martedì 8 maggio 2018

"Perfect Storm" Hits Yields; Dimon Warns "We Don't Fully Understand" Impact Of Unprecedented QE Unwind

Jamie Dimon is worried. Between rising inflation and tax-cut-driven growth printing better-than-expected, the JPMorgan CEO told Bloomberg TV this morning that The Fed may raise interest rates more than many anticipate, and it would be wise to prepare for benchmark yields to climb to 4 percent.

And Dimon is confident that 'Murica can handle 4%...

"It might force the 10-year up [if the Fed boosts short-term rates more than expected]...

You can easily deal with 4 percent bonds and I think people should be prepared for that."

Bear in mind that 4% is still well below the 5.5% pre-2008-crash average for 10Y yields.

With the Fed paring back its balance sheet and the federal government increasing its borrowing, the U.S. will have to finance by the end of the year "$400 billion a quarter -- that's a lot, that's a huge shift from the past," Dimon also said.

Along with cutbacks in bond purchases by other central banks, it "may cause more volatility, higher rates in a way we don't fully understand" given the exit from quantitative easing is unprecedented, he said. And as the yield curve shifts flatter and flatter, so VIX will rise with it...

Bloomberg notes that, for Dimon, the key is that markets are in uncharted territory when it comes to what central banks are setting out to do.

"We've never had QE, we've never had reversal," Dimon said.

Dimon's warning comes just days after billionaire bond investor Bill Gross at Janus Henderson threw in the towel temporarily on his bond bear market thesis. As we noted previously, he now expects the yield to "meander" between 2.80 percent and 3.15 percent for the rest of the year -- in what he termed a "hibernating bear market."

 

However,  Michael Hasenstab, Franklin Templeton's chief investment officer for global macro, agreed with Dimon, telling Bloomberg TV this morning that 10Y U.S. Treasury yields will "easily" be higher than 4 percent.

Hasenstab warned, a "perfect storm" is pushing Treasury yields higher...

"In a normal situation with U.S. growth at 3%, inflation at 2% and rising,in history the 10-year yield would be 4.5% to 5.5%. We're not completely in a normal situation, but we're getting closer to that state."

However, he is not adding to his already large bet against Treasuries. Probably a good idea since the world and their pet rabbit is now short bonds...

This won't end well.

Who’s Doing The Selling In Emerging Markets? It’s The ‘Smart’ Money, Stupid.

It's because after years of benefiting from flows facilitated by unprecedented accommodation by DM central banks, the tide is starting to turn and even if lackluster data in Europe and a generalized deceleration across developed economies means the U.S. ends up being the proverbial "last man standing", the Fed is likely to stay the course on hikes thanks ironically to the fact that the very same late-cycle fiscal stimulus that makes it possible for the U.S. expansion (already the second longest in recorded history) to continue, also raises the risk of inflation pressures building.

And so, Jerome Powell will stick to his guns (until he doesn't) and that means more hikes and higher short rates and higher real rates and rising 10Y yields and a stronger dollar and perhaps a shortage of dollar liquidity (i.e., a prolonging of the funding squeeze that unfolded in Q1), and on and on.

None of that bodes well for EM and the recent run on the Argentine peso and Turkish lira perhaps provide something in the way of a preview of what happens when inherently precarious idiosyncratic stories in the developing world collide with Fed normalization. There's also trouble in Indonesia and Hong Kong, with the latter seemingly vulnerable to capital flight and the possibility that higher rates could end up bursting bubbles that inflated on the back of abundant liquidity.

"It has been striking to see market participants suddenly becoming aware of the often indirect mechanisms which meant that in prior years an abundance of $ liquidity drove up asset prices, and of the potential for these processes now to run in reverse," Citi wrote in a recent note.

But the primary question (which is: will the ongoing dollar rally and an aggressive Fed continue to destabilize EM by undercutting the dynamics that fueled the carry trade?), another question is this: who's been selling recently?

The answer, according to JPMorgan's Nikolaos Panigirtzoglou, is the smart money. To wit, from a note out Friday:

EM dedicated hedge funds appear to have been mostly responsible for the recent EM correction. This is shown in Figure 1 which depicts the beta of EM dedicated hedge funds proxied by the HFRX EM Composite Index vs. the JPM EM currency index. EM currency exposure represents an important component of both EM equity and EM bond exposures and thus the single best metric to assess EM hedge fund betas.

BetaEM

Figure 1 shows a big and abrupt drop in EM hedge fund beta to the EM currency index for the most recent period since April 19th, pointing to currently low EM exposure and the lowest since last November. Effectively, the entire previous rise in the EM hedge fund beta seen between November last year and March this year has been unwound in recent weeks.

Here's the JPM EM FX index for reference purposes:

FX

Contrast that drop-off in the most recent period in the third column of Figure 1 above with the relatively stable betas in the following two tables for real money EM managers (proxied using the 20 largest EM active equity MFs and the 20 biggest EM active bond MFs):

betasEMRealMoney

As Panigirtzoglou notes, "in contrast to hedge funds, real money EM managers do not appear to have lowered their beta over the past two weeks."

He goes on to suggest that recent outflows from EM equity and bond ETFs (i.e., retail money) haven't been that large on an aggregate basis.

In case it isn't clear enough where they're going with this, the idea is that if the "smart" money has been doing all of the selling thus far, more pain for the space could be in store if the more sticky real money starts to sell.

As usual, the last people to get the message will be retail, although maybe not because thanks to ETFs, "dumb" money can trade in and out of previously esoteric asset classes easier than ever before. "Dumb" money is now also "hot" money in some cases. It's now "smart, not like everybody says." Cue Fredo.

Panigirtzoglou's conclusion:

EM selling is not overdone and that EM assets look still vulnerable if real money investors decide to join hedge funds in reducing their EM exposure.

Trade accordingly.

Problems Are Emerging.

Well, first thing's first.

Donald Trump sent 11 tweets by 3:00 p.m. ET, a truly impressive "covfefe" tally, that included this batshit ramble about Lisa Page and Peter Strzok:

Yes, "what a total mess." And for Christ sake, will someone please teach him what a proper noun is or, more to the point, what a proper noun isn't?

But this was the one that mattered:

That came amid other headlines, including these (from Barak Ravid of Israel's Channel 10):

  • EUROPEAN, U.S. ARE SAID CLOSE TO DEAL ON IRAN: CHANNEL 10
  • DEAL AIMS TO PERSUADE TRUMP NOT TO END ACCORD
  • UNCLEAR TRUMP CAN BE PERSUADED TO MAINTAIN IRAN ACCORD

Whatever the case, oil careened lower…

WTI

…after breaching $70 for the first time since 2014 earlier on Monday:

WTI2

The dollar rose and is coming off its third consecutive week of gains:

DXY

YTD high:

Dollar

Stocks faded what was a pretty impressive rally when the Iran headlines/Trump tweet hit:

Stocks

Futs:

ES

Citi doesn't think this is a particularly attractive entry point:

Nothing doing to speak of in Treasurys. As Bloomberg notes, 10-year yields were confined to a 2.4bp band, "among the smallest this year". Panning out a bit for some context vis-a-vis Friday's payrolls miss:

Yields

Emerging markets are of course still in the spotlight. We talked more about this earlier today in the context of who's been selling.

YTD high for Brazil CDS:

BrazilCDS

It's the same story – external concerns (read: aggressive Fed, dollar strength, rising U.S. rates) are colliding with country-specific risk. To be sure, there are folks out there pushing a bullish narrative for Brazil, but election uncertainty and the broader jitters weighing on EM are making a dent.

Commenting on the widening in CDS spreads, Credit Agricole's Italo Lombardi blamed "a somewhat less favorable external environment, higher US rates and expectations for Fed adjustments, in addition to the whole issue of protectionism." Obviously, Brazil is better shape than it was in 2015 when a rolling political crisis pushed things to the brink, but you can see the stress showing up in the real:

USDBRL

Another jittery day for the lira (much more on that here). CBT tried something feeble, but as you can see, the relief "rally" was shallow and short-lived:

USDTRY

Tough day for MXN, which slid past 19.50 late in the session:

USDMXN

Broadly speaking, the pressure on EM is mounting:

FX

Here's a bit more color on this from JPMorgan:

What about currencies? What picture do we get from the available spec positions on EM currencies? We use two proxies to gauge overall EM currency positions: 1) the aggregate spec positions on the USD (Figure 8) and 2) our spec position indicator on Risky vs. Safe currencies (Chart A17). The former suggest that a previous short base in the USD is still being covered but has yet to be covered completely. The latter suggest that while "Risky" currencies including EM currencies saw a significant reduction in their positions vs "Safe" currencies, they are still far from capitulation.

USD

Wealth-Destroying Zombies, Report 6 May 2018

          The hot topic in monetary economics today (hah, if it's not an oxymoron to say these terms together!) is whither interest rates. The Fed in its recent statement said the risk is balanced (the debunked notion of a tradeoff between unemployment and rising consumer prices should have been tossed on the ash heap of history in the 1970's). The gold community certainly expects rapidly rising prices, and hence gold to go up, of course.

Will interest rates rise? We don't think it's so obvious. Before we discuss this, we want to make a few observations. Rates have been falling for well over three decades. During that time, there have been many corrections (i.e. countertrend moves, where rates rose a bit before falling even further). Each of those corrections was viewed by many at the time as a trend change.

They had good reason to think so (if the mainstream theory can be called good reasoning). Armed with the Quantity Theory of Money, they thought that rising quantity of dollars causes rising prices. And as all know, rising prices cause rising inflation expectations. And if people expect inflation to rise, they will demand higher interest rates to compensate them for it.

The quantity of dollars certainly rose during all those years (with some little dips along the way). Yet the rate of increase of prices slowed. Nowadays, the Fed is struggling to get a 2% increase and that's with all the "help" they get from tax and regulatory policies, which drive up costs to consumers but has nothing to do with monetary policy. Nevertheless interest rates fell. And fell and fell.

Why Have Interest Rates Been Falling?

It seems obvious that if one wishes to say that a trend has changed, after enduring for well over three decades, one needs to explain why. The Question of the Day is: what has suddenly happened? The quantity of dollars is going to rise? Been there done that, got the falling interest T-shirt. Prices are going to rise? Maybe.

For extra credit, no scratch that, to get any credit your answer should include an explanation of why the rate has been falling for so long. Is this too much to ask? Your explanation should contain three parts:

  1. The cause that drove interest rates to fall for most of the time that Generation X has been alive, for most of the duration of the careers of even the oldest Baby Boomers
  2. Why the old cause is now inoperable
  3. Identify a new cause, and show why it will drive the new trend for rising rates

Keith published his theory of interest and prices. To cut to the chase, interest falls when the rate is above the marginal productivity of the entrepreneur. That is, when the marginal entrepreneur earns a lower return on capital than he must pay for the credit to finance it.

It should be obvious that you cannot borrow at 10% to earn 8%. If this is happening to the true marginal entrepreneur, and not just to an isolated bad businessman, then the interest rate must fall. It must fall because business demand for credit is weak under such conditions. And if the rate rises, the demand gets even softer. Businesses who can repay their debts will do so, even if they must liquidate capital assets to do so. Certainly, new businesses will not enter the market if they see a negative spread between cost of capital and return on capital.

Only when the rate falls, do businesses demand credit. When the rate falls, from say 10% to 7%, they can then make a positive spread.

Unfortunately, the drop in rates does not rectify the problem. Our hapless entrepreneur may have sold bonds into the market at 10%. And now he's stuck with that rate.

Even if not, he is locked into his capital assets, such as building and equipment. Consider the marginal restaurateur. Let's call him Fred. When rates were high, he was very careful to borrow as little as possible to buy and remodel a building into a suitable environment to serve high-end food. But then rates drop, and another guy can borrow more to open a more opulent restaurant next door. Diners willing to pay $100 a plate may be attracted to the new place, and reluctant to eat at Fred's. So Fred must lower his price. Sure, he may be paying only 7% now. But he cannot command the same price, and hence earn the same gross margin.

Or consider the marginal manufacturer, Barney. He stamps and welds metal frames for trailers. He set up shop when the interest rate was 10%, so half a million dollars of equipment was a lot for his business to support. However, years later when interest is 5%, a new entrant can put a million dollars into computer-controlled machines plus an automated line. This new company incurs a lower cost to put out the same product. Barney struggles to compete.

Profits Follow Rates

Profit margins follow interest rates.

Notice that this dynamic looks a lot like the bogus view of government-managed "perfect competition". Businesses struggle to make decent margins. Then margins fall, with the government relentlessly turning up the pressure. This process goes on for decades, fueling quite a consumer boom, as firms are put onto a treadmill turning faster and faster, forced to lower prices and to borrow to invest more and more in technology and in capital such as tooling. Every year, smart phones get smarter, big screen TVs get bigger, and sports cars get more sporting.

It's all lots of fun. The dirigiste-technocrats claim credit for managing the economy to the benefit of consumers. Meanwhile, the free marketers say "see, look at the benefits of capitalism!" They're both wrong. It's certainly not capitalism, and since consumers are also workers, savers, and owners of capital, they do not benefit from a wholesale conversion of wealth into income. To paraphrase (with some liberties) economist Ludwig von Mises, Keynes did not teach stone-headed central planners to turn water into wine, but to direct us to the not-so-miraculous eating of the seed corn.

Do the revelers benefit from the eating of the seeds that they would plant in order to eat next year?

A boom is not a healthy economy. Falling interest rate induced churn is not creative destruction. And the economy is not driven by consumption.

Anyways, the falling rate, falling margins, and hence falling return on capital is a ratchet. A drop in interest rates does not rectify it, only drives it down further.

This is our answer to part 1 of the Question of the Day. The cause is interest > productivity.

However, we do not agree that this cause has become inoperable. We believe it is still in full force and effect.

Zombie Firms

The Bank for International Settlements defines a zombie corporation as being unable to pay its interest expense from its profits. Sound familiar?

A zombie can only exist by the grace of too-low interest rates, and a very permissive credit environment. In other words, they (we) can thank central banks for these resource-sucking, wealth-destroying, boat anchors on the economy. Oh and let's not forget worker-underpaying in our litany of the flaws of zombies.

Here is a graph, taken from the BIS 87th Annual Report, showing the growth of the zombiehorde over the past decade or so.

3 Zombie firms are defined as listed firms with a ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to interest expenses below one, with the firm aged 10 years or more. Shown is the median share across AU, BE, CA, CH, DE, DK, ES, FR, GB, IT, JP, NL, SE and US.

This graph ends in 2015, though we note that the trend is sharply rising. From about 5% before the global financial crisis, the percentage of zombies more than doubled. What is it up to by now?

This is a picture of a problem that has grown beyond merely the marginal enterprise. It is a significant fraction of the global economy!

What will happen to these companies' demand for credit as rates rise? One anecdote is Ford. In February, we noted that the automakers are still offering to finance their cars at 0% for 72 months. However, their cost of capital has been rising. We used this in another angle looking at the soft demand for credit as rates rise. Ford knew that sales would drop if it tried to pass through the interest rate increase to its customers. Ford determined that the loss of profitability due to this sales drop would be greater than its cost to keep subsidizing 0% financing. We did some rough back-of-the-envelope math to estimate Ford's increase in costs (not its total cost, just the increase due to the rise in rates since 2014) to be about $1.4 billion. Ford's annual profit is about $5 billion, so this has eaten about 28% of its net profit.

The postscript is that Ford has recently announced that it will stop making cars except the Mustang sports car, and Focus crossover. It will focus on trucks, which have higher margins. Margins for trucks and SUVs may be fat enough to support the finance subsidy, for now.

Ford, of course, is a big name. Out of the spotlight and away from press coverage, many other businesses are reducing their demand for credit in response to the rise in rates. With falling demand, the price of credit cannot rise far or durably.

This analysis is aside from the political reality that every interest group, and every politician from the president on down, will be pressuring the Fed to lower rates to avoid the bankruptcies of 10.5% (more, by now) of corporations, the layoffs of their workforces, the losses to banks, insurers, and pensions on the bonds of these corporations, the loss of tax revenues to federal, state, and local governments, the burgeoning welfare budgets, the embarrassing hit to economics statistics like GDP and unemployment, etc.

We are painting a picture of dropping credit demand as its cost rises. And the demand will drop even more if those bankruptcies and layoffs occur. Unemployed people do not buy new Ford trucks, even if Ford gives them 0% financing for 72 months.

Next week, we will give our answers to parts 2 and 3 of the Question of the Day. They are hypothetical answers, as we have shown interest is above marginal productivity—with a vengeance. So we will look at what it would take to reverse this ratchet.

Supply and Demand Fundamentals

The price of gold dropped 9 bucks, while that of silver rose 3 cents.

Readers often ask us if permanent backwardation (when gold withdraws its bid on the dollar) is still coming. We say it is certain (unless we can avert it by offering interest on gold at large scale). They ask is it imminent, and we think this is with a mixture of fear and longing for a higher gold price. We say well yeah that will bring a much higher gold price (perhaps it will hit some of the gold bug predictions, or perhaps it will go off the board before getting that high) but be careful what you wish for. And it's not imminent. We will have a graph below that gives it some perspective.

In the meantime, we all watch the price of gold and maybe trade it when there's a clear opportunity.

Speaking of which, we will show the only true picture of the fundamentals of supply and demand in gold. But first, here is the chart of the prices of gold and silver.

Next, this is a graph of the gold price measured in silver, otherwise known as the gold to silver ratio (see here for an explanation of bid and offer prices for the ratio). It fell this week.

Here is the gold graph showing gold basiscobasis and the price of the dollar in terms of gold price.

The price of gold fell slightly (which means the dollar rose, as measured in gold). And with the price drop comes an increase in scarcity (i.e. the cobasis, the red line). Alas, this is just the near contract which is already under selling pressure as it expires in a few weeks. Farther contracts do not show an increase in scarcity, but a slight decrease (not a sign of imminent backwardation).

Here is a graph of the gold term structure. Note no backwardation, and each farther contract has a higher basis (which is normal).

The Monetary Metals Gold Fundamental Price fell $41 this week to $1,497. Now let's look at silver.

In silver, not only did the price rise (a few pennies) but scarcity increase in the near and farther contracts. So it should not be a surprise that the Monetary Metals Silver Fundamental Price rose 20 cents to $17.69.

Here is a graph of the silver term structure.