MARKET FLASH:

"It seems the donkey is laughing, but he instead is braying (l'asino sembra ridere ma in realtà raglia)": si veda sotto "1927-1933: Pompous Prognosticators" per avere la conferma che la storia non si ripete ma fà la rima.


martedì 18 settembre 2018

BCA: The "Bubble In Everything" Threatens $400 Trillion In Assets

By now, it's a very familiar question: how high can the Fed hike rates before it causes a major market "event."

Two weeks ago, Stifel analyst Barry Banister became the latest to issue a timeline on how many more rate hikes the Fed can push through before the market is finally impacted. According to his calculations, just two more rate hikes would put the central bank above the neutral rate - the interest rate that neither stimulates nor holds back the economy. The Fed's long-term projection of its policy rate has risen from 2.8% at the end of 2017 to 2.9% in June. As the following chart, every time this has happened, a bear market has inevitably followed.

A similar argument was made recently by both Deutsche Bank and Bank of America, which in two parallel analyses observed last year that every Fed tightening cycle tends to end in a crisis.

Now, it's the turn of BCA research to warn that ultimately the fate of risk assets depends on the relative size of the inflationary impulse being spawned by the Fed vs the remnant disinflationary impulse from monetary policies over the past decade.

In a report issued on Friday, BCA's strategists make the key point that the performance of bonds - and stocks - in an inflation scare would depend on the relative size of the inflationary impulse compared with the disinflationary impulse that resulted from sharply lower risk-asset prices.

They make the point that if central banks were more concerned about the inflationary impulse, which at least for Fed chair Powell appears to be the case for now - Janet Yellen's "lower for longer revised forward guidance"notwithstanding - they would have to keep tightening - in which case, bond yields would be liberated to reach elevated territory. Conversely, if the bigger worry was the disinflationary impulse, which arguably is the case from a legacy standpoint, central banks would quickly reverse course, and bond yields would return to the lowlands. Thus, the disinflationary impulse from lower risk-asset prices would end up as the bigger issue.

BCA then goes on to note that the current episode of elevated risk-asset valuations is not unprecedented, but there is a crucial difference today with past experiences. Previous episodes of elevated risk-asset valuations tended to be localized, either by geography or sector: 1990 was focused in Japan; 2000 was focused in the dot-com related sectors; 2008 was focused in the U.S. mortgage and credit markets and preceded the emerging market credit boom.

By comparison, BCA warns - echoing a point made here on numerous occasions - the post-2008 global experiment with quantitative easing, and zero and negative interest rate policies have boosted the valuations of all risk-assets across all geographies and all asset-classes - global equities (see chart), global credit, and global real estate. The "bubble in everything" as some call it.

This broader overvaluation makes things "considerably more dangerous" for investors, as BCA estimates that the total value of global risk-assets is $400 trillion, equal to about five times the size of the global economy.

The takeaway is that any inflationary impulse would - through higher bond yields - undermine the valuation support of global risk-assets that are worth several times the size of the global economy. Thereby, it could unleash a potentially much larger disinflationary impulse. Or stated simply, the higher yields go, the lower they will eventually drop during what Albert Edwards has dubbed the next deflationary "ice age."

It's Not The Economy, It's The Bad Money Stupid!

Our debt-based fiat money system poses an existential threat...

We're all going to have to be a lot more resilient in the future.

The "long emergency", as James Howard Kunstler puts it, is now upon us.

If ever there was a wake-up call from Mother Nature, it's been the weather events over the past 12 months.

Last year, the triplet Hurricanes Harvey, Maria, and Irma resulted in thousands of deaths (mainly in Puerto Rico) and tens of $billions in destruction.

This year has seen a rash of 120° F (50° C) summer days, droughts, current monster storms like Typhoon Mangkhut and Hurricane Florence -- as well as numerous 100/500/1,000-year floods spread across the globe.

And that's just so far.

It remains nearly impossible to connect climate change directly to any particular weather event. But taken together, it's becoming increasingly difficult to dismiss the scientific claim that the quantity of heat trapped in the earth's weather systems impacts the amount of water that now falls (or refuses to fall) from the sky and the high-temperature heat waves that now shatter records with such regularity that once-rare extreme conditions are now becoming routine.

Our "new normal" is quickly diverging from the natural conditions most of us have grown up with. Permafrost isn't "permanent " anymore -- it melts. The Arctic now can be ice-free. In a growing number of regions in the US, you can leave a screenless window open on an August evening (with the lights on!), and remain unmolested by the swarms of insects that used to prowl the night.

All of these symptoms are connected by a root cause: our society's relentless addiction to growth. And while we do our best to continually raise awareness of this existential threat, the rest of the media completely ignores it.

Virtually no major news outlet is talking about how our voracious consumption of ever-more natural resources is fast exhausting and poisoning the Earth's capacity to support human life. But Serna William's latest court meltdown? That's splashed everwhere...

Which is why the vast majority of people have no clue what's actually happening. And a disturbing portion insist on remaining that way, being led around by the media, wasting their effort, focus and time on things on the irrelevant.

People are convinced that salvation lies with one political party or another, in the election of one candidate or the defeat of another, when the sad truth is all major political parties are on exactly the same side when it comes to promoting endless growth or waging war. In the US there's simply no alternative political party at this point.

Addicted To Growth

Yes, we've been beating this drum for a long time -- over a decade now. But we persist beacuse this critical message is being blunted by very powerful forces that are mainly interested in preserving the status quo.

All the machinery of monetary, political, propagnda and military power is aligned in the quest to keep things headed in precisely the same direction they're already going. Those who control the system today are personally benefitting too much, and so fight change with all their might.

That said, while the new religion embraced by society is Technology, I find it ironic that the very same scientific process that brings us wondrous innovations is simply ignored or dismissed out-of-hand when it return answers that run counter to our pursuit of endless economic growth and consumer comfort.

Here's a recent report that does exactly that. It's by scientists commissioned by the UN who took a look at things along the same line of thinking that we've outlined in the Crash Course. They conclude, as we did over ten years ago, that our unsustainable economic trajectory is almost out of runway.

But have you heard of this report before now? I highly doubt it. It's not a message "they" want the masses to hear.

This is how UN scientists are preparing for the end of capitalism

Sept 12, 2018

Capitalism as we know it is over. So suggests a new report commissioned by a group of scientists appointed by the UN secretary general. The main reason? We're transitioning rapidly to a radically different global economy, due to our increasingly unsustainable exploitation of the planet's environmental resources and the shift to less efficient energy sources.

Climate change and species extinctions are accelerating even as societies are experiencing rising inequality, unemployment, slow economic growth, rising debt levels, and impotent governments.

Contrary to the way policymakers usually think about these problems these are not really separate crises at all.

These crises are part of the same fundamental transition. The new era is haracterized by inefficient fossil fuel production and escalating costs of climate change. Conventional capitalist economic thinking can no longer explain, predict or solve the workings of the global economy in this new age.

"We live in an era of turmoil and profound change in the energetic and material underpinnings of economies. The era of cheap energy is coming to an end," says the paper.

Conventional economic models, the Finnish scientists note, "almost completely disregard the energetic and material dimensions of the economy."

(Source)

Hallelujah! I really do hope these scientists get as much traction as possible with their message. But my experience tells me their warning will go unheeded.

And it's not even a hard one to digest intellectually: Every organism can grow into its available energy supply, but no further.

A plant grown in dim light will not be as large or as healthy as one grown in full sunlight. The amount of sugar in a vat determines the maximum number of yeast cells produced. The abundance of fish in the waters surrounding a sea bird rookery will determine the fate of the nesting colony's population.

Humans are no exception.

All of life is the study of energy flows and transformations. Where conventional economists have gone off the rails is in assuming there will always be sufficient inputs from the natural world to power the economy. That at a high enough price, there always be more of everything.

And in their defense, up until very recently, that has largely been true. But no longer.

Talk to any oil company operator and ask them how easy it is to find oil these days. Or ask a farmer how quickly crop yields would plummet if N-P-K inputs derived from fossil fuels were not added back each and every year to his topsoil. Or talk to a veteran cod fisherman about the 95% collapse in catch size over the past several decades.

Reality-based systems have limits. And we're hitting them all over the planet.

It's The Money, Stupid

Debt-based fiat money, like any monetary system, enforces some behaviors and punishes others.

Specifically, debt-based fiat money demands a regime of constant, perpetual growth. As any mathmatician will tell you, anything that grows contantly accumulates exponentially.

So each year, there's exponentially more debt in the system than the year before. If not, our high-leveraged system begins collapsing, as threatened in 2008:

As long as you can have endless growth, the system of money we have in place today is perfectly fine. But if you can't, then once growth peters out, the entire system crashes into nothingness. There's no in-between territory.

We could choose to have a different monetary system. We could embrace a 'sound money' system, where money can't be conjured out of thin air, at no cost, the way it is today. Instead, it's in limited supply.

Under a sound money system, you either produce more than you consume or you face the consequences (rising interest rates, economic contraction, etc.). No ramping up the printing press to defer the reckoning off to a future date, which will also make it more intense when it eventually arrives.

Wars cannot be financed on the backs of future generations as yet unborn. Either you rally the populace to pay more in taxes to fund a military campaign, or you ramp down the war machine.

Sound money won't fix everything. But it would be a great step in the right direction.

There are many other indictments against debt-based fiat money, including its proclivity to concentrate wealth into the hands of fewer and fewer winners, with everyone else in debt to that oligarchy (a process already well underway). Given these, busying ourselves with trying to refine our current monetary model is a waste of precious time. 

As long as debt-based fiat money pins us between the harsh dichotomy of either growing exponentially or collapsing, there's no amount of tweaking, (de)regulating, or rule modifying that's going to make the slightest bit of difference.

We need a full-blown replacement.

You see, money is at the root of it all.

Every large, hierarchical assembly of people throughout history has had an organizing principle that kept everyone in line. Where once it was "royal blood" or "direct access to the god(s)", today it's money. That's what keeps everyone in line and in their place.

But what happens when your organizing principle that keeps everyone in line marches them towards a cliff?

You need to either change it or perish. As the above article on the UN study continues:

Most observers, then, have no idea of the current biophysical realities – that the driving force of the transition to postcapitalism is the end of the age that made endless growth capitalism possible in the first place: the age of abundant, cheap energy.

And so we have moved into a new, unpredictable and unprecedented space in which the conventional economic toolbox has no answers. As slow economic growth simmers along, central banks have resorted to negative interest rates and buying up huge quantities of public debt to keep our economies rolling. But what happens after these measures are exhausted? Governments and bankers are running out of options.

Capitalist markets will not be capable of facilitating the required changes – governments will need to step up, and institutions will need to actively shape markets to fit the goals of human survival. Right now, the prospects for this look slim. But the new paper argues that either way, change is coming.

I too, will argue that -- like it or not -- change is on the way. However, I would go further than the authors adn note that any system, whatever its premise and however it's run, will fail if it's predicated upon an unsustainable idea.

And our system's unsustainable idea is debt-based fiat money.

It's flawed and it's failing. Yet nobody in power can envision a solution because the answer cuts too deeply across our entire social, political and geopolitical constructions. Each is based on infinite growth and has enshrined power based on what we call "money".

Changing the model is just too unpalatable to those who currently benefit most from the current system. Blinded by their spoils, they simply can't realize that if/when the system breaks down, they'll find mob justice offers an even worse outcome.

How To Move Forward

Help is NOT on the way. Not from our leaders, and quite frankly, not from ourselves. Too many people are not going to proactively reject society's pursuit of growth and start embracing having less stuff in their lives.

Materially reducing carbon emissions into the atmosphere would require enormous hits to the economy, lost jobs and quite possible a reduction in total global population. Nobody in politics will go anywhere remotely near that conversation.

And yet the changes are coming. In many cases, they're already here. 

As I type, Hurricane Florence is stalled at the coastline of North Carolina, dramatically increasing the rainfall is it dumping there and exacerbating the flooding damage.

Is global warming to blame for the specific steering currents that brought about this path? Maybe; maybe not. But we can easily make the case that the warmer air and warmer seas of recent years result in more energy that increases hurricane intensity.

We can also easily make the case that the damage inflicted by Florence and future storms to come will be compounded by the extremely short-sighted building practices designed to maximize property values and real estate development. Wetlands and dunes that evolved to absorb storm surge have been bulldozed and paved over in the pursuit of profits. Are the resulting flooding damages worth those extra dollars (and lost ecosystems)?

Shale oil is being pumped out of the ground as fast as possible, surprisingly with no profits to be seen (collectively, the shale oil industry has been a massive loss-making enterprise so far). Drillers have to pump to simply to keep the debt and equity that's already in play in motion. Shale holes aren't being drilled and fracked because it makes sense, or because it's the right thing to do at this moment in time; but simply because all of that money printed by the Federal Reserve had to go somewhere and do something. And right now, it's flooding into the oil patch.

Any sane person should sit back, scan the ratio of mess-to-benefit provided by shale oil and shout: Stop!  But apparently we "need" the jobs, the money, the oil Right Now!

That's the nature of debt-based money. It enforces the Right Now! mentality at the expense of long-term thinking. Or even any thinking.

So changes are coming. There will be an enormous mess when this third central bank inspired credit bubble bursts and this will be the last one of this size. After this burst, there won't be any getting around the fact that letting a few banksters fiddle with the price of money in an attempt get more borrowing to fuel even more spending was a terrible, horrible, no good idea.

Meanwhile -- as people are marveled by our shiny rising stock prices, complete with $trillion-dollar companies and price-to-earnings ratios at nosebleed highs -- the weather gets worse, more species disappear, and more people fall into lifelong debt servitude. And the hard conversations that we desperately need to be having aren't happening at all.

So, what can you do about it?

Attend to your own business. Develop resilience to become better prepared for what is surely to come. Don't fall for the current bogus narrative. Stand fast to what you know to be true and right. Tend your garden, build your wealth, and let go of old ways.

OK, so how to do this? I do have an idea.

Seth Klarman: These Are The 20 Forgotten Lessons From The 2008 Crisis

On the 10 year anniversary of the Lehman bankruptcy, a cottage industry of crisis experts, historical apologists, and generally freelance reminiscers (sic) had emerged, opining on what happened, what should have happened, what changed in the interim ten years, and what will happen in the future. Most of these opinions are worthless with many of them coming from those who were either responsible for the financial crisis or never saw it coming in the first place. So instead, we have chosen to go with the far more actionable and erudite take of investing legend Seth Klarman who many years ago, one the 1 year anniversary of Lehman's failure, described the 20 lessons from the financial crisis which, he said "could and should have been learned from the turmoil of 2008" but instead "were either never learned or else were immediately forgotten by most market participants." 

The Forgotten Lessons of 2008

One might have expected that the near-death experience of most investors in 2008 would generate valuable lessons for the future. We all know about the "depression mentality" of our parents and grandparents who lived through the Great Depression. Memories of tough times colored their behavior for more than a generation, leading to limited risk taking and a sustainable base for healthy growth. Yet one year after the 2008 collapse, investors have returned to shockingly speculative behavior. One state investment board recently adopted a plan to leverage its portfolio – specifically its government and high-grade bond holdings – in an amount that could grow to 20% of its assets over the next three years. No one who was paying attention in 2008 would possibly think this is a good idea.

Below, we highlight the lessons that we believe could and should have been learned from the turmoil of 2008. Some of them are unique to the 2008 melt-down; others, which could have been drawn from general market observation over the past several decades, were certainly reinforced last year. Shockingly, virtually all of these lessons were either never learned or else were immediately forgotten by most market participants.


Twenty Investment Lessons of 2008

  1. Things that have never happened before are bound to occur with some regularity. You must always be prepared for the unexpected, including sudden, sharp downward swings in markets and the economy. Whatever adverse scenario you can contemplate, reality can be far worse.
  2. When excesses such as lax lending standards become widespread and persist for some time, people are lulled into a false sense of security, creating an even more dangerous situation. In some cases, excesses migrate beyond regional or national borders, raising the ante for investors and governments. These excesses will eventually end, triggering a crisis at least in proportion to the degree of the excesses. Correlations between asset classes may be surprisingly high when leverage rapidly unwinds.
  3. Nowhere does it say that investors should strive to make every last dollar of potential profit; consideration of risk must never take a backseat to return. Conservative positioning entering a crisis is crucial: it enables one to maintain long-term oriented, clear thinking, and to focus on new opportunities while others are distracted or even forced to sell. Portfolio hedges must be in place before a crisis hits. One cannot reliably or affordably increase or replace hedges that are rolling off during a financial crisis.
  4. Risk is not inherent in an investment; it is always relative to the price paid. Uncertainty is not the same as risk. Indeed, when great uncertainty – such as in the fall of 2008 – drives securities prices to especially low levels, they often become less risky investments.
  5. Do not trust financial market risk models. Reality is always too complex to be accurately modeled. Attention to risk must be a 24/7/365 obsession, with people – not computers – assessing and reassessing the risk environment in real time. Despite the predilection of some analysts to model the financial markets using sophisticated mathematics, the markets are governed by behavioral science, not physical science.
  6. Do not accept principal risk while investing short-term cash: the greedy effort to earn a few extra basis points of yield inevitably leads to the incurrence of greater risk, which increases the likelihood of losses and severe illiquidity at precisely the moment when cash is needed to cover expenses, to meet commitments, or to make compelling long-term investments.
  7. The latest trade of a security creates a dangerous illusion that its market price approximates its true value. This mirage is especially dangerous during periods of market exuberance. The concept of "private market value" as an anchor to the proper valuation of a business can also be greatly skewed during ebullient times and should always be considered with a healthy degree of skepticism.
  8. A broad and flexible investment approach is essential during a crisis. Opportunities can be vast, ephemeral, and dispersed through various sectors and markets. Rigid silos can be an enormous disadvantage at such times.
  9. You must buy on the way down. There is far more volume on the way down than on the way back up, and far less competition among buyers. It is almost always better to be too early than too late, but you must be prepared for price markdowns on what you buy.
  10. Financial innovation can be highly dangerous, though almost no one will tell you this. New financial products are typically  created for sunny days and are almost never stress-tested for stormy weather. Securitization is an area that almost perfectly fits this description; markets for securitized assets such as subprime mortgages completely collapsed in 2008 and have not fully recovered. Ironically, the government is eager to restore the securitization markets back to their pre-collapse stature.
  11. Ratings agencies are highly conflicted, unimaginative dupes. They are blissfully unaware of adverse selection and moral hazard. Investors should never trust them.
  12. Be sure that you are well compensated for illiquidity – especially illiquidity without control – because it can create particularly high opportunity costs.
  13. At equal returns, public investments are generally superior to private investments not only because they are more liquid but also because amidst distress, public markets are more likely than private ones to offer attractive opportunities to average down.
  14. Beware leverage in all its forms. Borrowers – individual, corporate, or government – should always match fund their liabilities against the duration of their assets. Borrowers must always remember that capital markets can be extremely fickle, and that it is never safe to assume a maturing loan can be rolled over. Even if you are unleveraged, the leverage employed by others can drive dramatic price and valuation swings; sudden unavailability of leverage in the economy may trigger an economic downturn.
  15. Many LBOs are man-made disasters. When the price paid is excessive, the equity portion of an LBO is really an out-of-the-money call option. Many fiduciaries placed large amounts of the capital under their stewardship into such options in 2006 and 2007.
  16. Financial stocks are particularly risky. Banking, in particular, is a highly lever- aged, extremely competitive, and challenging business. A major European bank recently announced the goal of achieving a 20% return on equity (ROE) within several years. Unfortunately, ROE is highly dependent on absolute yields, yield spreads, maintaining adequate loan loss reserves, and the amount of leverage used. What is the bank's management to do if it cannot readily get to 20%? Leverage up? Hold riskier assets? Ignore the risk of loss? In some ways, for a major financial institution even to have a ROE goal is to court disaster.
  17. Having clients with a long-term orientation is crucial. Nothing else is as important to the success of an investment firm.
  18. When a government official says a problem has been "contained," pay no attention.
  19. The government – the ultimate short- term-oriented player – cannot withstand much pain in the economy or the financial markets. Bailouts and rescues are likely to occur, though not with sufficient predictability for investors to comfortably take advantage. The government will take enormous risks in such interventions, especially if the expenses can be conveniently deferred to the future. Some of the price-tag is in the form of back- stops and guarantees, whose cost is almost impossible to determine.
  20. Almost no one will accept responsibility for his or her role in precipitating a crisis: not leveraged speculators, not willfully blind leaders of financial institutions, and certainly not regulators, government officials, ratings agencies or politicians.

Below, we itemize some of the quite different lessons investors seem to have learned as of late 2009 – false lessons, we believe. To not only learn but also effectively implement investment lessons requires a disciplined, often contrary, and long-term-oriented investment approach. It requires a resolute focus on risk aversion rather than maximizing immediate returns, as well as an understanding of history, a sense of financial market cycles, and, at times, extraordinary patience.

False Lessons

  1. There are no long-term lessons – ever.
  2. Bad things happen, but really bad things do not. Do buy the dips, especially the lowest quality securities when they come under pressure, because declines will quickly be reversed.
  3. There is no amount of bad news that the markets cannot see past.
  4. If you've just stared into the abyss, quickly forget it: the lessons of history can only hold you back.
  5. Excess capacity in people, machines, or property will be quickly absorbed.
  6. Markets need not be in sync with one another. Simultaneously, the bond market can be priced for sustained tough times, the equity market for a strong recovery, and gold for high inflation. Such an apparent disconnect is indefinitely sustainable.
  7. In a crisis, stocks of financial companies are great investments, because the tide is bound to turn. Massive losses on bad loans and soured investments are irrelevant to value; improving trends and future prospects are what matter, regardless of whether profits will have to be used to cover loan losses and equity shortfalls for years to come.
  8. The government can reasonably rely on debt ratings when it forms programs to lend money to buyers of otherwise unattractive debt instruments.
  9. The government can indefinitely control both short-term and long-term interest rates.
  10. The government can always rescue the markets or interfere with contract law whenever it deems convenient with little or no apparent cost. (Investors believe this now and, worse still, the government believes it as well. We are probably doomed to a lasting legacy of government tampering with financial markets and the economy, which is likely to create the mother of all moral hazards. The government is blissfully unaware of the wisdom of Friedrich Hayek: "The curious task of economics is to demonstrate to men how little they really know about what they imagine they can design.")

The World's Most Bearish Hedge Fund Unveils A New "Big Short"

It was another tough month for Horseman Global, which we previously dubbed "the world's most bearish hedge fund", due to its exposure which, while fluctuating, has been net short for the past 6 years and most recently had a net short position of -43.5%.

In August, the fund dropped another 5%, bringing its total return for 2018 to -10.40%, setting up for another painful year for Horseman LPs who have underperformed the market since 2015.

The fund's underperformance was not lost on CIO Russell Clark, who writes that while he likes "big ideas, and I like trying to do something different. When it works, its great. But when it doesn't, it's average" admits that "lately, performance has been very average." He attributed the reason for that to "US assets and the dollar which are drastically outperforming all other markets", something we have discussed extensively in prior posts.

Clark's lament is the same as that from Goldman Sachs, namely that running a large fiscal deficit with record low unemployment "makes little sense" - Goldman went so far as describing this state of affairs as only observed during war time -  and with US oil production beginning to slow, he warns that "something is likely to break."

Being bearish on the US dollar and US assets has hurt. I had a very similar problem, and similar lackluster performance from 2009 to 2011, when I thought Chinese monetary and fiscal policy was similarly deluded

Still Clark, and Horseman, continue undeterred, and as he writes in his latest letter to investors (who appear to be shrinking, with AUM under Horseman Global now down to $488MM), he has seen "lots of good short themes in the markets over the last year including Western corporates suffering from Chinese competition, higher commodity price and bond yield impacting the corporate bond market, an investment grade borrower getting downgraded and dislocating the high yield market, the collapse in crypto currencies and their negative impact on the semiconductor market and finally the destruction of the short volatility trade."

Yet none of these were enough to get Clark truly excited, because as he further explains "all of these are ideas that hold water from a macro perspective, but they lacked one important factor: An industry that investors so believed in, they would continue to hold even as the sector began to break down."

Now, with just 2 weeks left in the third quarter and with Horseman increasingly desperate for a Hail Mary trade, Clark writes that "finally, this month we think we found" what may be the next big short trade.

Here is his explanation of why the semiconductor space may be due to for a big drop in the coming months:

We had been looking at the semiconductor market for a while, but mainly looking at cutting edge semiconductor makers, and their exposure to cryptocurrency mining. However, one of our shorts, Applied Materials, stated in a conference call that the majority of its orderbook is for lagging technology, not leading as had been expected. 

What is lagging semiconductor technology? To simplify massively, it tends to be sensors. Sensors take real world data and convert it to electronic data. When we looked closer, we found that investors had become enamored with this area for two reasons. One; the "internet of things" had convinced investors that demand would remain strong for the foreseeable future, and two; "the breakdown of Moore's Law" had meant that supply was constrained.

We found that the number of lagging semiconductor fabs were forecast to increase after declining for years. 

Finally, we had found the sector that investors believe in, even as fundamentals declined. We also know that the Chinese are entering this sector. All we needed was a market signal. And right on cue, a Japanese sensor producer, Renesas, warned on Q2 profits and then followed this up with a cash bid for US producer Integrated Device Technology at seven times sales! That's what I call ringing the bell.

As we continued to look at the sensor industry, we began to see that the sector was seeing a slowdown in orders from the auto sector and particularly in China after a long period of growth. The auto sector is a big buyer of sensors. Higher commodity prices are starting to affect the profitability of auto firms globally, which have large amounts of debt. Ford has been downgraded to one notch above high yield and looks likely to become a fallen angel. General Motors could well follow.

With that in mind, here is Horseman's latest portfolio allocation:

The short book is made up of sensor related stocks, autos and banks that will be affected by deterioration in the corporate debt market. The long book has seen us reduce or exit miners that produce commodities tied to the auto industry, such as copper, nickel and zinc. While the Chinese auto market is slowing, the effect on profitability is likely to impact foreign producers who dominate this market. 

And visually:

His parting thoughts underscore why Clark remains (painfully) bearish:

2011 and 2018 are playing out very similarly for me. Easy momentum trades of the past year are breaking down, and investors are herded from one area to another. While all the talk is of an emerging market crisis, the biggest emerging markets are all engaging in reform, while the developed markets are still overly reliant on easy money. In 2011, selling the then outperforming emerging markets, and buying Irish debt was the right trade. And in 2018, shorting developed markets and buying emerging markets looks the right trade now.

venerdì 14 settembre 2018

Lehmann Lesson or "Was the Financial Crisis Wasted"?

Though it has now been a decade since the collapse of Lehman Brothers, lingering questions about the global financial crisis remain. Chief among them is whether it can happen again.

In this Big PictureHoward Davies laments that despite the global nature of the crash, financial regulations have yet to be harmonized internationally. And Jeffrey Frankel warns that the US is now pursuing the same kind of pro-cyclical fiscal agenda that had tied its hands in 2008.

Meanwhile, Richard Kozul-Wright argues that the post-crisis response has done nothing either to change the culture of the financial sector or to prevent a massive build-up of global debt. And, as Carmen Reinhart pointed out last year, the loose monetary conditions that have made legacy debts from the crisis more manageable are now coming to an end.

For his part, Jim O'Neill worries that while the global imbalances that gave rise to the crisis have been addressed, a dangerous short-term outlook still drives business. And Harold James adds that the problem is not just business practices, but also the broader cultural impact of rapid technological change and disruption. While financial regulation has been materially strengthened since the 2008 crisis, its implementation remains in the hands of a patchwork quilt of national agencies. The resulting structural diversity of post-crisis reforms does not help ensure consistency in the implementation of global standards. As the tenth anniversary of the start of the global financial crisis approaches, a wave of retrospective reviews is bearing down on us. Many of them will try to answer the Big Question: Has the financial system been fundamentally reformed, so that we can be confident of preventing a repeat of the dismal and destructive events of 2008-2009, or has the crisis been allowed to go to waste? There will be no consensus answer to that question. Some will argue that the post-crisis reforms, especially those concerning banks' capital requirements, have gone too far, and that the costs in terms of output have been too high. Others will argue that far more must be done, that banks need far higher capital, and possibly, as the proponents of a recent Swiss referendum argued, that banks should lose their ability to create money. But any reasonable observer must acknowledge that there has been a very significant change. Most large banks now have 3-4 times as much capital, and of far higher quality, than they had in 2007. Additional buffers are now required in systemic institutions. Risk management has been greatly strengthened. And regulatory intervention powers are far more robust. Political support for tough regulation remains strong, at least everywhere except the United States, and even there the Trump administration's measures have mainly benefited community banks, not Wall Street. There is one area, however, where far less has been achieved. As former US Federal Reserve board chair Paul Volcker has observed, "virtually every post-mortem of the financial crisis cites the convoluted regulatory system [in the US] as a contributory factor in the financial meltdown." Yet the 2010 Dodd-Frank legislation, which sought to address the shortcomings exposed by the financial crisis, made very few changes. It abolished only one small agency, the unlamented Office of Thrift Supervision, and added another, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, a body so little loved by the current administration that one wonders about its longevity. The convolution highlighted by Volcker was not addressed. His verdict today is that "the system for regulating financial institutions in the US is highly fragmented, outdated, and ineffective." Aside from that, all is well! The US is undoubtedly an outlier. What of the rest of the world? There have been a few changes, perhaps most notably in the United Kingdom, where we enjoy rearranging institutional deck chairs. The functions of the fully integrated Financial Services Authority (of which I was the first chair) have been returned to the Bank of England or reallocated to the Financial Conduct Authority. recent study by the Financial Stability Institute, established by the Bank for International Settlements and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, concludes that 11 of the 79 countries assessed have made some changes. Interestingly, despite the UK reform, the weak international trend remains toward integrated regulation, and away from the traditional model whereby different agencies regulate insurance and securities, while the central bank oversees the banking system.

But there remains a remarkable diversity of practice worldwide. Of the 79 countries, 39 still operate a three-way sectoral breakdown, and 23 have integrated agencies (nine of which double up as the monetary authority). Nine others have two agencies divided along sectoral lines, and eight have chosen a so-called Twin Peaks system, with one agency handling capital-market regulation and the other overseeing business conduct. One might have expected that some degree of agreement would have emerged from an analysis of what did, and did not, work in the crisis. But there is little sign of it. The conclusions of what analysis there has been are somewhat ambiguous. It is hard to say that one structure worked better than another in every place. But there are some suggestive assessments. An International Monetary Fund study of pre-crisis regulation concluded that "countries with integrated supervisory agencies [at that time generally outside the central bank] enjoy greater consistency in quality of supervision." In other words, their compliance with Basel-set standards was more rigorous. Yet, where changes have been made since the crisis, central banks have typically been given greater powers. This structural diversity of post-crisis reforms does not help ensure consistency in the implementation of global standards. It is particularly problematic in the European Union. There is now a banking union in the eurozone, but supervisors in around half of the member states are in the central bank, while they are outside it in the other half. Is there not a job here for the Financial Stability Board? Could the FSB not review practices and point to a preferred structure, or at least some non-preferred ones? There is, unfortunately, no appetite there for picking up that thistle. National supervisors have no interest in criticizing their own systems. The Financial Stability Institute's review showed a bit more courage. Reading between the lines, the authors think little of the sectoral model, but their anticlimactic conclusion is only that "it looks worthwhile to regularly conduct assessments of the functioning of the supervisory architecture in each jurisdiction in the light of prevailing objectives." Who could disagree with that? The authors were clearly mindful that every academic paper worth its salt ends with a plea for more  research. So we seem set to limp along with a highly diverse system. Even the 2008 financial crisis did not dislodge the vested interests in many countries. So while financial regulation has been materially strengthened, which is clearly the most important thing, its implementation remains in the hands of a patchwork quilt of national agencies.

'Dr.Doom' Sees The Makings Of A 2020 Recession & Financial Crisis

Although the global economy has been undergoing a sustained period of synchronized growth, it will inevitably lose steam as unsustainable fiscal policies in the US start to phase out. Come 2020, the stage will be set for another downturn – and, unlike in 2008, governments will lack the policy tools to manage it.

As we mark the decennial of the collapse of Lehman Brothers, there are still ongoing debates about the causes and consequences of the financial crisis, and whether the lessons needed to prepare for the next one have been absorbed. But looking ahead, the more relevant question is what actually will trigger the next global recession and crisis, and when.

The current global expansion will likely continue into next year, given that the US is running large fiscal deficits, China is pursuing loose fiscal and credit policies, and Europe remains on a recovery path. But by 2020, the conditions will be ripe for a financial crisis, followed by a global recession.

There are 10 reasons for this.

First, the fiscal-stimulus policies that are currently pushing the annual US growth rate above its 2% potential are unsustainable. By 2020, the stimulus will run out, and a modest fiscal drag will pull growth from 3% to slightly below 2%.

Second, because the stimulus was poorly timed, the US economy is now overheating, and inflation is rising above target. The US Federal Reserve will thus continue to raise the federal funds rate from its current 2% to at least 3.5% by 2020, and that will likely push up short- and long-term interest rates as well as the US dollar.

Meanwhile, inflation is also increasing in other key economies, and rising oil prices are contributing additional inflationary pressures. That means the other major central banks will follow the Fed toward monetary-policy normalization, which will reduce global liquidity and put upward pressure on interest rates.

Third, the Trump administration's trade disputes with China, Europe, Mexico, Canada, and others will almost certainly escalate, leading to slower growth and higher inflation.

Fourth, other US policies will continue to add stagflationary pressure, prompting the Fed to raise interest rates higher still. The administration is restricting inward/outward investment and technology transfers, which will disrupt supply chains. It is restricting the immigrants who are needed to maintain growth as the US population ages. It is discouraging investments in the green economy. And it has no infrastructure policy to address supply-side bottlenecks.

Fifth, growth in the rest of the world will likely slow down – more so as other countries will see fit to retaliate against US protectionism. China must slow its growth to deal with overcapacity and excessive leverage; otherwise a hard landing will be triggered. And already-fragile emerging markets will continue to feel the pinch from protectionism and tightening monetary conditions in the US.

Sixth, Europe, too, will experience slower growth, owing to monetary-policy tightening and trade frictions. Moreover, populist policies in countries such as Italy may lead to an unsustainable debt dynamic within the eurozone. The still-unresolved "doom loop" between governments and banks holding public debt will amplify the existential problems of an incomplete monetary union with inadequate risk-sharing. Under these conditions, another global downturn could prompt Italy and other countries to exit the eurozone altogether.

Seventh, US and global equity markets are frothy. Price-to-earnings ratios in the US are 50% above the historic average, private-equity valuations have become excessive, and government bonds are too expensive, given their low yields and negative term premia. And high-yield credit is also becoming increasingly expensive now that the US corporate-leverage rate has reached historic highs.

Moreover, the leverage in many emerging markets and some advanced economies is clearly excessive. Commercial and residential real estate is far too expensive in many parts of the world. The emerging-market correction in equities, commodities, and fixed-income holdings will continue as global storm clouds gather. And as forward-looking investors start anticipating a growth slowdown in 2020, markets will reprice risky assets by 2019.

Eighth, once a correction occurs, the risk of illiquidity and fire sales/undershooting will become more severe. There are reduced market-making and warehousing activities by broker-dealers. Excessive high-frequency/algorithmic trading will raise the likelihood of "flash crashes." And fixed-income instruments have become more concentrated in open-ended exchange-traded and dedicated credit funds.

In the case of a risk-off, emerging markets and advanced-economy financial sectors with massive dollar-denominated liabilities will no longer have access to the Fed as a lender of last resort. With inflation rising and policy normalization underway, the backstop that central banks provided during the post-crisis years can no longer be counted on.

Ninth, Trump was already attacking the Fed when the growth rate was recently 4%. Just think about how he will behave in the 2020 election year, when growth likely will have fallen below 1% and job losses emerge. The temptation for Trump to "wag the dog" by manufacturing a foreign-policy crisis will be high, especially if the Democrats retake the House of Representatives this year.

Since Trump has already started a trade war with China and wouldn't dare attack nuclear-armed North Korea, his last best target would be Iran. By provoking a military confrontation with that country, he would trigger a stagflationary geopolitical shock not unlike the oil-price spikes of 1973, 1979, and 1990. Needless to say, that would make the oncoming global recession even more severe.

Finally, once the perfect storm outlined above occurs, the policy tools for addressing it will be sorely lacking. The space for fiscal stimulus is already limited by massive public debt. The possibility for more unconventional monetary policies will be limited by bloated balance sheets and the lack of headroom to cut policy rates. And financial-sector bailouts will be intolerable in countries with resurgent populist movements and near-insolvent governments.

In the US specifically, lawmakers have constrained the ability of the Fed to provide liquidity to non-bank and foreign financial institutions with dollar-denominated liabilities. And in Europe, the rise of populist parties is making it harder to pursue EU-level reforms and create the institutions necessary to combat the next financial crisis and downturn.

Unlike in 2008, when governments had the policy tools needed to prevent a free fall, the policymakers who must confront the next downturn will have their hands tied while overall debt levels are higher than during the previous crisis. When it comes, the next crisis and recession could be even more severe and prolonged than the last.