest rates and the situation stabilized.

But it was a close call, something no one ever wanted to repeat.

It was a valuable lesson, because soon after, regulators set out to make hedge fund lending safer.

Regulators believed this would prevent the next crisis. When the panic of 2008 hit, however, they were surprised that problems were not in hedge funds but in something new — subprime mortgages. The mortgage market collapse quickly spun out of control and once again brought global capital markets to the brink of collapse.

After the 2008 debacle, regulators again set out to fight the last war.

They made mortgage lending much safer with a number of regulations. But once again, regulators today are fixing the last problem and totally ignoring the next one.

The next financial collapse will not come from hedge funds or home mortgages but from somewhere they're not looking. And I agree it'll be here soon...

In a recent book has ben used 2018 as a target date primarily because the two prior systemic crises, 1998 and 2008, were 10 years apart. Extending the timeline 10 years into the future from the 2008 crisis to maintain the 10-year tempo, we arrive at 2018.

Only this time the Fed will have much less ability to respond to this crisis the way it has before. It's mostly out of "dry powder."

A benchmark writer of mine spoke to a member of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve a couple of years ago and said, "I think the Fed is insolvent."

This governor first resisted and said, "No, we're not."

But he pressed her a little bit harder and she said, "Well, maybe." And then he just looked at her and she said, "Well, we are, but it doesn't matter."

In other words, here's a governor of the Federal Reserve admitting to him, privately, that the Federal Reserve is insolvent, but that it doesn't matter.

It doesn't matter? Really?

When the next crisis hits, the Fed will soon realize that it does matter. A lot.

The Last Time This Happened Was Just Months Before The Start Of The Great Depression

One week after Goldman's chief equity strategist David Kostin predicted a three-year bull market of "rational exuberance", lifting his 2018 S&P price target from 2,500 to 2,850 rising to 3,100 in 2020, and stating that should the exuberance turn "irrational", the S&P could rise as high as 5,300 by the end of 2020, another Goldman strategist, Christian Mueller-Glissmann, has decided it may be a good idea to play bad cop and cover all bases.

And so, in a report released on Tuesday "The Balanced Bear - Part 1: Low(er) returns and latent drawdown risk" this now bearish Goldmanite warns that in the medium-term, the two likely scenarios are either i) a "slow pain" deflation scenario of low yields and high valuations "which persist as macro is stable but there are less windfall gains from rising valuations and less carry - as a result, returns are likely to be lower across assets", or ii) a "fast pain" drawdown scenario in which there is "either a material negative growth or inflation/rate shock, or a combination of both, which drives a drawdown in 60/40 portfolios."

For those confused, don't worry - you read it right. While on one hand Goldman is predicting nothing but blue skies for the "medium-term" of the next three years, predicting no recession and double digit equity upside, at the very same time, the very same Goldman is also forecasting either a "slow" or "fast" pain scenario, which while different, share one thing in common (as the name implies): "pain."

No surprise, Goldman talking out of both sides of its mouth, the only question being while the client-facing "research" is obviously crap and meant to get clients to do the opposite of what Goldman's prop traders are doing, it remains debatable on what side Goldman's prop is axed. Is the bank pulling a CDO and shorting everything it sells to its clients, or has the bank assured further S&P upside, even as valuations no "longer make sense" to quote, well, Goldman? 

We don't know the answer, nor do we care. For those who do, here is Mueller-Glissmann summary: 

We think a period of low(er) returns (scenario 1) is more likely than a full-fledged bear market in 60/40 portfolios (scenario 2), at least in the near term. But there will likely be a balancing act with slowing growth and rising inflation. And at current low yield levels and with the 'beginning of the end of QE', bonds might be less effective hedges for equities and are likely a larger drag on balanced portfolios. And rising inflation could move the central bank put 'more out of the money', requiring a larger 'growth shock' for central banks to ease policy. Also current easing options are more limited for central banks as rates are still low and QE purchases have only just been reduced. 

And once the balanced bear comes, it might be larger and faster. Duration risk in bond markets is much higher this cycle and vol of vol in equities has increased since the mid-80s. While we think investors should lower duration and run higher equity allocations in scenario 1, they should consider hedging at least the risk of smaller equity drawdowns in the near term. We like shorter-dated S&P 500 put spreads. In part 2, we intend to explore different strategies to enhance balanced portfolio returns while managing drawdown risk in case of a bear market.

Ultimately, like every other forecast to come out of Goldman, it's garbage: want bullish, read Kostin; want bearish - either a little or lot - stick to Glissman. Just remember to use your friendly, Goldman salesperson who will gladly collect the trade commission whatever you do.

That said, there was one useful data point in the 26 page pdf: a chart showing that not only are we nearing the longest 60/40 bull market without a 10% return drawdown, but that the last time we were here was sometime in the late 1920s... and the Great Depression would follow in just a few months. 

As Goldman observes: "we are closing in on the longest 60/40 bull market in history - there has been no 10% drawdown in real terms since 2009. A passive long-only balanced portfolio has delivered attractive risk-adjusted returns since the 90s. A favourable 'Goldilocks' macro backdrop, supported by the 'Great Moderation' and the central bank put, has boosted returns in both equities and bonds. However, after the recent 'bull market in everything', valuations across assets are as expensive as they have been this century, which reduces the potential for returns and diversification in balanced portfolios.

Some more statistics:

We are nearing the longest bull market for balanced equity/bond portfolios in over a century - a simple 60/40 portfolio (60% S&P 500, 40% US 10-year bonds) has not had a drawdown of more than 10% since the GFC trough (8.7 years) and has delivered a 143% return (11% p.a.) since then. 

And when was the last time a balance portfolio had such a tremendous return? Goldman answers again: 

"The longest run has been during  the Roaring 20s, ending with the Great Depression. The second longest run was the post-war 'Golden age' in the 50s - the 90s Boom has been in third place but is now fourth, after the current run.

In other words, one would have to go back to some time in early 1929 to be looking at the kind of returns that a balanced "60/40" portfolio is generating today.  In fact, the current period of staggering returns without a 10% total drawdown is now 8.7 years. How long was the comparable period in the 1928s? 9.1 years. Which means that if history is any guide, the second great depression is just around the corner.