MARKET FLASH:

"It seems the donkey is laughing, but he instead is braying (l'asino sembra ridere ma in realtà raglia)": si veda sotto "1927-1933: Pompous Prognosticators" per avere la conferma che la storia non si ripete ma fà la rima.


sabato 6 gennaio 2018

Beware A Violent Unwind In The Most Crowded Trades

Back in 2013, when hedge funds were just starting to realize that something is fundamentally broken in the current "market", in which few if any active participants were able to consistently generate alpha as a result of central bank nationalization of capital markets, we laid out simply and succinctly what the "Best Trading Strategy" in this market was, namely "buying The Most Hated Names and shorting the Most widely-held ones." And, as we documented year after year, this simple strategy generated outsized alpha every single year... until 2017.
This quirk was also noticed today by Bank of America's Savita Subramanian, who in a report on fund positioning confirms that "over the last several years, buying the most underweight stocks and selling the most overweight stocks has consistently generated alpha, although performance in 2017 has bucked the trend."
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And while 2017 appeared to be an outlier in this trend of betting against crowded trades, Subramanian cautions that this divergence will hardly last into the new 2018, to wit: "History suggests one should watch out for crowded stocks at the beginning of the year: based on our data since 2009, the 10 most overweight stocks have lagged the 10 most underweight stocks on average by 57bp and 117bp during the first 15 and 30 calendar days of the year, respectively."
The biggest risk, according to the BofA strategist is that after Dec. 31, fund managers "tend to rebalance after year-end," something which they already did to an extent late in 2017:
We already saw some of this trade shortly after the strong style reversal since Nov 27, when neglected stocks outperformed crowded stocks by almost a full percentage point over the next two weeks. However, this spread was subsequently wiped out ahead of December 31, suggesting that crowding risks may remain ahead of the tendency for asset allocators and PMs to rebalance after year-end.
Looking at a sector breakdown, it will not come as news to anyone that over the past year the entire fund community has bought up tech names. As 13F after 13F season has shown, large cap funds hit record overweights in Tech several times last year, and Tech overtook Discretionary as the most crowded sector. This is a two-edged sword: while on one hand, this massive crowding helped funds finish the year with the highest hit rate in 8 years (48.1%), as Tech accounted for  38% of the S&P 500’s returns in 2017, the unwind - which has yet to come - will be especially violent and painful.
It's not just tech names however: several other sectors where there has been abnormal changes in fund positioning in recent months are financials and real estate, consumer, and energy and materials:
  • Financials and Real Estate: With the sector expected to benefit from tax reform and deregulation, Financials have emerged from a 15-month long underweight in 2017 to hit the benchmark (S&P 500) weight, driven by Banks and Capital Markets. Broken out from Financials as its own sector in 2016, Real Estate saw the biggest increase in  exposure across sectors in 2017, with its relative weight rising from .33x a year ago to .40x today — the highest level in our data history since 2009.
  • Consumer: PMs cut back on Discretionary and Staples exposure throughout 2017, with relative weight in Discretionary today at an 18-month low and Staples at its lowest level since 2009.
  • Energy and Materials: These two sectors saw the biggest drop in relative weight last year as managers continued to shun commodity exposure. The relative weight in Energy has dropped from .87x a year ago to .76x (although is neutral on a beta adjusted basis); and Materials dropped from .95x to .86x today, its lowest level since 2009.
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So going back to BofA's original warning, namely that it is a dangerous time for the most crowded longs, here is the bank's analysis of the 10 stocks active funds have the most and least exposure to as of this moment.
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Again, Subramanian's warning is that should there be a violent unwind - and one is long overdue - the most crowded stocks will be hit the hardest, while predictably the "least loved" stocks will outperform.
Or perhaps not, because at the current rate, active funds may no longer be the marginal decision - and price - makers for stocks. As the following charts show, not only is the exodus of funds out of active (and into passive) vehicles accelerating - with passive winning and active losing for most of the last 9 yrs - but the cumulative outflows from active funds since the great financial crisis are now approaching $1 trillion dollars, offset by $2 trillion in inflows into passive funds.
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If that is indeed the case, the only differentiating factor is how much faster will retail investors dump funds into stocks, which as we first warned one year ago, are being sold by institutions, private clients and other smart money at an unprecedented pace to "mom and pop" investors across the US.

mercoledì 3 gennaio 2018

Survival Tactics for a Hypervalued Market

It is not to be forgotten that what we call rational grounds for our beliefs are often extremely irrational attempts to justify our instincts.
– Thomas Huxley

As we begin 2018, the most appropriate starting point is to clarify our actual investment stance. A central aspect of our outlook is the distinction between investment and speculation. If Wall Street believes that stock prices could advance further because investors temporarily have a speculative bit in their teeth, and that they care more that the environment "feels good" than about any careful evaluation of long-term investment prospects, we have no strenuous objection to that argument. Indeed, that's exactly why, until we see more than the early deterioration in market internals we observe at present, our immediate investment outlook is rather neutral. On the other hand, if Wall Street believes that current valuations are actually "justified," that 10-12 year S&P 500 total returns are likely to be meaningfully positive, or that the S&P 500 will avoid a collapse on the order of -65% over the completion of the current market cycle, my view is that these beliefs are strenuously at odds with the evidence from a century of market history.

The essential survival tactic for a hypervalued market, and its resolution ahead, is to recognize that market valuations can experience breathtaking departures from historical norms for extended segments of the market cycle, so long as shorter-term conditions contribute to speculative psychology rather than risk-averse psychology. One must distinguish between a boulder resting safely at a permanently high plateau, and a boulder teetering at the edge of a cliff, thanks to temporary and unreliable support. Refrain from imagining that extreme valuations are equivalent to "justified" or "durable" valuations. A century of evidence suggests that something very different is going on.

Specifically, while the most historically-reliable market valuation measures are now more than 2.8 times their historical norms, history has produced many instances (1929, 2000 and the present being the three most offensive) where stocks reached objectively extreme valuations on reliable measures, but prices continued to advance for a portion of the complete market cycle. The "hinge" that distinguishes an overvalued market that continues to advance from an overvalued market that drops like a rock is purely psychological – it's the preference of investors toward speculation or risk-aversion, typically encouraged by short-term, cyclical factors that lead investors to feel optimistic or fearful. Based on a century of market evidence, we've found that the most reliable and observable measure of those psychological preferences is the uniformity or divergence of market internals across a broad range of individual stocks, industries, sectors, and security-types, including debt securities of varying creditworthiness. That uniformity is important, because when investors are inclined toward speculation, they tend to be indiscriminate about it.

The summary of our present outlook is this: we view market valuations as obscene, with negative expected S&P 500 total returns over the coming 10-12 year period, and a probable interim loss on the order of -65% over the completion of the current market cycle. Still, in the absence of further deterioration and dispersion in market internals, our immediate market outlook is actually rather neutral. Remember also that a material retreat in valuations, coupled with an early improvement in market internals, is likely to produce favorable investment opportunities far sooner than 10-12 years from now.

Presently, a further deterioration in market internals, particularly evidenced by widening credit spreads or expanding breakdowns among individual stocks, would signal a shift in investor preferences from speculation toward risk-aversion. We'll take that evidence as it emerges. I do believe that out-of-the-money tail-risk hedges may be useful, given the low level of option volatility (as measured by the VIX), but a negative market outlook should wait on further internal deterioration. Establishing tail-risk hedges may be useful because, as investors discovered after the 1929, 1973, 1987, 2000 and 2007 peaks, once internals deteriorate materially, the exit doors can prove to be impossibly narrow, at a point where the distance between prices and historically reasonable valuations remains very wide.

Put simply, valuation is the essential driver of investment returns over a 10-12 year horizon, and of the potential market loss over the completion of any given cycle. However, market returns over shorter segments of the cycle (as well as deviations from value-based expectations) are mainly driven by cyclical fluctuations in investor psychology. Even the most extreme overvaluation has little effect on market direction in periods when investors feel optimistic. Likewise, even deep undervaluation may provide little support in periods when investors are fearful. The key during these times is to refrain from attempts to "justify" the level of prices just because the market is trading at one extreme or another, and to carefully monitor the uniformity or dispersion of market internals, in order to gauge that psychology in an observable way.

The next few charts demonstrate these principles. First, the chart below shows our preferred valuation measure, which I introduced several years ago (nonfinancial market capitalization to corporate gross value-added, including estimated foreign revenues). MarketCap/GVA is shown on an inverted log scale in blue. The red line shows S&P 500 average nominal total returns over the subsequent 12-year period.


We can extend the history of this chart at a slight cost to reliability using the Margin-Adjusted CAPE, my margin-adjusted variant of Robert Shiller's cyclically-adjusted P/E, which substantially improves on Shiller's raw version by accounting for variations in the embedded profit margin. On this measure, market valuations are the most extreme in history. Again, our Margin-Adjusted CAPE is shown on an inverted log scale in blue, along with actual subsequent 12-year S&P 500 total returns.


It should be clear that valuations are the primary determinant of whether subsequent market returns are likely to be satisfactory or unsatisfactory, but notice that there are also several "errors" in these charts; points where actual 12-year market returns either exceeded or fell short of the returns that one would have projected 12-years earlier. These "errors" aren't random. When we look at periods when the most recent 12-year S&P 500 total return has been substantially higher than what one would have expected 12-years earlier, it's always because the end point represented a temporary speculative extreme, like 2000, 2007, and today. Likewise, 12-year S&P 500 total returns ending at the 1949, 1974, and 1982 secular valuation lows clearly undershot the return that one would have expected 12-years earlier. As a side-note, we prefer the 12-year horizon because that's the point where the "autocorrelation" profile of valuations generally reaches zero.

A few weeks ago, Mark Louis, a macro investor, suggested a useful way to illustrate what's going on with those errors. The blue line in the chart below shows the deviation of 12-year S&P 500 total returns from what one would have projected 12-years earlier, based on MarketCap/GVA. The line runs to the present because we know both the most recent 12-year return, and the return that would have been projected 12-years ago. The red line shows the Consumer Confidence Index reported by the Conference Board. What's clear from this chart is that the main reason that market returns periodically deviate from value-based expectations is that investors temporarily feel good, or that they temporary feel pessimistic. These departures from value-based expectations reflect shorter-term cyclical factors that create comfort or discomfort among investors. Just like 2000 and 2007, the current departure from valuation norms has much less to do with any durable "justification" for rich valuations as it does with the fact that, for the moment, investors generally "feel good."


Refrain from imagining that extreme valuations are equivalent to 'justified' or 'durable' valuations. A century of evidence suggests that something very different is going on.

A quick reminder of why we experienced difficulty during the half-cycle since 2009, and how we've adapted. In prior market cycles across history, the emergence of extreme "overvalued, overbought, overbullish" syndromes often provided advance warning of air-pockets, panics and crashes. In the advancing half-cycle since 2009, zero-interest rate policy and post-election enthusiasm encouraged speculation well after these syndromes emerged. The necessary adaptation was to explicitly prioritize market internals above those "overvalued, overbought, overbullish" syndromes, and to do so without any exceptions. The fact that we made that adaptation incrementally certainly eroded my credibility in this half-cycle, despite admirably navigating previous complete market cycles. We now make no exceptions: regardless of any other feature of valuations or market action, if our measures of market internals are favorable, we will not establish a hard-negative market outlook. That single adaptation would have dramatically improved our experience in the recent half cycle.

The recent advancing half-cycle has generated the incorrect impression that we adhere to a perma-bearish outlook as a matter of disposition. As this market cycle is completed, our departure from that expectation may come as a surprise, but it shouldn't. The fact is that I expect our market outlook to be constructive or aggressive far more often than not over the course of time. Such an outlook emphatically does not require valuations to retreat to historical norms. If you understand that, you'll also understand why nearly all of my financial assets remain committed to our own value-conscious, historically-informed, full-cycle investment discipline.

The strongest investment opportunities typically emerge when a material retreat in valuations is joined by an early improvement in market internals. In the interim, understand that the most reliable valuation measures we identify are indeed over 2.8 times historical norms that they've regularly approached or breached by the completion of every market cycle in history, apart from the 2002 low. That includes market cycles associated with low interest rates. After navigating the 2000-2002 and 2007-2009 collapses (with a constructive stretch in between), Money magazine named me as the best advisor for a bear market. One can never make assurances about the future, but I hope to merit that characterization over the completion of this cycle as well.

Avoid the temptation to "justify" current extremes

Like the 1929 and 2000 market peaks, Wall Street is pushing a great deal of loose analysis intended to "justify" current valuations, imagining that just because prices have reached a certain level, they must actually belong there. Arguments like "valuations are justified given the level of interest rates," or "given the recent tax cuts," or "given a growing economy with low inflation" sound reasonable enough, but as we've detailed at length in recent months, they don't hold up to the scrutiny of careful discounted cash flow analysis.

Specifically, if interest rates are depressed because long-term growth rates are also depressed (which we'll detail again below), no valuation premium is "justified" at all. Even without a valuation premium, prospective equity market returns would already be commensurately depressed and aligned with lower interest rates, as a result of the lower growth rate. This can be demonstrated using any discounted cash flow approach.

Suppose, for example, that a stock is expected to deliver a dividend D next year, future dividends grow at rate g into the infinite future, and those future cash flows are discounted to present value at rate r. Given these assumptions, the present value of the discounted cash flows will be V = D/(r-g). Moreover, assuming that the stock is purchased at a price equal to V and the expected cash flows are actually delivered, one can show that the long-term rate of return on the investment will be r.

Now, reduce r and g by the same amount. What happens to the fair value V? Nothing. What happens to the fair multiple of price to dividends? Nothing. Put simply, if the discount rate is lower because growth is also lower, no valuation premium is justified at all. Now imagine that an investor pays a price that's 2.8 times V anyway. Will the long-term rate of return on the investment still be r? Not a chance.

To understand the implications of this example, let's look at some data. I've demonstrated before that the growth rate of GDP is the sum of two components: growth in the number of workers (employment growth), plus growth in output per worker (productivity). The "structural" part of employment growth is driven by demographic factors like population growth and the age profile of the work force, while the "cyclical" part of employment growth is driven by changes in the unemployment rate (which falls when employment growth exceeds labor force growth, and rises when employment growth falls short of labor force growth).

The charts below recap the behavior of these components. First, because of long-term changes in population growth and other demographic factors, U.S. labor force growth has gradually declined from 1.8% annual growth in the early post-war years, to just 0.4% annual growth today.


The trajectory of labor productivity shows a similar pattern of maturation and slowdown over the post-war period, with real output per person slowing from 2.6% growth in the early post-war years, to just 0.6% annual growth today.


Add 0.4% labor force growth and 0.6% productivity growth, and you get 1% "structural" GDP growth. Not surprisingly, the slowdown in these drivers of real GDP growth have been observed in the form of real U.S. GDP growth averaging less than half of its historical rate. Indeed, even if productivity growth was to suddenly accelerate enough to fully recover the 1.9% average pace of the 1972-2012 period, structural economic growth would still be just 2.3% annually.


So even in the event of a surge in economic productivity, the trajectory of U.S. GDP growth is likely to be constrained to the 1-2% range. Any growth beyond that range for U.S. real GDP would have to be driven by the "cyclical" component of employment growth, namely a falling unemployment rate. Since 2009, the rate of unemployment has dropped from 10% to just 4.1%, contributing nearly half of the 2.2% annual GDP growth we've observed since the bottom of the global financial crisis. Given the current level of unemployment, the scope for further "cyclical" contributions to GDP growth is quite limited. Indeed, any material increase in the unemployment rate at this point would quickly reduce real GDP growth below that 1-2% "structural" expectation, which is another way of saying that economic recessions are likely to emerge more easily than in the past, not less. The chart below illustrates the impact of structural and cyclical components of GDP growth.


The bottom line here is that while interest rates are indeed low, those low interest rates are also coupled with substantially lower growth prospects than in the past. The belief that low interest rates "justify" high equity market valuations may sound appealing, but is only true if the trajectory of cash flows is held constant. That's not the case here. The simple fact is that no valuation premium at all is "justified" by the combination of low interest rates and low structural economic growth prospects. Moreover, even if valuation multiples were at their historical norms, expected market returns would still be below their historical norms, as a result of lower structural growth. Again, this can be demonstrated using any discounted cash flow approach.

Likewise, even before the recent tax cuts, the effective U.S. corporate tax rate (actual taxes paid as a fraction of pre-tax corporate earnings) was already just 20%; one of the lowest levels in history outside of U.S. recessions. Even if the recent cut reduces the effective corporate tax rate to just 12%; the increase in after-tax earnings would be (1-0.12)/(1-0.20)-1 = 10%, and stock prices would deserve to fully capitalize that as a 10% price increase only if the cuts were expected to permanently survive every future Congress and Administration.

Meanwhile, given that record earnings and depressed corporate borrowing rates have not sufficed to boost net domestic investment beyond half of its historical norm, and prior tax windfalls (e.g. the 2004 repatriation holiday) were almost entirely expended on dividends and stock buybacks, there's little reason to expect any sort of durable surge in capital spending. That's particularly true given a 4.1% unemployment rate and already deep account deficits, since rapid growth in capital spending invariably emerges from wholly opposite conditions.


Given the current level of unemployment, the scope for further 'cyclical' contributions to GDP growth is quite limited. Indeed, any material increase in the unemployment rate at this point would quickly reduce real GDP growth below the 1-2% 'structural' expectation, which is another way of saying that economic recessions are likely to emerge more easily than in the past, not less.

Again, the essential survival tactic for the financial environment ahead is to recognize that market valuations can experience breathtaking departures from historical norms for extended segments of the market cycle, so long as shorter-term conditions contribute to speculative psychology rather than risk-averse psychology. The best observable measure of that psychological preference is the uniformity or divergence of market internals across a broad range of securities.

This distinction between investment and speculation allows one to understand how valuations were able to reach extremes like 1929, 2000, and today, without collapsing at much more modest levels of overvaluation; to understand how valuations can be so strongly related to long-term and full-cycle market outcomes while being nearly useless in navigating shorter segments of the market cycle; and to understand how we can fully expect a -65% market collapse over the completion of this cycle and yet maintain a fairly neutral immediate outlook (albeit with a preference for hedges to cover wicked tail risk).

Don't discount discounted cash flows

A share of stock is ultimately nothing but a claim on a very, very long-term stream of cash flows that will be delivered into the hands of investors over time. Investment, properly defined, is concerned with the price one pays for that very, very long-term stream of future cash flows, and the returns that can be expected as a result of that tradeoff. On this front, the Iron Law is that the higher the price an investor pays for given stream of expected future cash flows, the lower the return the investor can expect over time. Conversely, the lower the price an investor pays for a given stream of expected future cash flows, the higher the return the investor can expect over time.

Notice that only two objects are required in this formulation: the stream of expected future cash flows, and the current price. The instant these two objects are in hand, the expected long-term investment return is also fully identified. For example, suppose a security promises a $100 payment a decade from today. If the price of that security is $46.32, one can immediately calculate that the expected return is 8% annually. Once the price is known, no appeal to interest rates is required to make that calculation. Of course, once that expected return is calculated, investors can compare it to the returns available on competing investments.

So given any stream of expected future cash flows, once valuations are observed (on sufficiently reliable measures), expected future returns are also observed. To say that valuations are elevated is then equivalent to saying that expected future investment returns will be depressed. Low interest rates may be used as an argument for why future investment returns should be below the norm, but they will be below the norm nonetheless.

Few things in the investment world are more intellectually distressing than an investor who believes that low interest rates "justify" extreme valuations, yet still believes that future investment returns will be satisfactory anyway. If interest rates are low because growth rates are also low, the situation is even worse, because no valuation premium is required in order to reduce future investment returns – the lower growth rate does that already. To assign extreme valuations to stocks in that situation is to reduce future returns even further. That's exactly what investors have done.

I've often observed that every reliable valuation measure is nothing more than shorthand for a proper discounted cash flow analysis. The central requirement for the "fundamental" one uses for a valuation ratio is that it should act as a "sufficient statistic" that is proportional to, and representative of, the very, very long-term stream of cash flows that investors can expect to be delivered into their hands over decades. Earnings are certainly required in order to generate long-term cash flows, but year-to-year earnings (or operating earnings, or NIPA profits, or even Shiller earnings) are rather unreliable statistics for the long-term stream. While we're sympathetic to the idea that profit margins could potentially be higher in the future than in the past (though most of the arguments we've seen to this effect are rather speculative), we're not at all sympathetic to the idea that the appropriate adjustment is to elevate the expected value of future cash flows by a factor of 2.8.

As an empirical matter, we've regularly found that when we relate reliable valuation measures to subsequent S&P 500 total returns, a 10% expected 10-12 year market return generally corresponds to the pre-bubble (i.e. pre-1998) norms for those measures. Above-average valuations correspond to weaker returns, and below-average valuations correspond to stronger returns. This isn't an accident. Rather, it should inform investors that the long-term returns they expect from stocks are tightly related to the prices they pay.

Every reliable valuation measure is nothing more than shorthand for a proper discounted cash flow analysis.

Back in 2007, as the market approached its peak before the global financial crisis, I demonstrated that with very few assumptions, one could actually calculate the level of the S&P 500 corresponding to a 10% expected return, at every point in time across history. The chart below shows this approach. Essentially, we've taken actual S&P 500 dividends since 1900, and discounted them back to present value at each point in time, using a 10% capitalization rate. Since future expected dividends also need to be estimated, the assumptions we use exert some effect on current estimates. Given the likelihood of 1-2% real structural GDP growth, we've assumed 4% annual nominal growth in future dividends, which is right in line with the growth rate of nominal GDP, corporate revenues, and corporate earnings over the past 20 years. Remember also that Standard & Poor's already accounts for the impact of stock repurchases by reducing the index divisor (which boosts index-level dividends directly).

What we observe at present may be distressing, but we think it's also accurate. In order for the S&P 500 to be priced for a 10% expected long-term annual return, the Index would presently need to trade at roughly 884; less than one-third of present levels. An 8% expected long-term return would correspond to a level of roughly 1281 on the S&P 500. Indeed, the Index reached this range of prospective returns even by the completion of the most recent market cycle, and the valuation level associated with an 8% expected return exceeds the actual value of the S&P 500 at nearly every point in history except the period surrounding the 1929 peak and the extremes of recent years. The only reason the S&P 500 has posted even 5.2% average annual total returns since the 2000 peak is that the recent extreme has restored the most offensive valuations in U.S. market history. We expect all of that total return to be erased over the completion of this market cycle.


The bottom line is that we fully expect a market retreat on the order of 50-65% over the completion of the current cycle. That's a different statement than saying that it must occur immediately. If we've learned one thing in this speculative half-cycle, it's to refrain from underestimating the speculative extremes that investors are capable of embracing. The appropriate response is not to try to "justify" current valuations, but rather to recognize the speculative factors that allow them to temporarily persist, and to closely monitor the uniformity and divergence of market internals. Given the potential for abrupt shifts, we're partial to establishing tail-risk hedges early, but given the low level of implied volatility in the options market, those hedges are remarkably inexpensive relative to historical norms.

Again, every reliable valuation multiple is simply shorthand for a proper discounted cash flow analysis. The chart below offers a rather elegant illustration of this principle. The blue line shows the ratio of the S&P 500 to the estimated level (based on actual subsequent discounted dividends) where the Index would be priced for a 10% expected return in data since 1900. The red line presents the Margin-Adjusted CAPE on a log scale (right). It should come as no surprise that these measures are tightly correlated with each other, and with actual subsequent market returns across history.


Over the coming years, we expect roughly $20 trillion in capitalization to be erased from the U.S. equity market; a figure that is roughly the same size as U.S. GDP itself. Household financial assets have now reached the highest ratio to disposable personal income in history. Unfortunately, this measure (particularly the log ratio) has a strikingly negative correlation (-0.88) with actual S&P 500 returns over the subsequent 12-year period.

There's no sense in encouraging investors to sell. In aggregate, that's not possible. Somebody will have to hold equities over the completion of this market cycle. The best we can do is to speak our truth on behalf of those who value our work; to encourage investors to evaluate their market exposure, investment horizons and risk-tolerances; and to remind them that the position of valuations is likely to exert an enormous impact on their long-term returns, even if the speculative inclinations of investors sustain these extremes over a shorter segment of the market cycle.

The essential survival tactic for a hypervalued market, and its resolution ahead, is to recognize that market valuations can experience breathtaking departures from historical norms for extended segments of the market cycle, so long as shorter-term conditions contribute to speculative psychology rather than risk-averse psychology. Yet those departures matter enormously for long-term returns.

By the completion of this market cycle, there will likely be no talk of the "cost" of getting out too early. The 2000-2002 collapse wiped out the entire total return of the S&P 500 – in excess of T-bill returns – all the way back to May 1996. The 2007-2009 collapse wiped out the entire excess total return of the S&P 500 all the way back to June 1995. We correctly anticipated the extent of both collapses. I can't emphasize strongly enough how much of our challenges in the recent half-cycle traced to our bearish response to "overvalued, overbought, overbullish" syndromes- which we've since subordinated to our measures of market internals, with no exceptions.

Frankly, I expect that the completion of the current cycle will wipe out the entire excess total return of the S&P 500 all the way back to roughly October 1997. That outcome would not even require our most reliable measures of valuation to revisit their historical norms. If you know how our measures of valuation and market action helped us to navigate prior complete market cycles, you know that it would be a mistake to underestimate the full-cycle risks investors currently face, regardless of whether or not those risks are realized immediately.

lunedì 1 gennaio 2018

2007 All Over Again: Borrowers Start Scamming Desperate Lenders


One of the hallmarks of late-stage bubbles is a shift of power from lenders to borrowers. As asset prices soar and interest rates plunge it becomes harder to generate a decent yield on bonds and other fixed income securities, so people with money to lend (like pension funds and bond mutual funds) are forced to accept ever-less-favorable and therefore far-more-risky terms. 
Recall the liar loans that were popular towards the end of the 2000s housing bubble and you get the idea. Lenders were so desperate for paper to feed the securitization machine that they literally stopped asking mortgage borrowers to prove that they could cover the interest. 

Here we go again, but this time in the market for leveraged buyout loans: 

Yield-Starved Investors Giving In to the Demands of Bond Sellers

(Wall Street Journal) – Demand for leveraged loans is allowing private-equity firms to water down legal safeguards for investors Hellman & Friedman LLC and other investors sought last month to borrow money in the bond market to finance a takeover. 

The U.S. private-equity firm offered a yield of about 3%, but few of the protections once considered routine.

Still, the investors bought.

Rampant demand for leveraged loans is allowing private-equity firms to water down legal safeguards for investors. Many lawyers and bankers increasingly worry that such changes could result in higher losses for investors during the next downturn, as creditors find themselves with less protection.

Terms on loans from Hellman & Friedman's takeover of Denmark's Nets A/S allowed greater flexibility for the borrower to take on more debt, extract cash from the company and even restrict who owns the loans. That, though, is no longer unusual in the loan market.


In the financing of a previous takeover of Nets in 2014, a separate group of private equity borrowers had to prove that debt at the Danish payments company wasn't rising too quickly. Such a requirement wasn't present this time.

The move to more borrower-friendly terms has come in both the U.S. and Europe. But the most dramatic shift has been in Europe, where the imbalance between loan supply and demand is most acute.

Investors are clamoring for leveraged loans as years of low interest rates and central banks' bond buying have pushed down returns elsewhere. Trillions of dollars of sovereign debt, primarily in Europe, continue to sport negative yields, meaning investors pay to lend governments money.

With "far too much cash trying to find too few homes," private-equity firms "can be more aggressive and lenders will take it," said Adam Freeman, a partner at Linklaters LLP.

Some of the year's largest leveraged buyouts in Europe have either removed covenants and legal protections, or allowed the borrower to control who buys its debt.

That included Bain Capital and Cinven's takeover of German drugmaker Stada Arzneimittel AG, Lone Star LP's acquisition of German building materials maker Xella Group, as well as the takeover of Nets A/S.

Analysts say that along with low borrowing costs, the weakening of deal terms has helped boost the appeal of loans to private-equity firms. In Europe, around 88% of the debt funding for leveraged buyouts came from loans this year, according to S&P Global Market Intelligence's LCD unit, up from 73% in 2015. Meanwhile, 81% of loans in Europe this year have been "covenant-lite," meaning they lack many standard investor protections, up from 21% in 2013, according to LCD.

Among the first changes was the stripping out of so-called financial-maintenance covenants, which are investors' main defense against borrowers taking on too much debt. They require quarterly tests of a company's leverage level, allowing lenders to force the firm into default if it rises too high.

Other borrower-friendly terms include stringent loan-to-own clauses, which limit investors' ability to sell to distressed debt funds. Recent loans have placed restrictions against such firms as Elliot Capital Management, Apollo Global Management and Cerberus Capital Management.

Bankers warn that such provisions, along with so-called white lists that detail which funds can buy the loan, could hurt liquidity if investors can't unload loans in troubled companies to the sort of funds that specialize in taking on this risk.

This is just what happens when central banks push interest rates way down while flooding the market with new currency. Lenders find themselves with too much money to lend and borrowers can, as a result, can write their own tickets. With eventually disastrous results. 

When things get tough, as they always do after a long debt binge, the private equity borrowers will suck as much money out of their captive companies as possible, while layering on new debt at unfavorable terms. Then they'll let those companies default and hand off the near-worthless carcasses to creditors. 

You have to feel sorry (and, yes, a bit of disgust) for the victims of this recurring scam. Pension funds, for instance, are saddled by their political masters with unrealistically high return assumptions of 7% – 8%, which are unattainable in a world where long-term bonds yield next to nothing. So the prospect of even an extra percentage point of yield is tantalizing for pension fund managers whose jobs are on the line if they can't do the impossible. 

A personal aside: My first serious finance job was as a junk bond analyst with a high-yield mutual fund, and my days boiled down to reading bond covenants and answering the question, "how can they screw us?" The assumption was that if the borrowers could screw us they would, and we wanted to see it coming. 

But with bubbles of today's magnitude, seeing it coming isn't much help for either the owners of this increasingly toxic paper or the economy as a whole.

domenica 31 dicembre 2017

China Launches New Capital Controls: Puts $15,000 Annual Cap On Overseas ATM Withdrawals

Back in September 2015 - long before bitcoin became the "world's biggest bubble in history", and when it was still trading at just $200 - we explained not only that the primary purpose behind the use of the cryptocurrency was evading capital controls, but predicted that it would rise much, much higher as more Chinese, and not only, money launderers caught on to the real function of bitcoin and other cryptos, to wit:


... we would not be surprised to see another push higher in the value of bitcoin: it was earlier this summer when the digital currency, which can bypass capital controls and national borders with the click of a button, surged on Grexit concerns and fears a Drachma return would crush the savings of an entire nation. Since then, BTC has dropped (in no small part as a result of the previously documented "forking" with Bitcoin XT), however if a few hundred million Chinese decide that the time has come to use bitcoin as the capital controls bypassing currency of choice, and decide to invest even a tiny fraction of the $22 trillion in Chinese deposits in bitcoin (whose total market cap at last check was just over $3 billion), sit back and watch as we witness the second coming of the bitcoin bubble, one which could make the previous all time highs in the digital currency, seems like a low print.

A little over two years later, and several thousand percent higher, we were right on both counts: not only did bitcoin proceed to soar to meteoric highs, but the Chinese capital outflows were just getting started and only a series of draconian interventions by China in 2016 managed to briefly halt the hot money exodus which amount to roughly $1 trillion in Chinese reserve outflows.

We said "briefly" because despite its closed "capital account", no government can ever hope to halt the flight of nearly $40 trillion in deposits (and countless trillions invested across China's securities).

And while China has been doing everything in its power to halt the capital flight, or at least give the impression there no longer is one, going so far as the central bank directly manipulating the currency by directly crushing the shorts in terminal short squeezes and margin calls to telegraph to the world that there is no legitimate capital flight, actions out of China suggest otherwise, and it now appears that - in the latest good news for bitcoin bulls - China is once again cracking down on capital controls as hot money outflows have not only not stopped, but may again be accelerating.

According to the SCMP, to gree the New Year, Beijing will implement new limits on the amount of money people can withdraw from their Chinese bank accounts while overseas, "in the latest move by Beijing to tighten its capital account controls and curb money outflows."

Under the new rules individuals will be allowed to withdraw a maximum of 100,000 yuan (US$15,000) a year, regardless of how many separate bank accounts or ATM cards they have, China's FX regulator, the State Administration of Foreign Exchange said in a statement released on Saturday.

Under current rules, there is an annual ATM withdrawal cap of 100,000 yuan per bank card, but there are no rules to stop people having multiple cards attached to a single account or multiple accounts with different banks. So apparently, the PBOC finally figured out the oldest trick in the book that Chinese residents were using to game the regime.

Meanwhile, the existing cap on daily withdrawals remains unchanged at 10,000 yuan per card. People will still be allowed to hold multiple ATM cards but the annual limit will apply to the combined value of all withdrawals.


The annual cap of 100,000 yuan per person and daily limit of 10,000 yuan applies to all ATM cards issued by mainland Chinese banks, covering both yuan and foreign exchange accounts.

What is the punishment for violating the latest capital control? The foreign exchange regulator said that if any Chinese is found using mainland bank cards to withdraw more than 100,000 yuan from overseas ATMs within a calendar year, they will be barred from taking out cash abroad using any mainland bank card for the rest of the year as well as the following year.

The restrictions were a "necessary measure" to curb money laundering, terrorism financing and tax evasion, the regulator said.

"International experiences have shown that large cash transactions are often associated with criminal activities such as fraud, gambling, money laundering and terrorism financing," the statement said.

What SAFE really meant is that despite Beijing's best attempts, capital flight was continuing.

The regulator also said that "some" Chinese had been found to have used a large number of ATM cards to withdraw sums of cash overseas that far exceeded what was needed for "normal consumption", according to the regulator.

It also warned Chinese not to try evading the rules. "People should not borrow other people's bank cards or lend them to others to help get around the regulation," the statement said.

And just like every other time China cracks down on capital flight, it will merely force even more to use cryptocurrencies to circumvent attempts to halt moneyflows, which needless to say, is very bullish for the entire crypto space.

Putting China's closed capital account in context, China's capital controls are among the most restrictive of the world's major economies, and Beijing has tightened rules on outbound remittances and payments in the past two years as a way to defend the country's foreign exchange reserves and yuan exchange rate, something we have covered extensively in the past 3 years.

At the top-level, mainland Chinese can change up to US$50,000 worth of yuan into foreign currencies per year, but the regulator has set extra requirements within that quota including filling in forms and declarations for any purchases. Naturally, the $50K quota is only for mere mortals: Chinese political oligarchs, princelings and corporate barons are largely exempt from the rules, simply because they know the loopholes, chief among which remains use of bitcoin and other cryptos.

Separately, the regulator said the cap on foreign currencies would remain unchanged and the new rule should not affect ordinary Chinese wanting to travel and spend money abroad.

Some 81% of the overseas cash withdrawals made using mainland Chinese ATM cards last year totalled around 30,000 yuan per card, according to the regulator. It said the annual cap of 100,000 yuan should "both meet demand for normal cash withdrawals abroad and contain the large sums made by a few lawbreakers".

But before Vancouver and Toronto real estate agents panic and liquidate all inventory on fears the Chinese "hot money" flood will shortly cease, keep an eye on the price of bitcoin: with Beijing once again cracking down on conventional money transfer means, i.e., debit and credit cards, the only avenue left will be cryptocurrencies.

Come to think of it, it's about time the Chinese again regain their place as the world's largest marginal price setters of bitcoin, once again dethroning Japan and South Korea for the crypto-throne.

The Inescapable Reason Why the Financial System Will Fail

Modern finance has many complex moving parts, and this complexity masks its inner simplicity.

Let's break down the core dynamics of the current financial system.

The Core Dynamic of the "Recovery" and Asset Bubbles: Credit

Credit is the foundation of the current financial system, for credit enables consumers to bring consumption forward, that is, buy more stuff today than they could buy with the cash they have on hand, in exchange for promising to pay principal and interest with their future income.

Credit also enables speculators to buy more assets than they otherwise could were they limited to cash on hand.

Buying goods, services and assets with credit appears to be a good thing: consumers get to enjoy more stuff without having to scrimp and save up income, and investors/speculators can reap more income from owning more assets.

But all goods/services and assets are not equal, and all credit is not equal.

There is an opportunity cost to any loan (i.e. credit), as the income that will be devoted to paying principal and interest in the future could have been devoted to some other use or investment.

So borrowing money to purchase a product or an asset now means foregoing some future purchase.

While all products have some sort of payoff, the payoffs are not equal. If I buy five bottles of $100/bottle champagne and throw a party, the payoff is in the heady moments of celebration. If I buy a table saw for $500, that tool has the potential to help me make additional income for years or even decades to come.

If I'm making money with the table saw, I can pay the debt service out of my new earnings.

All assets are not equal, either. Some assets are riskier than others, with a less certain income stream or payoff. Borrowing to buy assets with predictable returns is one thing, buying assets with highly speculative returns is another; regardless of the eventual result of the investment, the borrower still has to pay interest on the debt, even if the speculative investment goes bust.

The basic idea here is the loan is based on collateral, that there is something of value that is anchoring the loan above and beyond the borrower's ability to pay principal and interest.

The classic example is a house: the lender issues a mortgage based on the market value of the house, i.e. what it can be sold for should the buyer default on the mortgage and the lender has to sell the collateral (the house) underpinning the loan.

The value of the collateral is obviously contingent on the market; the value of the house goes up and down depending on supply and demand, the availability and cost of credit, and so on.

If a lender loans me $500 to buy a new table saw, and I default on the loan, the table saw is the collateral. Unfortunately for the lender, the market value of the used tool is perhaps $250 at best. So the lender loses $250 even after repossessing and selling the collateral.

If the lender loaned me $500 to buy champagne and I default, there is no collateral at all; the loan was based solely on my ability and willingness to pay principal and interest into the future.

When I say that all credit is not equal, I'm referring to the creditworthiness of the borrower. 

Lenders make money by issuing credit to borrowers. The incentives are clear: the more credit they issue, the higher their income.

Given this incentive, it's easy to convince oneself that a marginal borrower is creditworthy, and that a speculative investment is a safe bet.

This is especially true if the government guarantees the loan, for example, a home mortgage. With the government guarantee, there's no reason not to take a chance on a marginal (risky) borrower buying a marginal (risky) house.

If we take some home mortgages and bundle them into a mortgage-backed security, we can sell the future income stream (i.e. the payments made by the borrowers in the future) as securities that can be sold worldwide to investors. I can make risky loans, skim the fees and pass the risk onto global investors.

All this debt is now considered an asset to investors.

There's one last feature of credit: liquidity. Liquidity refers to the pool of credit available to refinance or roll over existing debt. If I'm having trouble paying my credit card, for example, and there's plenty of liquidity in the credit system, I can obtain a larger line of credit and borrow enough to pay my monthly principal and interest on the existing debt.

If I can refinance my existing debt at a lower interest rate, so much the better.

Credit can be issued by private-sector lenders to private-sector borrowers, or by public-sector central banks to private-sector lenders. Central banks can buy public and private debt (government and corporate bonds, mortgages, etc.), effectively transferring debt from the private sector to the public sector.

These are the basic moving pieces of the credit expansion that has fueled both the "recovery" and the reflation of asset valuations, which have now reached historic extremes.
The Current (Flawed) Logic We're Pursuing

In response to the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2008, central banks lowered interest rates to near-zero to boost private-sector lending, and increased liquidity to enable private-sector lenders and borrowers to refinance existing debt and generate new credit.

They also bought assets: government bonds, corporate bonds and in some cases, stocks via ETFs (exchange traded funds).

The goal here was to prop up the collateral underpinning all the debt. If liquidity dried up, consumers and enterprises would default, handing lenders catastrophic losses, as the crisis had crushed the market value of the collateral that lenders would have to sell to recoup their losses.

And so central banks pursued heretofore unprecedented policies aimed at goosing private-sector lending and borrowing while boosting the markets for stocks, bonds and real estate—the collateral that supported all the debt that was at risk of default.

All this low-cost and easily available credit, coupled with the central banks' public messages that they would "do whatever it takes" to restore credit mechanisms and reflate the private-sector markets for stocks, bonds and real estate, worked: credit expanded and markets recovered, and then soared to new highs.

While these policies accomplished the intended goals, boosting both new credit and asset valuations, they also generated less salutary consequences.

By lowering interest rates and bond yields to near-zero, central banks deprived institutional owners who rely on stable, high-yielding safe investment income—insurers, pension funds, individual retirement accounts, and so on—of exactly what they need: safe, stable, high-yield returns.

In this "do whatever it takes" environment, the only way to earn a high return is to buy risk assets—assets such as stocks and junk bonds that are intrinsically riskier than Treasury bonds and other low-risk investments.
The Stark Conundrum We Face

Central banks are now trapped. If they raise rates to provide low-risk, high-yield returns to institutional owners, they will stifle the "recovery" and the asset bubbles that are dependent on unlimited liquidity and super-low interest rates.

But if they keep yields low, the only way institutional investors can earn the gains they need to survive is to pile into risk assets and hope the current bubbles will loft higher.

This traps the central banks in a strategy of pushing risk assets—already at nose-bleed valuations—ever higher, as any decline would crush the value of the collateral underpinning the titanic mountain of debt the system has created in the past eight years and hand institutional owners losses rather than gains.

This conundrum has pushed the central banks into yet another policy extreme: to mask the rising systemic risk created by asset bubbles, central banks have taken to suppressing measures of volatility—measures than in previous eras would reflect the rising risks of extreme asset bubbles deflating.