venerdì 25 maggio 2018

Late-Stage Credit: When There Are No Buyers Left for Inflated Assets

When Fed-printed dollars are flowing freely through the banking system and out to consumers, bidding wars break out for everything. Stocks, bonds, housing…free debt means lots of easy capital with which to overpay for assets. And whoever it willing to borrow the most can overpay the most.

What happens when that easy credit goes away? Suddenly, those previous buyers go to sell to the next bigger sucker taking out the next bigger 

loan…but that loan isn't available anymore. Welcome to the bursting of the subprime real estate bubble. The bursting of the Everything Bubble awaits. As summer approaches, and dispositions loosen, something less amiable is happening.  Credit markets are tightening. 

The yield on the 10-Year Treasury note has exceeded 3.12 percent.

If yields continue to rise, this one thing will change everything.

When credit is cheap, and plentiful, individuals and businesses increase their borrowing to buy things they otherwise couldn't afford. 

For example, individuals, with massive jumbo loans, bid up the price of houses. Businesses, flush with a seemingly endless supply of cheap credit,

 borrow money and use it to buy back shares of their stock…inflating its value and the value of executive stock options.

When credit is tight, the opposite happens.  Borrowing is reserved for activities that promise a high rate of return; one that exceeds the 

high rate of interest.  This has the effect of deflating the price of financial assets.

The Federal Reserve and the dollar don't stand a chance. The rising part of the credit market cycle will be their death knell. But first, 

rising interest rates and deflating asset prices will wreak havoc and disaster on the world at large.

Why The Fed Is About To Adjust The Interest On Excess Reserves

In addition to the hawkish discussion on timing of future rate hikes ("soon"), offset by the Fed's dovish admission it is willing to tolerate a "modest" inflation overshoot, coupled with the FOMC's thoughts on the shape of the yield curve, and the potential change to forward guidance, an interesting development and novel development in today's FOMC minutes was the discussion of an imminent adjustment that the Fed pays on Excess Reserves.

Currently at 1.75%, and referencing roughly $1.9 trillion in Excess Reserves, the Interest on Excess Reserves (or IOER) was prominently featured in a presentation by Simon Potter discussing the "technical realignment" of the IOER rate relative to the top of the range for the fed funds rates. This is the key excerpt:

The deputy manager then discussed the possibility of a small technical realignment of the IOER rate relative to the top of the target range for the federal funds rate. Since the target range was established in December 2008, the IOER rate has been set at the top of the target range to help keep the effective federal funds rate within the range. Lately the spread of the IOER rate over the effective federal funds rate had narrowed to only 5 basis points. A technical adjustment of the IOER rate to a level 5 basis points below the top of the target range could keep the effective federal funds rate well within the target range. This could be accomplished by implementing a 20 basis point increase in the  IOER rate at a time when the Committee raised the target range for the federal funds rate by 25 basis points.  Alternatively, the IOER rate could be lowered 5 basis points at a meeting in which the Committee left the target range  for the federal funds rate unchanged.

In their discussion of this issue, participants generally agreed thatit could become appropriate to make a small technical adjustment in the Federal Reserve's approach to  implementing monetary policy by setting the IOER  rate modestly below the top of the target range for the federal funds rate. Such an adjustment would be consistent with the Committee's statement in the Policy Normalization Principles and Plans that it would be  prepared to adjust the details of the approach to policy implementation during the period of normalization in light of economic and financial developments. Many participants judged that it would be useful to make such a technical adjustment sooner rather than later. Participants generally agreed that it would be desirable to make that adjustment at a time when the FOMC decided to increase the target range for the federal funds rate; that timing would simplify FOMC communications and emphasize that the IOER rate is a helpful tool for implementing the FOMC's policy decisions but does not, in itself, convey the stance of policy. While additional technical adjustments in the IOER rate could become necessary over time, these were not expected to be frequent. A number of participants also suggested that, before  too long, the Committee might want to further discuss how it can implement monetary policy most effectively and efficiently when the quantity of reserve balances reaches a level appreciably below that seen in recent years.

This is in line with a note from Goldman from late last week looking at the "implications of rising money market rates for the Fed's Balance Sheet reduction" which, as the FOMC Minutes above confirm, found that the effective fed funds rate (EFFR) has drifted further toward the top of the Fed's target range between the overnight reverse repo (ON RRP) rate and interest on excess reserves (IOER); repo rates have risen close to or above IOER; and usage of the Fed's reverse repo facility has dropped to nearly zero. This is shown in the chart below.

So what does the above mean in simple English?

Well, as the FOMC reminds us, the IOER rate has been set at the top of the target range since December 2008 to keep the effective fed funds rate within the range. And, as the chart above shows and as SocGen points out, during the normalization process, the effective funds rate has generally traded close to the middle of the range, but more recently, the spread of IOER to the effective rate has narrowed to 5 bps.

The Minutes noted that "In large part, this development seemed to reflect a firming in rates on repos that, in turn, had resulted from an increase in Treasury bill issuance and the associated higher demands for rep financing by dealers and others." With the Fed continuing to normalize its balance sheet, a drop in reserves was likely to keep putting upward pressure on the effective funds rate relative to the IOER rate, a process which has also been observed recently in the blow out in the Libor-OIS spread.

So to tackle that problem, the FOMC noted that the IOER rate could be set to a level 5 bps below the top of the target range. Fed officials "generally agreed" with this approach, and "many" judged that "it would be useful to make such a technical adjustment sooner rather than later." They also largely agreed that it would be best to make this adjustment at a time when the FOMC decided to increase the target range (i.e. hike), so it seems that this change will occur in June. Thus, when the Fed hikes the target range by 25 bps, IOER would be boosted by 20 bps.

Goldman agreed with this and in a note released on Wednesday afternoon, noted that "making the adjustment at a meeting when the FOMC decided to hike rates was viewed as a simpler alternative to communicate, adding that IOER "does not, in itself, convey the stance of policy."

What does this mean in market terms? Well, shortly after the announcement, Libor-OIS widened by about 2.5bp led by a drop in the OIS component, as market participants repriced the size of future Fed rate hikes after the minutes according to Bloomberg, although there was little additional impact.

Commenting on the upcoming change to the IOER, Jefferies economists Ward McCarthy and Thomas Simons said that the "current state of affairs" doesn't justify a "significant change in operating procedure, but the Committee is being prudent by having this discussion ahead of time." However, they noted that if fed funds is only 2-3bp below IOER by early June, it's possible that the Fed would implement this policy at the June meeting.

Even then, "it might make more sense for the Fed to investigate the issues a little bit more and communicate these issues to the market before making a change."

Practically speaking, a 5bps drop in IOER will have a tiny impact on how much interest banks collect from the Fed on their "parked reserves", although since the drop will take place only on an uptick in Fed Funds, it will be more than offset by the 25 bps increase in underlying rates, making sure that banks continue to extract a generous risk-free coupon on their $1.9 trillion in Uncle Sam generosity courtesy of the Federal Reserve.

What Is The Italian "Contagion" Trigger? Here Is The Answer

Two days ago, when looking at the ongoing turmoil gripping the Italian market, where the imminent formation of a populist, Euroskeptic government with a penchant for spending and threatening to impose a "parallel currency", the "Mini-BoT" has sent Italian yields soaring to the highest level in years, we noted something more troubling not just for Italy, but for all of Europe: Italy's redenomination risk was soaring, and was starting to spread to the other key PIIGS: Portugal and Spain (Greece, having recently concluded its 4th bailout will probably not implode soon).

Still so far the contagion has been quite limited, with "redenomination risk" barely rising to levels seen at the start of the year. Furthermore, today the (long-overdue) hurricane that hit Italy's market over the past two weeks seemed to abate in early trading, pushing BTPs modestly higher and bunds lower, after local press reported that 5-Star was considering Luidi Zingales for Finance Minister, a far more mainstream candidate than the euroskeptic Paolo Savona who is currently the top candidate for the post.

However, the early bund weakness and peripheral gains were quickly reversed after reports that Paolo Savona, who has repeatedly called on the Italy government to plan for a possible euro exit, was in fact backed by League leader Salvini to become economy minister. As a result, Italian 10Ys, i.e. BTPs, which were tighter to bunds by 13bps early on Thursday, moved back to the widest levels of 2018, with the spread blowing out to 193bps...

... while the 10-year yield broke above the closely watched 2.40% resistance level.

But while some modest "contagious" spillover was already noted, much of Europe remained calm despite today's renewed late-day selling in Italy.

So when does it get serious, or in other words, what is the trigger for acute and broad contagion from the ongoing Italian political chaos?

For the answer we go to Goldman, whose X-asset strategist Francesco Garzarelli published a report this morning in which he notes that after an eerie period of complacency, markets "appear to be extremely sensitive" all of a suden to any suggestion that Italy could threaten to leave the Euro area (which would cause systemic turmoil) in order to extract greater concessions from its European partners or, in a worse-case scenario, introduce a dual currency to pursue its domestic policy ambitions.

Confirming what we already know, Garzarelli then notes that concerns about a "parallel currency" exploded after their  made their way into a draft of the political agreement leaked by the press on May 16. "This marked a watershed, as  the 10-year spread to Germany at that time was still close to 130bp."

It is against this backdrop that the choice of the next Minister of Finance - whether euroskeptic Paolo Savona or someone else - in the coming days will be particularly sensitive. And here Goldman notes that "for the risk premium on Italian sovereign bonds to stabilize, investors will at least need to be reassured that the seat will be occupied by  someone who believes that Italy's prosperity lies unambiguously within the single currency area." In other words, if the 5-Star/League coalition does stick with Savona, all bets are off.

It's at that point that contagion emerges as a credible threat to the rest of the Eurozone, potentially reigniting the sovereign debt crisis as some dramatically recall from those days in September-November 2011.

But at what levels? The answer to that key question brings us to the punchline of Goldman's report, which notes the following in terms of actual prices:

Tactically, we would be neutral on 10-year BTPs with spreads n in the 175-200bp area. If the anti-Euro rhetoric  subsides and the Ministry of Finance is offered to an individual with a moderate stance and relevant background, which is our base case, spreads could come back to the 150-160bp range, as levered short positions are closed. Should, instead, the profile of the Cabinet profile and statements by its members continue to send conflicting signals around Italy's Euro participation, we could see the 10-year BTP-Bund spread reaching 250bp, pushing the yield on 10-year BTPs towards 3%. Probability-weighting these two outcomes, we come out as tactically neutral at this stage.

That's the baseline scenario: what about the worst case? For the answer look at the BTP-Bund spread and specifically whether it moves beyond 200 bps, or just 7 wide of where it is trading now.

Should spreads convincingly move above 200bp, systemic spill-overs into EMU assets and beyond would likely increase. Italian sovereign risk has stayed for the most part local so far. Indeed, the 10-year German Bund has failed to break below 50bp, and Spanish bonds have increased a meager 10bp from their lows. This is consistent with our long-standing expectation that Italy would not become a systemic event. That said, should BTP 10-year spreads head above 200bp, the spill-over effects onto other EMU sovereigns would likely intensify.

The chart below shows the current level of the spread, and how close Goldman's "contagion trigger" is located.

And now that we know "what" the trigger is, here is the answer to "where" contagion would spillover to next:

The most vulnerable market in this scenario – based on historical patterns – would be Portugal. We estimate that its sensitivity to swings in our EMU-wide stress variable is twice as high as Spain's.

Goldman then makes two follow up observations: the first is that as risk persists, the BTP-Bund correlation is likely to remain negative:

The daily correlation between BTPs and Bunds has turned negative, reflecting the Italian political uncertainty (Exhibit 3). We would expect this correlation to fall further into negative territory in two opposite scenarios: (i) a further escalation of political tensions and spill-over effects into other EMU spreads (with BTPs selling off and Bunds rallying) or (ii) an easing of political tensions, triggering a market friendly reaction on Italian rates (with BTPs rallying and Bunds selling off). We observed a similar dynamic after the first round of the French Presidential elections, when markets ruled out the possibility of Ms. Le Pen reaching the second round. In that occasion, the correlation between Bunds and OATs fell dramatically into negative territory as spreads tightened. That said, Italian political uncertainty is likely to linger for longer than was the case in France. We expect this to be reflected in more sustained volatility of Italian bond returns, and this is the reason why we expect spreads to trade above their macro 'fair' levels.

But the real question is at what point does Italian risk - and contagion - lead to economic weakness (or collapse) and forces the ECB to not only halt its tightening plans and undo its tapering intentions, but forces Draghi to engage in even more QE which, as a result of a continentwide bond shortage, will mean the ECB now has to buy ETFs (and single stocks) outright:

The potential for spread contagion can put further pressure on the Euro outlook. The majority of the EUR slide over the past month reflects other factors, including a softening of the Euro area's growth momentum, and should be couched in the context of broad Dollar strength. Yet, judging for example by the behaviour of EUR/CHF, Italian risk has played a more central role in setting the tone for the currency, especially since the draft agreement was leaked by the media last week. Going forward, as long as Italian risk remains confined to the country's borders, our FX team does not see much additional Italy-related downside risk to EUR. However, should this become a more systemic event, then we would expect to see it weigh on the currency, which would be primarily visible in EUR/CHF and secondarily EUR/USD.

This observation gives traders a second (and third) contagion indicator: the level of EURUSD and EURCHF:

Following the logic above, our guidepost for FX is therefore signs of wobbles in Portugal and other peripheral markets. Based on the usual sensitivities to peripheral sovereign risk premia, we estimate that EUR/USD could fall by around 5 big figures should systemic spill-overs increase. On the other hand, if things cool off, we expect that would push EUR/USD 2-3 big figures higher and move EUR/CHF back to 1.20 in short order.

Something tells us we will experience the "falling EUR" scenario long before the "push higher" case arrives.