martedì 22 maggio 2018

Blain: "Some Analysts Are Suggesting The Draghi Put May No Longer Exist"

Blain's Morning Porridge – May 22nd 2018

"Kid you good-a looking, but you don't know what's cooking till you Mambo Italiano.…."

Yesterday saw about the least convincing massive upside rally ever – as stocks gapped higher on the open, buoyed by the outbreak of peace in the China/US trade war. Then they range traded through the day on tiny volumes. My chartists on the equity desks are utterly sceptical.  There was nothing in yesterday's action to suggest anything has really changed – and the cold trade war with China remains on. The jury is out on whether Trump just lost this round without landing any significant punches. Ding, ding, seconds out as China comes out swinging, and essentially untouched.

Oil prices collapsed 60% from June 2014 ($100) to Jan 2016 ($41). Since then are up 94% to near $80 this morning – a 4-year high! Go figure what that might mean for global growth?

Not so sure why the dollar stalled y'day. The critical rate to watch is the 10-year Treasury around 3.06% - the rules of financial gravity should mean every spare penny, cent and yen on the planet is being sucked into the only positive real yield in the bond markets, thus pushing the dollar higher as global investors are forced to buy the greenback. Maybe it's the Trump effect again? Unconventional to see higher rates, rising fiscal policy and a tumbling currency – but it makes a curious kind of sense.

Unlike Italy.

The Italian 10-year bond yield has risen 31% in the last two weeks to 2.37% – that would normally be a sign of imminent disaster. But, maybe it's an opportunity? Markets always overweight bad political news through a process of negative bias confirmation. Bad news gets headlines, headlines attract readers, readers believe what they read – therefore every single negative thing you read about Italy reinforces the picture and 100% nailed on certainty that Italy is going to hell in the proverbial handbasket.

This morning, the new Government's "Contract for A Government of Change" is scaring the bejesus out of everyone. Fiscal prudence is out the window - apparently. I'm reading a stack of analyst reports about increased political instability likely from the coalition, others drawing parallels with Greece, talk of referendums, and that we can expect the Bund-BTP spread to gap dramatically wider.

Have these folk forgotten the Golden "do whatever it takes" Rule and the Draghi Put?

(Speaking of the Draghi Put – some analysts are suggesting it may longer exist? They say 2.4% Italian yields will confirm the ECB has washed its hands…) That is Heresy! Of course The Draghi Put lives.. without it Yoorp will vanish in a flash of logic and blue smoke…)

I doubt it will get so dramatic. The lessons of Greece and the "Adults in the Room" scenario had a very different base – small country, very broken, no choices. Italy is a very large economy, and front and central to Europe. Its core. While Greece was a destabilising noise from the outside on a Richter Scale of 6-7 (still enough to crack the foundations), a similar Italian scenario would be a full tectonic force 10 Super-quake right in the centre of Europe – it could send the whole edifice tumbling.

It simply isn't going to happen. Brussels won't let it. Neither will Italian politicians – they may play fast and loose, but they know how to spread the jam. Talk about Italy will shake, rattle and roll markets and present opportunity in coming weeks – but there will be an implicit accommodation where the ECB keeps buying and behind the scenes horse-trading makes the new government look like good Europeans. Brussels and Rome will trust each other as far as they can throw each other – but it's an alliance that pays dividends. The League certainly know that for all their hostility and posturing, Northern Italy is a clear Euro winner, and Southern Italy is a client state of European aid.

There is political risk – since 1945 Italian governments have averaged about 15 months. If there are further elections – which could be likely given the coalition's thin legislative majority - its likely to populist drift will accelerate, raising the prospect of further instability and damaging talk about Italeave and referendums. The balance of probability is that it's more likely we'll see long term accommodation with the new Italian regime. They will get away with new aggressive anti-immigration policies, confirming Europe's borders are closing.

My conclusion – for what its worth – is the Draghi Put, the threat of Italian instability contaging other states, and the maintenance of the European dream at any cost, mean Italian bonds look cheap because the ECB has to act.

Stocks – I'm unconvinced. Reform on Italy isn't going to happen in a gridlocked system. Italy will remain the classic Sick Zero-Growth part of Europe Brussels would rather not talk about.. Pretend and pretend some more.

Meanwhile, I note the Italians are once more talking about promissory notes to pay off state suppliers – Mini-Bots! Another source of opportunity perhaps if they trade at the kind of discounts we'd expect?

Out of time and back to the day job!

This Is The Most Important Chart To Watch On Italy

As traders arrive at their desks this morning across America, one could be forgiven for exclaiming "I love the smell of relief rallies in the morning" as Italian bond yields are lower and Italian bank stocks are not tumbling (for the first time since Five-Star and The League joined forces)...

...and US equity futures are holding gains (from yesterday's Trump Trade Truce)...

...suggest that the indestructible market mantra that "bad is good" and "buy the dip" is back.

There's just one thing...

The Italian crisis is far from over and the concept of their 'mini-BoT' parallel currency is throwing up some very red flags about the future of the European Union...

You just have to know where to look.

As Bloomberg's Tasos Vossos notes, a gauge of euro re-denomination risk (based on the so-called 'ISDA Basis' in Italy's credit default swaps) blew out.

What's more, redenomination risks are spreading as the measure widened in Portugal, Spain, and in France to a lesser extent, according to CMAN data.

As parallel currencies and debt-cancellation become serious discussion points for an Italian government, so European break-up risk is resurging.

Simply put, the higher this chart goes, the lower the market 'values' an Italian Euro relative to say a German Euro... and thus it is measuring the risk that the European Union - so long defended by Draghi et al. as indestructible - will break up.

As Marcello Minenna, head of Quantitative Analysis and Financial Innovation at Consob - the Italian securities regulator, previously noted, "markets do not lie... Italy must avoid remaining with short end of the stick. I wonder if our leadership will rise to the challenge."

While the European Central Bank's commitment to defend the irreversibility of the euro is based as much on threats as on positive pledges, financial markets understand the risks of "Italeave" even if the likelihood of the event is still judged to be low.

This can be seen in the data on credit default swaps (CDS), which offer protection in the case of an "insured event" or, in the jargon, a credit event. The widening gap in prices between different types of CDS contracts reflects the rising risk that some euro area sovereign debts may be redenominated into new, depreciating, currencies, which would probably lead to real losses for investors.

To correctly interpret the data on CDS prices, we need a quick flashback to 2012, another year of great tension for the single currency. While the center of the crisis was in Greek sovereign debt and the Spanish banking sector, institutional investors had already begun to think of how to protect themselves from the danger of the euro's total dissolution, which might be prompted by the exit of a big country such as Italy or France.

Back then, there were no good options available. Buying CDS wouldn't have helped because the standard contract explicitly excluded debt redenomination from the list of credit events if the issuer were a member of the G7 or an OECD investment-grade sovereign.

Two years later, new ISDA standards entered into force: contracts made since 2014 protect against euro area countries redenominating their debt into new national currencies.

Strictly speaking, it's still possible to redenominate debt into a different currency without triggering a credit event, but this only works if the debt is switched into a reserve currency: the US dollar, the Canadian dollar, the British pound, the Japanese yen, or the Swiss franc. In all other cases, the only way to avoid the triggering of a credit event is if the switch to the new currency does not result in a loss for the investor: "no reduction in the rate or amount of interest, principal or premium payable".

Since 2014 two types of sovereign CDS therefore coexist: the old (ISDA 2003) and the new (ISDA 2014). The latter has always traded at spreads wider than the CDS-2003, but the difference (the ISDA basis) had generally been small until: 15-25 bps for Portugal, 10-15 bps for Italy, 8-12 bps for Spain, 2-4 bps for France, and 1-2 bps for Germany.

The width of the spread between the two types of CDS - the ISDA basis - reflects both the perceived risk of redenomination risk and, in addition, the potential scope for depreciation in the event of a return to a national currency.

This year, something has changed.

And so, the chart above shows why U.S. credit investors may be right to be more concerned over a European sovereign crisis. As a reminder, the net share of investors expecting things in Europe to improve tumbled to 5% from a record 26% in March, based on Bank of America Merrill Lynch's survey for May.

Italy: An Anti-Euro Government Takes Power In the Heart Of The Eurozone

Ah, Italy. My people; fun to be around, a nightmare to govern. And now an existential threat to the European Union, the euro currency, and the global bond markets.

After suffering for over a decade under a monetary regime designed by and for efficient economies like Germany, the Italian people have finally said enough, giving a majority of their votes in this month's election to parties that promise relief – though rather different forms of relief – from the burdens of a stable currency. From last week's Guardian UK:

Italy's new government, likely to be formally confirmed within the next few days, sets a perilous precedent for Brussels: it marks the first time a founding member of the EU has been led by populist, anti-EU forces. From the EU's perspective, the coalition of the anti-establishment Five Star Movement (M5S) and the far-right League looks headstrong and unpredictable, possibly even combustible. Leaked drafts of their government 'contract' include provision for a 'conciliation committee' to settle expected disagreements.

Mainly it looks alarming. Both parties toned down their fiercest anti-EU rhetoric during the election campaign, dropping previous calls for a referendum on eurozone membership… But as they approach power, the historical Euroscepticism of the M5S and the League is resurfacing. An incendiary early version of their accord called for the renegotiation of EU treaties, the creation of a euro opt-out mechanism, a reduction in Italy's contribution to the EU budget and the cancellation of €250bn (£219bn) of Italian government debt.

It's important to remember that until very recently Italy's short-term government paper traded with negative yields. That is, if you wanted to lend them money you had to pay them rather than the other way around. This was largely because everyone assumed that the European Central Bank would give Italy effectively unlimited amounts of credit to ensure that it stuck around and played nice.

Now, not so much. Italian bond yields are spiking and spreads relative to German and other supposedly risk-free bonds are rising. And the ECB feels no compulsion to bail out this particular set of Italian politicians.

Italy 10-year bond yield

What exactly does this mean for the euro? Well, that depends on whether the new government follows through on its voters' desire to start prepping for a departure from the eurozone and a return to the lira – a currency that can be devalued at Rome's pleasure.

Were this to happen, Italian paper worth hundreds of billions of euros would …well…it's not clear what it would do. If Italy converted its outstanding debt to lira that would be a breach of contract, triggering a legal orgy with wholly unpredictable consequences, one of which might be its banishment from the global money markets. If Italy tried to leave the EU, we can take the never-ending Brexit quagmire and raise it an order of magnitude, and even then we're probably underestimating the disruption.

Is Italy Just Another Emerging Market?
It might be helpful to stop thinking of Italy – and several other "peripheral" EU members — as advanced developed countries and instead put them in the "emerging market" category. In which case they have lots of company. From Doug Noland's most recent Credit Bubble Bulletin:

Where to begin? Contagion… The Argentine peso dropped another 5.0% this week, bringing y-t-d losses to 23.7%. The Turkish lira fell 3.9%, boosting 2018 losses to 15.4%. As notable, the Brazilian real dropped 3.7% (down 11.5% y-t-d), and the South African rand sank 4.0% (down 3.0% y-t-d). The Colombian peso fell 3.0%, the Chilean peso 2.7%, the Mexican peso 2.7%, the Hungarian forint 2.3%, the Polish zloty 2.1% and the Czech koruna 2.0%.

EM losses were not limited to the currencies. Yields continued surging throughout EM. Notable rises this week in local EM bonds include 54 bps in Brazil, 27 bps in South Africa, 34 bps in Hungary, 36 bps in Lebanon, 25 bps in Indonesia, 28 bps in Peru, 14 bps in Turkey, 20 bps in Mexico and 11 bps in Poland.

Dollar-denominated EM debt was anything but immune. Turkey's 10-year dollar bond yields spiked 41 bps to 7.16%, the high going back to May 2009. Brazil's dollar bond yields surged 29 bps to 5.58%, the highest level since December 2016. Mexico's dollar yields jumped 18 bps to 4.64%, the high going all the way back to February 2011. Dollar yields rose 19 bps in Chile, 28 bps in Colombia, 19 bps in Indonesia, 14 bps in Russia, 14 bps in Ukraine and 167 bps in Venezuela (to 32.80%). Losses are mounting quickly for those speculating in EM debt.

Bonds throughout the euro zone periphery were under pressure. Greek 10-year yields surged 50 bps to a 2018 high 4.50%. Portuguese yields jumped 19 bps to 1.87%, and Spanish yields gained 17 bps to 1.44%. Elsewhere, Australian 10-year yields rose 12 bps to 2.90%, and New Zealand yields rose 14 bps to 2.86%.

There's a recurring "death spiral" element to emerging market debt, in which these countries temporarily stabilize their finances, get cocky, start borrowing in major currencies like the dollar on the assumption that their local currencies will continue to strengthen, thus allowing them to pay off their external currency loans with ease…and then fall prey to traditional overspending, corruption and inflation temptations, causing their currencies to fall and their debts to become unmanageable.

Here we go again, with the added twist of populist political parties rising around the world, promising to extricate their countries from the clutches of elite parasites.

If this has a "2008" feel to it, that's because crises frequently begin at the periphery and move towards the core. Initially the core markets and asset classes watch with smug amusement as the hinterlands burn while terrified capital flows to the center, actually boosting the value of core assets.

But in the end everybody (except for short sellers and gold bugs) pays a price for each generation's late-cycle hubris.

Credit-Driven Train Crash

Today we will summarize something I've been thinking about for a long time. Exactly how will we get from the credit crisis, which I think is coming in the next 12–18 months, to what I call "The Great Reset", when the global debt will be "rationalized" via some form of nonpayment.Whatever you want to call it, I think a worldwide debt default is likely in the next 10–12 years.

This is part of a yet-undetermined number of installments. We may break away for a week or two if other events intrude, but I will keep coming back to this. It has many threads to explore. I'm going to talk about my expectations given today's reality, without the prophetically inconvenient practice of predicting actual dates.

Also, while I think this is the probable path, it's not locked in stone. Later in this series, I'll describe how we might avoid the rather difficult circumstances I foresee. While it is difficult now to imagine cooperation between the developed world's various factions, it has happened before. There are countries like Switzerland that have avoided war and economic catastrophe. We'll hope our better angels prevail while taking a somber look at the more probable.

The experts who investigate transport disasters, crimes, and terror incidents usually create a chronology of events. Reading them in hindsight can be haunting—you know what's coming and you want to scream, "Don't do that!" But of course, it's too late.

We do something similar in economics when we look back at past recessions and market crashes. The causes seem obvious and we wonder why people didn't see it at the time. In fact, some people usually did see it at the time, but excessive exuberance by the crowds and willful ignorance among the powerful drowned out their warnings. I've been in that position myself and it is quite frustrating.

The steps seemed to fall in four stages. I've dubbed them:

  • The Beginning of Woes

  • Lending Drought

  • Political Backlash

  • The Great Reset

Again, the precise route and speed are uncertain, but the probable destination is not. Consider this a kind of "road map" to orient us for the journey. Now, let's look at each stage.


The Beginning of Woes

I recall how legendary railroad engineer Casey Jones was barreling along when an unexpected train appeared ahead. He saved his passengers at the cost of his own life. Today's high-yield bond market has no such hero, and I think the crisis will begin there.

The problem will be what I mentioned last week: massive illiquidity. Trading can and will dry up in a heartbeat at the very time people want to sell. In late 2008, the high-yield bond benchmarks lost a third of their value within a few weeks, and many individual bond issues lost much more, in large part because buyers disappeared.

The same thing happened in the dot-com recession, though not quite as dramatically. There were still several whipsaws and a particularly terrible month in June 2002.

This time, I believe the collapse will go deeper and happen faster because Dodd-Frank has decimated market makers' ability to cushion it. Likewise, the Fed will be reluctant to bail out ridiculously priced bonds like WeWork and its many covenant-lite, unsecured brethren. And rightly so, in my view.


But if it's not high yield, something else will set off the fireworks. There's always a train that shouldn't be there, a dog that didn't bark, always something. We may not even recognize it at the time. Remember, then-Fed Chair Ben Bernanke said in 2007 that the subprime debt problem was "contained." Whatever starts the next credit crisis, authorities will assure us it is "contained." (Spoiler: It won't be.)

Last week, I read a powerful chapter by William White, former chief economist for the Bank of International Settlements and now chairman for the OECD economic committee. I read everything from Bill that I can get my hands on. He is my favorite central banker in the world. This paragraph jumped out at me (emphasis mine):

… the trigger for a crisis could be anything if the system as a whole is unstable. Moreover, the size of the trigger event need not bear any relation to the systemic outcome. The lesson is that policymakers should be focused less on identifying potential triggers than on identifying signs of potential instability.

This implies that paying attention to macroeconomic "imbalances" may pay bigger dividends than trying to assess financial instability through highly disaggregated "risk maps" of the sort currently being encouraged by the G20 and the IMF. The latter are not only expensive to monitor, but potential rupture points in the financial fabric can change rapidly in real time.

Perhaps more important, serious economic and financial crises can have their roots in imbalances outside the financial system.

As I will show in this letter and others, the system itself is unstable. Predicting the actual trigger in advance is difficult. I can imagine numerous possible "triggers" for the coming credit crisis.

As in the biblical book of Revelation, the initial credit crisis stemming from the fall of high-yield bonds will be merely the beginning of woes. Illiquidity will spread as lower-end corporate bonds fall to junk ratings. Legal and contractual constraints will then force institutions to sell, pressuring all except the highest-grade corporate and sovereign bonds. Treasury and prime-rated corporate bond yields will go down, not up (see 2008 for reference on this). The selling will spill over into stocks and trigger a real bear market—much worse than the hiccups we saw earlier this year.

I give the probability of the credit crisis in the high-yield junk bond market somewhere close to 95%. For the record, nothing is 100% certain, as we don't know the future. But I think this is pretty much baked in the cake.

Lending Drought

Remember how Peter Boockvar describes the new cycle. Instead of recession pushing asset prices lower, lower asset prices trigger the recession. That will be the next stage as falling stock and bond prices hit borrowers. Rising defaults will force banks to reduce their lending exposure, drying up capital for previously creditworthy businesses. This will put pressure on earnings and reduce economic activity. A recession will follow.

This will not be just a US headache, either. It will surely spill over into Europe (and may even start there) and then into the rest of the world. The US and/or European recession will become a global recession, as happened in 2008.

Aside: Europe has its own set of economic woes and multiple potential triggers. It is quite possible Europe will be in recession before the ECB finishes this tightening cycle. With European rates already so low, and the ECB having already bought so much corporate debt, I wonder how else they will try to bring their economy out of recession? Everything is on the table.

As always, a US recession will spark higher federal spending and reduce tax revenue, so I expect the on-budget deficit to quickly reach $2 trillion or more. Within four years of the recession's onset, total government debt will be at least $30 trillion, further constraining the private capital markets and likely raising tax burdens for everyone—not just the rich.

Political Backlash

Meanwhile back at the ranch, job automation will intensify with businesses desperate to cut costs. The effect we already see on labor markets will double or triple. Worse, it will start reaching deep into the service sector. The technology is improving fast.

Needless to say, the working-class population will not like this and it has the power to vote. "Safety net" programs and unemployment benefit expenditures will skyrocket. The chart below from Philippa Dunne of The Liscio Report shows the ratio of workers covered by unemployment insurance is at its lowest level in 45 years. What happens when millions of freelancers lose their incomes?

Source: The Liscio Report

The likely outcome is a populist backlash that installs a Democratic Congress and president. They will then raise taxes on the "rich" and roll back some of the corporate tax cuts and increase regulatory burdens. They may even adopt my preferred consumption-oriented Value Added Tax (VAT)… but without the "reduce income taxes and eliminate payroll taxes" part that I suggested in 2016.

At a minimum, this will create a slowdown but more likely a second recession. Recall (if you're old enough) the back-to-back recessions of 1980 and 1982. That was an ugly time for those of us who lived through it.

Of course, that presumes a recession before the 2020 election. It may not happen—I put the odds at about 60–70%. Also, it is possible the Democrats will fumble what for them will be a golden opportunity. I'm not sure Republicans should view that as a "win" because they will then have to deal with the eventual recession themselves instead of being in opposition. I think by the latter part of the 2020s, US total government debt will be at $40 trillion. You think Washington is paralyzed now? You've seen nothing yet.

My friend Neil Howe thinks we could see a socially conservative, fiscally liberal party gain power. (Some would argue one already did, given the current GOP's spending binge.) But in any scenario, I see very little chance the federal government will shrink or reduce its impact on the economy. That is already a big problem and will only grow.

The Great Reset

Unemployment may approach the high teens by the end of the decade and GDP growth will be minimal at best. What do you call that condition? Certainly not business as usual. Long before that happens, the Federal Reserve will have engaged in massive quantitative easing. There's a lot of misunderstanding about QE, so let me clarify something important.

Quantitative easing is not about "printing money." It is buying debt with excess bank reserves and keeping that debt on the Fed's balance sheet as an asset. The Bank of Japan is an example. They did not put currency (yen) into the market. That's how Japan still flirts with deflation and its currency has gotten stronger. QE is the opposite of printing money, though there is a relationship. That's one reason central bankers like it.

As this recession unfolds, we will see the Fed and other developed world central banks abandon their plans to reverse QE programs. I think the Federal Reserve's balance sheet assets could approach $20 trillion later in the next decade. Not a typo—I really mean $20 trillion, roughly quintuple what they did after 2008. They won't need to worry about the deflation that usually accompanies such deep recessions (dare we say depression?) because the Treasury will be injecting lots of high-powered money into the economy via deficit spending. But since we have never been in this territory before, I must say this is only my guess.

If that's what they do, will it work? No. The world simply has too much debt, much of it (perhaps most) unpayable. At some point, the major central banks of the world and their governments will do the unthinkable and agree to "reset" the debt. How? It doesn't matter how, they just will. They'll make the debt disappear via something like an Old Testament Jubilee.

I know that's stunning, but it's really the only possible solution to the global debt problem. Pundits and economists will insist "it can't be done" right up to the moment it happens—probably planned in secret and announced suddenly. Jaws will drop, and net lenders will lose.

While all that is brewing, technology will keep killing jobs. Many mainstream commentators and serious analysts like Karen Harris (see The Great Jobs Collision) are projecting that 20–40 million jobs will be lost in the US alone and hundreds of millions across the developed world.

As we get into the 2020s, the presidency and Congress will again be whipsawed, and we will begin to discuss Bernie Sanders' "crazy" universal basic employment idea, or others like it. By then, the idea will not be considered crazy, but the only feasible choice. Even conservative politicians can see the light when they feel the heat.

All of this is going to lead to the most tumultuous decade in US history, even if we somehow (hopefully) avoid throwing a war into the mix, as is typical of the end of a Fourth Turning. Typically, the end of a Fourth Turning (which started in 2007, according to Neil Howe), has been accompanied by wars. This one could, too, though I think we will more likely see multiple low-grade skirmishes.

If we somehow get through all that, and particularly the Great Reset, the 2030s should be pretty good. In fact, think incredible boom and future. No one in 2039 will want to go back to the good old days of 2019. Our kids will think it was the Stone Age. But we have to get there first.

Wrong Track

I keep coming back to this train-wreck metaphor because it fits so well. I said Casey Jones plowed into a train that wasn't supposed to be there. The full story is a little more complicated.

Railroads in 1900 knew the danger of collisions. They took extensive precautions to make sure it didn't happen. The stopped train in front of Casey Jones had pulled off onto a siding like it was supposed to. The error was that its last four cars were stuck on the main line because an air hose had broken, locking their brakes.

This is a good analogy for our financial system. We know bad things can happen. We have systems to prevent them and limit their damage. Those systems are only as good as the people who manage them… and even then, surprises happen, and the safeguards fail.

What broken air hose will push the financial system close to collapse and bring on the Great Reset? I don't know, nor do I know when it will break. But I'm quite sure it will happen. Now is the time to get ready. There's no Casey Jones to save us.

Winston Churchill said America always does the right thing—after we try everything else. Maybe we can find that middle and "work it out" before the crisis. America has shifted before. Maybe that's only a dream, but it's one we better hope comes true.

In later letters, we will talk about how to protect your portfolios and trade through the coming crises. You don't have to go gently into that good night. You can get off the train. There is plenty of time, but you need to start planning now.