lunedì 9 aprile 2018

Systemic crises are rare. But they are make-or-break events for long-term performance and social relevance of investment managers. In systemic crises conventional investment strategies lose big. The rules of efficient positioning are turned upside down. Trends follow distressed flows away from best value and institutions abandon return optimization for the sake of preserving capital and liquidity. It is hard to predict systemic events, but through consistent research it is possible to improve judgment on systemic vulnerabilities. When crisis-like dynamics get underway this is crucial for liquidating early, following the right trends and avoiding trades in extreme illiquidity. Crisis opportunities favor the prepared, who has set up emergency protocols, a realistic calibration of tail risk and an active exchange of market risk information with other managers and institutions. The below is an updated version of the SRSV summary lecture “Managing Systemic Risk”. The importance of man

Systemic crises are rare. But they are make-or-break events for long-term performance and social relevance of investment managers. In systemic crises conventional investment strategies lose big. The rules of efficient positioning are turned upside down. Trends follow distressed flows away from best value and institutions abandon return optimization for the sake of preserving capital and liquidity. It is hard to predict systemic events, but through consistent research it is possible to improve judgment on systemic vulnerabilities. When crisis-like dynamics get underway this is crucial for liquidating early, following the right trends and avoiding trades in extreme illiquidity. Crisis opportunities favor the prepared, who has set up emergency protocols, a realistic calibration of tail risk and an active exchange of market risk information with other managers and institutions.

The importance of managing systemic risk

Economic and social benefits

Systemic risk characterizes the contingency of a malfunctioning financial system. Systemic risks build gradually but materialize abruptly and rarely and, hence, are mostly neglected in the day-to-day considerations of investment managers.

  • Yet, how a manager prepares for and deals with systemic risk often makes or breaks long-term performance. Most investment strategies rely on some combination of directional or alternative risk premia and information-based relative value. Systemic crises typically derail all of these. This is because in contrast to normal market drawdowns, systemic pressures trigger funding, accounting or legal constraints that force position liquidation with little freedom of choice for portfolio managers. When a systemic crisis escalates the priority of institutions shifts from seeking returns to short-term capital preservation. As a result, the principles of efficient positioning or flows may not only be suspended but reversed, with the best-value positions (by conventional standards) posting the greatest loss. This happens because value is correlated with positions in normal times. Diversification is of little help, because the scope of inefficient flows is wide.Empirical research shows that a single global financial cycle floats or sinks most markets at the same time. (view post here). Hence, for responsible portfolio managers systemic risk is an extreme form of setback risk, i.e. of a gap between downside and upside risk unrelated to fundamentals (view summary of setback risk here).
  • If asset managers prepare for systemic crises, the impact of shocks on the financial system and the economy will be less severe.  It is often the very lack of protocol for difficult situations that leads to poor decisions and crisis escalation (view post here). And the record of the financial industry in respect to crises is poor. There is ample evidence of regular boom and bust investment cycles, herding, trend chasing (view post here), inefficient expectation formation, and speculative bubbles. It has been shown that standard cognitive behavior is often inconsistent with efficient markets (view post here).
  • Managers' consideration of specific systemic crisis risk can also reduce the probability such crises. Most crises follow from excesses and economic imbalances. An excess of leverage reduces the capacity to absorb drawdowns. The recognition of risk typically increases the price for exposure to the risk and hence discourages its build-up. A relevant example for the future could be the unsustainable use of the environment and climate change (view post here). However, markets can only serve sustainability if managers think longer term, rather than in terms of annual performance fees. That is because "shorts" and protection strategies are typically negative carry trades with unknown duration.

Approaches to managing systemic risk

Preparing crisis strategies

Researching systemic risk creates awareness of the weak spots of a financial system. This knowledge cannot predict a crisis but prepares managers' judgment and response when crises occur. Familiarity with systemic risk factors sharpens manager's focus, increases chances of early portfolio adjustment, mitigates paralysis and panic and reduces liquidation costs in tight liquidity.

  • Focusing on weak spots: It is practically impossible to predict the timing and dynamics of systemic crises. However, it is possible to understand the nature of vulnerability in economies and markets. Through consistent research and briefings on systemic trouble spots, asset managers can judge whether a specific shock is likely to be transitory or escalatory after it has occurred. Two important criteria for escalation risk are vulnerability and rarity.
    • Vulnerability here means that parts of the financial system have become reliant on favorable conditions. Typically protracted periods of low market volatility lead to build-ups of leverage and risk until they reach a tipping point (Minsky hypothesis, view post here). Long-term empirical analysis suggests that asset price booms are most dangerous when they are associated with rising financial leverage. Combinations of housing price bubbles and credit expansions have been the most detrimental of them all. (view post here). Also, economies that have grown accustomed to low real interest rates for long periods of time are subsequently susceptible to stress when rates or credit spreads are rising. Whether this stress is likely to escalate depends on whether the government or central bank have the means and will to intervene. (view post here).
    • Rarity means that the type of shock that has occurred had a low a-priori probability: it was not on the radar screen of either investors or policymakers. Theory suggests that senior decision makers rationally do not prepare for rare events as they can only process a limited quantity of information. Hence, expected losses from unpreparedness are inversely proportionate to an event's rarity (view post here). Indeed, expected losses from unpreparedness are even higher if managers bear only limited liability.
  • Adjusting portfolios early: There are two rational bases for adjusting positions to systemic risk: information advantage and price volatility. Volatility targeting is a valid default rule for reducing tail risk if one is uncertain as to the severity of a shock. This is because recent volatility is a good predictor of future volatility but not generally for future returns (view post here). Over long periods of time and based on U.S. equity data, volatility targeting strategies have produced significant increases in return per unit of tail risk.
    Effective volatility targeting and dynamic hedging can make use of options-implied volatilities, which not only help predicting future actual volatilities but also asset price correlations. High implied volatilities translate into high correlation whenever a single global factor is dominating price moves across all global markets.
  • Running with the herd: Following market trends is often rational. And macro research can help figuring out when this is the case. For example, research may tell us that markets face a critical risk (e.g. a major bank may be at risk of default) but may not tell whether or not the risk will manifest (e.g. there may be a government bailout). In "make-or-break" situations it is rational to herd, i.e. to trade in the direction of prices, as private information disseminates in the market through prices. In this case, inaction would be an irrational and dangerous choice, even if we had no information advantage on the evolution of the crisis.
    Historically, simple trend following strategies have reduced maximum drawdowns in equity portfolios and provided some hedging against losses in FX carry trades. Trend following removes psychological and institutional obstacles to exiting positions early in escalatory crises. Trend following is a market directional strategy that promises "convex beta" and "good diversification" for outright long and carry portfolios as it normally performs well in protracted good and bad times alike.
  • Avoiding expensive liquidation:Market liquidity can evaporate in systemic crises. This can give rise to outsized price movements and, at the same time, make position adjustments prohibitively expensive. To the extent that liquidity problems rather than fundamental changes account for major market moves, position liquidation destroys investor value. Indeed, structural and regulatory changes in recent years seem to have made liquidity more precarious than in the past. Hence, calibrating or structuring positions such as to withstand liquidity events can be a major cost saver and performance factor. Researching the nature and potential of systemic risk is critical, both for preparation and for forming judgment whether or not it is really in the investor interest to liquidate positions in the thick of crises.

Investment managers can also benefit directly from systemic events to the extent that they have sufficient flexibility and risk limits to exploit price distortions and high risk premia paid. For systemic value based on price distortions see the related summary. And for detecting and receiving high risk premia see section on "implicit subsides".

Calibrating tail risk

Standard risk management relies on past volatility of price changes, historic correlation, and assumptions regarding outliers of price changes beyond normal ranges. On this basis, the majority of portfolios of liquid financial instruments is managed based on some form of Value-at-Risk (VaR) model, a statistical estimate of a loss threshold that will only be exceeded with a low probability.

Unfortunately, past volatility is not always a helpful gauge for financial markets risk. Volatility is merely the magnitude of historic price fluctuations, while risk is the probability and scope of future permanent losses. The two are not equivalent and may even become opposites.  In particular, reliance on historic volatility can create an illusion of predictability that gives rise to carelessness in specific markets. Indeed, low volatility itself is often a cause of excessive leverage and crowded positioning and hence conducive to subsequent outsized market movements. One example can be seen in heavily managed currencies which may appear to have low historical volatility, a situation that can suddenly change when there are regime shifts.

Therefore, it is helpful to go beyond conventional risk metrics when assessing and calibrating the risk of large outlier events ("tail risk"):

  • Risk estimation must rely, at least partly, on expert assessment with subjective and non-quantifiable elements. For example, the risks and consequences of political upheavals, monetary policy regime breaks, or first-time sovereign defaults are not typically quantifiable through price history. A broad assessment of risk always requires a broad perspective, common sense, and an open mind.
  • There are also quantitative warning signs of increased "tail risk" other than volatility. The simplest are valuation metrics for detecting bubbles, i.e. asset prices that are unusually high relative to the present value of estimated future cash flows. Academic papers have argued that equity markets with low dividend yields relative to local government bond yields are prone to large corrections. Similarly, countries with overvalued exchange rates and high short-term interest rates are prone to currency crises.
  • Volatility-based risk management metrics can be adapted for "tail events" and "gap risk". Historically, diversification and downside risk analyses have assumed normal ("Gaussian") probability distributions. Those are convenient for calculation but give little weight to large outliers. By now this "normality assumption" has been widely refuted and better gauges of tail risk are available, such as conditional Value-at-Risk. The distribution assumption is crucial for setting risk management parameters realistically and for assessing the potential upside of long-volatility and short-risk strategies.

Exchanging market risk information

No single investor or institution has all pieces of the puzzle that is systemic risk. Investors specialize on markets or countries. However, every financial market depends on all other financial markets to some extent. At times particular market segments such as asset-backed securities or technology stocks can have a dominant global influence. Even small and remote markets, such as Iceland or Greece have triggered sizeable global market moves in the past. Connections between seemingly unconnected markets often reflect their communal dependence on global liquidity, which is the ease of financing transmitted by a small number of financial centers.

Therefore, investment managers must engage in active risk information exchange, trading their insights for the insights of colleagues. Indeed, theoretical and experimental research suggests that portfolio managers will generally share ideas and research if mutual feedback is valuable . This creates investor value at all times but particularly when systemic risk is rising, because investment managers that are part of an information network are better positioned to act early, as they know more and know better what others know. From a social welfare angle this process of information exchange is essential to disseminate concerns over systemic crises. The dissemination turn may serve to warn market participants, policymakers and the broader public, smoothing market volatility.

Subprime Auto Implosion In Full Effect As Lenders Start Dropping Like Flies

We are in the midst of watching the subprime auto lending bubble burst in its entirety. Smaller subprime auto lenders are starting to implode, and we all know what comes next: the larger companies go bust, inciting real capitulation. 

In addition to our coverage talking about how the subprime bubble has burst and, since then since has been crunched even further, additional reports yesterday are showing that smaller subprime lenders are starting to simply implode after being faced with losses and defaults. In addition to losses and defaults, Bloomberg reported this morning that there have been allegations of fraud and under reporting losses, tactics that are clearly reminiscent of <throw a dart at any financial crisis/bubble burst over the last 30 years>:

Growing numbers of small subprime auto lenders are closing or shutting down after loan losses and slim margins spur banks and private equity owners to cut off funding.

Summit Financial Corp., a Plantation, Florida-based subprime car finance company, filed for bankruptcy late last month after lenders including Bank of America Corp. said it had misreported losses from soured loans. And a creditor to Spring Tree Lending, an Atlanta-based subprime auto lender, filed to force the company into bankruptcy last week, after a separate group of investors accused the company of fraud. Private equity-backed Pelican Auto Finance, which specialized in "deep subprime" borrowers, finished winding down last month after seeing its profit margins shrink.

The article continues:

The pain among smaller lenders has parallels with the subprime mortgage crisis last decade, when the demise of finance companies like Ownit Mortgage and Sebring Capital Partners were a harbinger that bigger losses for the financial system were coming. In both cases, rising interest rates helped trigger more loan losses.

"There's been a lot of generosity and not a lot of discretion on the part of lenders and investors," said Chris Gillock, a banker at Colonnade Advisors, which advises companies on subprime auto investments. "There's going to be more capitulation."

Representatives for Spring Tree didn't respond to requests for comment. A lawyer for Summit said "restructuring in a Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding is the best strategy to ensure its long term success" and the company is working with its vendors and lenders to meet its obligations.

Astonishingly and ridiculously, the article goes on to talk about this implosion as if it was expected to happen and as if it's what would have happened during the normal course of business if ridiculous debt and engineered interest rates weren't a mainstay of current economic policy:

This time around, the financial system's losses are expected to be much more manageable, because auto lending is a smaller business relative to mortgages, and Wall Street hasn't packaged as many of the loans into complicated securities and derivatives. As of the end of September, there were about $280 billion of subprime auto loans outstanding, according to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, compared with around $1.3 trillion in subprime mortgage debt at the start of 2007. There isn't a standardized definition of subprime borrowers, though it generally encompasses borrowers with FICO credit scores below 600 to 640 on an 850 point scale.

Take, for example, this gem of cognitive dissonance:

"When you think about the effects of housing versus autos, they're a lot different," said Kevin Barker, a stock analyst covering specialty finance companies at Piper Jaffray & Co. Losses tend to be less severe for car loans because they are smaller than mortgages and borrowers pay them down faster, he said, and the collateral is easier to repossess. With home loans, in many states foreclosures require a lengthy court process.

As we all saw from the housing crisis, the smaller shops are usually the first ones to go. The law of large numbers plays to the advantage of bigger corporations and usually buys them more time. The bigger the company, the more the government and institutions care if it goes bust. Smaller companies come and go like it's nothing, because they have no tangible effect on major financial institutions or the US economy. However, this generally only exacerbates the size of the ticking time bomb to come.

In early March of this year, we posted our "Signs of the Peak: 10 Charts Reveal an Auto Bubble on the Brink". Our timing couldn't have been better. In that article we pointed out that the key data which seems to suggest that the auto bubble may have run its course comes from the following charts which reveal that traditional banks and finance companies are starting to aggressively slash their share of new auto originations while OEM captives are being forced to pick up the slack in an effort to keep their ponzi schemes going just a little longer.

And while some can claim that this is just a natural result of healthy competition between lenders, what is likely causing sleepless nights at banks who have tens of billions in outstanding loans, is the coming tsunami of lease returns which will lead to a shock repricing for both car prices and existing LTVs once the millions in new cars come back to dealer lots...

We have seen this bubble coming from a mile away. 

Also, just as we expected, between record prices (courtesy of what until recently was easy, cheap debt), record loan terms, and rising rates, shoppers with shaky credit and tight budgets have suddenly been squeezed out of the market. In fact in the first two months of this year, sales were flat among the highest-rated borrowers, while deliveries to those with subprime scores slumped 9 percent, according to J.D. Power.

Confirming our observations, Bloomberg notes that while lenders took chances on consumers with lower FICO scores after the recession, partially on the notion that borrowers prioritize car payments ahead of other expenses, several financial companies started to tighten their standards more than a year ago. The result is a surge in the amount of captive financing shown in the chart above, which as we warned is the clearest indication yet of the popping car bubble.

We also predicted back in December of last year that certain PE firms would start to feel the pain of their subprime auto bets.

However, no one wants to make the point that subprime auto also followed in the footsteps of the financial crisis because it was a bubble that was engineered due to the Fed making it easy to take on cheap debt in order to fuel our nonsense "recovery".

The continued focus on borrowing and spending, instead of saving and underconsumption, will ensure not only that these bubbles continue to happen going forward, but they will get larger in size as time progresses.

US Congressman Pushes Bill To Reinstate Gold Standard

Recently, a new piece of legislation has been introduced by Republican Congressman from West Virginia Alex Mooney "to define the dollar as a fixed weight of gold."

It is quite clear that bureaucrats are starting to take note of the war on the middle class as workers and savers are being squeezed thanks to inflation in this prolonged zero interest rate environment we have been living through.

In the bill, Mooney criticized monetary policy, in particular how purchasing power has eroded drastically ever since the gold standard was abolished.

The United States dollar has lost 30 percent of its purchasing power since 2000, and 96 percent of its purchasing power since the end of the gold standard in 1913. Under the Federal Reserve's two percent inflation objective, the dollar loses half of its purchasing power every generation, or 35 years

Mooney goes on to describe the advantages of a link to gold:

The gold standard puts control of the money supply with the market instead of the Federal Reserve. The gold standard means legal tender defined by and convertible into a certain quantity of gold. Under the gold standard through 1913, the United States economy grew at an annual average of four percent, one-third larger than the growth rate since then and twice the level since 2000

The big question remains concerning the United States actually having its 8,1335.5 tons of physical gold as stated in its official reserves. There has been peculiar activity in the last few years with countries wanting to bring their gold holdings home, like Germany and Hungary.

The bottom line is, there has never been a very detailed audit on the US gold reserves which could be the reason why countries are starting to bring their gold home, and why this bill might never be passed.

After Doubling US Debt In 8 Years, Yellen & Furman Fearmonger "A Debt Crisis Is Coming"

After doubling America's national debt in the eight short years of President Obama's reign - expanding benefits for all, and relying on a Federal Reserve with its knee-high jack boot firmly on the throat of interest-rates, thus supressing any derogatory signal among the every day noise - five former chairs of The White House Council of Economic Affairs turned up their hypocrisy dial to '11' in a stunning op-ed in The Washington Post tonight, warning of a debt crisis looming due to President Trump's deficits...

A debt crisis is coming. But don't blame entitlements.

Martin Neil Baily, Jason Furman, Alan B. Krueger, Laura D'Andrea Tyson and Janet L. Yellen are all former chairs of the White House Council of Economic Advisers.

The U.S. unemployment rate is down to 4.1 percent, and economic growth could well increase in 2018. Consumer and business confidence is high. What could go wrong?

A group of distinguished economists from the Hoover Institution, a public-policy think tank at Stanford University, identifies a serious problem. The federal budget deficit is on track to exceed $1 trillion next year and get worse over time. Eventually, ever-rising debt and deficits will cause interest rates to rise, and the portion of tax revenue needed to service the growing debt will take an increasing toll on the ability of government to provide for its citizens and to respond to recessions and emergencies.

None of that is in dispute. But the Hoover economists then go wrong by arguing that entitlements are the sole cause of the problem, while the budget-busting tax bill that was passed last year is described as a "good first step."

Entitlement programs support older Americans and those with low incomes or disabilities. Program costs are growing largely because of the aging of the population. This demographic problem is faced by almost all advanced economies and cannot be solved by a vague call to cut "entitlements" - terminology that dehumanizes the value of these programs to millions of Americans.

The deficit, of course, reflects the gap between spending and revenue. It is dishonest to single out entitlements for blame. The federal budget was in surplus from 1998 through 2001, but large tax cuts and unfunded wars have been huge contributors to our current deficit problem. The primary reason the deficit in coming years will now be higher than had been expected is the reduction in tax revenue from last year's tax cuts, not an increase in spending. This year, revenue is expected to fall below 17 percent of gross domestic product - the lowest it has been in the past 50 years with the exception of the aftermath of the past two recessions.

All of us have supported corporate tax reform. The statutory tax rate was too high, much higher than in other Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development economies. However, because of deductions and breaks in the tax code, the effective marginal tax rate was similar to the average among competitor economies. The right way to do reform was to follow the model of the bipartisan tax reform of 1986, when rates were lowered while deductions were eliminated.

Instead, the tax cuts passed last year actually added an amount to America's long-run fiscal challenge that is roughly the same size as the preexisting shortfalls in Social Security and Medicare. The tax cuts are reducing revenue by an average of 1.1 percent of GDP over the next four years. The Hoover authors minimized the cost of the tax cuts by noting that if major provisions are allowed to expire on schedule — certainly an open question, given political realities — they would amount to "only" 0.4 percent of GDP. Even this magnitude exceeds the Medicare Trustees' projections of a 0.3 percent of GDP shortfall in Medicare hospital insurance over the next 75 years.

Just as entitlements are not the primary cause of the recent jump in the deficit, they also should not be the sole solution. It is important to use the right wording: The main entitlement programs are Social Security, Medicare, veterans benefits and Medicaid. These widely popular programs are indeed large and projected to grow as a share of the economy, not because of increased generosity of benefits but because of the aging of the population and the increase in economywide health costs.

There is some room for additional spending reductions in these programs, but not to an extent large enough to solve the long-run debt problem. The Social Security program needs only modest reforms to restore its 75-year solvency, and these should include adjustments in both spending and revenue. Additional revenue is critical because Social Security has become even more vital as fewer and fewer people have defined-benefit pensions. Medicare has been a leader in bending the health-care cost curve. Reforms to payments and reformed benefit structures in Medicare could do more to hold down its future costs.

As we focus on the long-run fiscal situation, our goal should be to put the debt on a declining path as a share of the economy. That will require running smaller deficits in strong economic periods — such as the present — to offset the larger deficits that are needed in recessions to restore demand and avoid deeper crises. Last year's Tax Cuts and Jobs Act turned that economic logic on its head. The economy was already at or close to full employment and did not need a boost. This year's bipartisan spending agreement contributed further to the ill-timed stimulus. The Federal Reserve will have to act to make sure the economy does not overheat.

Several years ago, there was broad agreement that responding to the looming fiscal challenge required a balanced approach that combined increased revenue with reduced spending. Two bipartisan commissions, Simpson-Bowles and Domenici-Rivlin, proposed such approaches that called for tax reform to raise revenue as a percent of GDP and judicious spending cuts. Without necessarily agreeing with these specific plans, we believe a balanced approach is the correct one. Start with spending goals based on the priorities of the American people and then set tax policy to realize adequate revenue. The Hoover economists' advocacy of paying for large tax cuts with entitlement reductions would take the United States in the wrong direction. 

*  *  *
So to sum up - everything was awesome before Trump got here, with unemployment low, interest rates low, inflation low, stocks high, and having added more debt to the serfdom-bearing shoulders of future Americans in the last eight years than since the existence of the nation over 200 years ago... But now that The Fed is blindly hiking rates, normalizing its balance sheet and Washington is continuing down its spend-as-if-there's-no-tomorrow path, suddenly these five disgustingly hypocritical 'economists' decide to cry foul over fiscal largesse... and, of course, right before CBO will dump a bucket of ice cold water over Trump's budget.

Why Are Markets Going Bonkers? Central Bankers Tried to Corner the Bond Market

The big questions being tossed around Wall Street today are: why are markets such a mess? Why are we getting these wild swings?

The reality is that the markets are NOT a mess. These are actually normal healthy markets. Healthy markets move, sometimes a lot in a small span of time.

The real issue is that from '09 until recently, the market was completely artificial because Central Banks cornered ALL risk by cornering the sovereign bond market.

Remember we are in a debt-based financial system today. Sovereign bonds are the bedrock of that system. They define the "risk free rate of return" against which ALL risk is priced. They're also the senior most collateral owned by the banks to backstop their trading/ derivatives portfolios.

When Fed and other Central Banks cornered sovereign bonds via ZIRP (front end of bond market) and QE (long end of bond market) they forced EVERYTHING to reprice to ridiculously low levels of risk. This is why I coined the term the Everything Bubble in 2014. 

It’s also why I wrote the book on this subject.

This bubble is unlike any other bubble in history in that it is truly systemic, affecting every asset class Today you have a primary bubble (sovereign bonds) creating secondary bubbles (corporate debt, housing, stocks) and even tertiary bubbles (short vol/ risk parity fund/ passive investing).

It truly is the Everything Bubble.

As Central Banks begin to attempt to normalize policy, all of these will start blowing up in reverse order. The tertiary bubbles blew up in February when the short-volatility trade destroyed over 97% of its value in a matter of days.

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Central Banks are now trying to manage to deflate secondary bubbles, particularly that of stocks, without causing a crisis.

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Big picture: you're going to see a LOT of volatility going forward. And we're going to see absolute insanity in asset prices. The reason? Every historic correlation/ relationship has been messed up by Central Bank interventions.

Imagine a person who was a raging heroine addict and who contracted major illnesses during his addiction. Now imagine that person getting clean. Throughout the detox process all kinds of issues/ organ problems would develop as the body attempts to adjust to drug being removed.

THAT is the market today. This time is truly different but not in a good way. We've never had a coordinate Central Bank policy of creating bubbles in the bedrock of the financial system before. Given how badly Central Banks managed the Tech stock bubble and Housing Bubble, the outcome won’t be pretty.

Upset About the Sudden Rise in Volatility? Blame Central Banks

The big questions being tossed around Wall Street today are: why are markets such a mess? Why are we getting these wild swings?

The reality is that the markets are NOT a mess. These are actually normal healthy markets. Healthy markets move, sometimes a lot in a small span of time.

The real issue is that from '09 until recently, the market was completely artificial because Central Banks cornered ALL risk by cornering the sovereign bond market.

Remember we are in a debt-based financial system today. Sovereign bonds are the bedrock of that system. They define the "risk free rate of return" against which ALL risk is priced. They're also the senior most collateral owned by the banks to backstop their trading/ derivatives portfolios.

When Fed and other Central Banks cornered sovereign bonds via ZIRP (front end of bond market) and QE (long end of bond market) they forced EVERYTHING to reprice to ridiculously low levels of risk.

This bubble is unlike any other bubble in history in that it is truly systemic, affecting every asset class Today you have a primary bubble (sovereign bonds) creating secondary bubbles (corporate debt, housing, stocks) and even tertiary bubbles (short vol/ risk parity fund/ passive investing).

It truly is the Everything Bubble.

As Central Banks begin to attempt to normalize policy, all of these will start blowing up in reverse order. The tertiary bubbles blew up in February when the short-volatility trade destroyed over 97% of its value in a matter of days.

Central Banks are now trying to manage to deflate secondary bubbles, particularly that of stocks, without causing a crisis.

Big picture: you're going to see a LOT of volatility going forward. And we're going to see absolute insanity in asset prices. The reason? Every historic correlation/ relationship has been messed up by Central Bank interventions.

Imagine a person who was a raging heroine addict and who contracted major illnesses during his addiction. Now imagine that person getting clean. Throughout the detox process all kinds of issues/ organ problems would develop as the body attempts to adjust to drug being removed.

THAT is the market today. This time is truly different but not in a good way. We've never had a coordinate Central Bank policy of creating bubbles in the bedrock of the financial system before. Given how badly Central Banks managed the Tech stock bubble and Housing Bubble, the outcome wonna be pretty.

This Is The Turning Point


The driving trends of the past decade are now reversing...

The saying "the worm has turned" refers to the moment when the downtrodden have finally had enough, and turn on their powerful oppressors.

The worms have finally turned against the privileged elites -- who have benefited so greatly from globalization, corruption, central bank stimulus and the profiteering of state-enforced cartels. It doesn't matter as much as the punditry assumes whether they are turning Left or Right; the important thing is that the powerless have finally started challenging their privileged overlords.

Though the Powers That Be will attempt to placate or suppress the Revolt of the Powerless, the genies of political disunity and social disorder cannot be put back in the bottle. It took a generation of rising inequality, corruption and the erosion of opportunity to create a society of the protected (the haves) and the unprotected (the have-nots), and rubber-stamping more regulations and distributing Universal Basic Income (UBI) will not rebalance a system that is irrevocably out of balance.

But the rise of resistance, as yet nascent, is only half the story: economic trends and cycles are turning as well, and even if the worms remain passively underground, these reversals will disrupt the status quo. The dominant narrative--the rightness, goodness and sustainability of endless growth of consumption and debt--will unravel, and the internal contradictions of this New Gilded Age (widening wealth/income/power inequality) will finally burst through the thin façade of stability that's been patched together over the past nine years of "recovery."

Eight Key Trends/Cycles Are Turning

Here's the thing about trends and cycles: when they inevitably lose altitude or reverse, we rush around trying to identify the cause. All sorts of theories are put forth, but as a general rule, it rarely boils down to one dynamic.

Consider the decline and fall of the Western Roman Empire. Efforts to identify the cause go back hundreds of years, and include everything from barbarian invasions to the use of lead pipes to deliver water.

A new book, The Fate of Rome: Climate, Disease, and the End of an Empire, pins a significant part of the responsibility on climate change and pandemic diseases—system-wide dynamics that slowly sapped Rome's vigor, food supplies, capital and labor force.  Not only that, but cooling weather patterns in Eurasia may have been behind the westward movement of the mobile tribes (the Huns and Mongolians) that pushed existing tribes on Rome's borders into Roman territories—the so-called Barbarian Invasions.

The point here is that systemic trends and cycles are often causally connected and tend to reinforce each other. This is how a stable, wealthy and resilient society gets hollowed out: trends end and cycles reverse, and forces that added stability, capital and resilience when they were working together are slowly replaced by forces that erode the foundations of wealth and stability.

In the current era, eight interconnected trends/cycles are either reaching the end of their run or reversing:

  1. Central bank distortion/manipulation of markets.
  2. The business cycle of credit/debt expansion and contraction.
  3. The yield/interest rate cycle.
  4. The commodity cycle.
  5. The stock market cycle.
  6. Regulation.
  7. Globalization.
  8. Demographics.

Each of these would need a short book to do the topic even partial justice, but let's summarize each trend/cycle.

Let's stipulate that technology isn't a cycle or a trend; its disruptions of existing sectors and institutions accelerate and decelerate over time, but it is woven inseparably into all the trends and cycles listed above.   That said, the emergence of some new technology doesn't mean the business cycle will be repealed for all time; cycles and trends are influenced by Human Wetware V1.0, an OS developed between 100,000 and 160,000 years ago and still in Version One.

Resource depletion is another background to these trends and cycles: robots and drones will not restore depleted ground water or bring back ocean fisheries.

Central Bank Distortion / Manipulation of Markets

Minus the $21 trillion in central bank asset purchases and trillions more in liquidity/credit programs, would the global economy be growing and global markets be at nosebleed heights? We all know the answer is "no."

Central banks have engineered a "recovery" that looks real enough on the surface, but what are its foundations? Gamed statistics and manipulated markets—in other words, controlling not just the narrative but the information available to market participants.  To achieve the desired outcome—rising equity markets, near-zero bond yields and incentivizing the purchase of risk-on assets—central banks have distorted market information and mechanisms.

The returns on this coordinated distortion are diminishing.  The "buzz" from the initial injections has faded, and now that the monetary authorities are trying to wean the markets off of their drug, the markets have lost the ability to discover the price of assets, risk and capital on their own.

No wonder volatility is rising.

Flooding the economy with trillions in new stimulus worked wonders in the initial stage, but after 9 years, the unintended consequences are metastasizing.

Goosing asset valuations higher in service of "the wealth effect" has widened wealth/ income inequality, creating a New Gilded Age of a few haves and many have-nots. The benefits of the central bank punch bowl—near-zero interest rates, leverage and access to unlimited credit--are reserved for those few at the top of the wealth-power pyramid; very little of the stupendous wealth created out of thin air has trickled down to the bottom 95%.

The relentless rise in asset valuations has pushed homes out of reach of those living in desirable urban/suburban markets, and exposed buyers to the risks of an inevitable reversion to the mean, i.e. a collapse of bubble prices back to historical norms.

Capital is not incentivized to invest in productivity or communities for the long haul; the incentives are for stock buybacks and short-term leveraged speculative bets, forms of mal-investment that hollow out the productive real economy is favor of a momentum-driven financialization boom.

Much of the political resistance troubling the status quo can be traced directly to central bank policies that have exacerbated the New Gilded Age inequalities and excesses. If the central banks can't find the will to reduce their distortions in service of the few, the political will of the many will do it for them.

The Business Cycle of Credit Expansion & Contraction

The business cycle is a basic structure of any economy based on credit and flows of capital seeking the highest available returns at the lowest available risk. In the expansion stage, households and enterprises borrow more money to boost production and satisfy unmet demand.  Speculators find opportunities in new enterprises and new markets.

In the contraction phase, all the inevitable excesses of freely available credit come home to roost. Marginal investments in new production fail to become profitable and go bust. Marginal household borrowers default, and speculators who bet the farm on momentum plays watch their capital evaporate like mist in Death Valley.

When too much income is being devoted to servicing existing debt, there's no more net income available to support additional borrowing. Lenders facing losses due to defaults tighten lending standards, and credit—and thus the economy—contracts.

This cycle is an essential dynamic of capitalism.  Central banks have attempted to eliminate the contraction phase that acts as the immune system, washing out bad debt and marginal borrowers.  This has left the economy saddled with "zombie" corporations and debtors that would be liquidated if monetary policies weren't enabling their feeble survival.

But even the most powerful central banks can't force firms and individuals to borrow more money when it no longer makes sense to do so. And keeping zombie banks, corporations and households on life support weakens the financial system by piling up the equivalent of dead wood in the forest. When the inevitable conflagration of bad debt catches fire, many of the healthy trees will also be consumed in the flames.

The Yield / Interest Rate Cycle

Many observers are confident interest rates cannot rise due to the deflationary forces in play. Indeed, they predict a future decline in rates back to zero. Perhaps, but history suggests interest rates typically move in long cycles of roughly two or three decades. The current downtrend in rates dates back to 1981, which means the current trend is pushing 40 years. That's stretching the historical boundaries.

As noted earlier, trends change and then we seek the causes. Interest rates are rising, and perhaps we need no explanation other than reversion to the mean.

The Commodity Cycle

Compared to the stock market (the S&P 500), commodities are at their cyclical lows. As to what happens next, we need only look at a single chart, courtesy of Incrementum AG:

The Stock Market Cycle

We're implicitly being told that stock markets can loft higher forever, as long as central banks are pumping out the financial stimulus. But nothing goes up forever; valuations get stretched, marginal buyers disappear and doubts about the continuing efficacy of central bank distortions creep in.

The typical Bull Market has a leading sector.  Starting with the mass-market Industrial Revolution in the 19th century, leaders tend to be new industries: railroads, radio, computers, the Internet, etc., or existing industries that have been revolutionized by some innovation: for example, banks freed from regulatory oversight discovered subprime mortgages in the 2000s.

The current leaders—the so-called FAANG stocks—are getting tired.  The tech leaders have reached a scale where growth must slow; the expansion of Facebook from 100 million users to 1 billion was a 10-fold increase; the expansion from 1 billion to 2 billion, a double. Are there even another billion potential users with the bandwidth, devices and interest to join? How much additional revenue can be extracted by selling the data of increasingly marginal users?

The same issues of scale are sapping the growth of Apple, Google, et al.  What happens when Apple has already sold an iPhone to everyone with the means and interest to own one?

There is now political pushback against the quasi-monopolies of big tech. Politicians are being forced to "do something," i.e. increase regulations, whether they accomplish the intended goal or not.

Valuations and profits are at the top of their respective cycles, the leaders are faltering, victims of their own dominance, and central banks are feeling pressured to reduce the punch bowl of free money for financiers.

Regulation

Democracy is no longer about solving real problems and being held accountable; it's all about persuading the public that all is well, or distracting them with ginned up controversies. Incumbents get re-elected because they vacuum up enough campaign contributions to buy influence via the mass (corporate) media. They have little incentive to respond to voters, so they don't.

What they can do is look like they're doing something other than protecting the cartels and financiers that fund their permanent re-election campaigns. So they propose more regulations, most of which fail to achieve the desired results but succeed in burdening legitimate enterprises to the point of failure. Small enterprises simply fold up when the exhausted owners can no longer bear the burdens and corporations offshore everything that's over-regulated.

The neoliberal ideology held that the many would benefit if regulations limiting enterprise were eased, and when done judiciously and with common sense, this has functioned as designed. But in the corrupt form of governance that dominates the global economy, regulatory capture means regulations protect cartels and insiders from competition.  Insiders have rigged the system so they can punish competitors and let their cronies off the hook.

The useful regulations protecting the many from the exploitation of the few are being buried by counter-productive "do something" regulations and regulatory moats that protect cartels and insiders.

Globalization

Global trade has a long history, stretching back to the Bronze Age (1500 B.C.). Like every other market, it expands and contracts as conditions change.  The emergence of China (and other nations) since the mid-1980s greatly expanded global trade and capital flows. This distributed new income and prosperity to hundreds of millions of people, and yet it also concentrated much of the newfound wealth in the hands of the few and left many behind.

Nothing goes up forever, not even globalization.  Those left behind are starting to wonder if the good of globalization outweighs the costs.

Demographics

If high-population-growth Africa is set aside, the world's working age populace is perched on the precipice of decline while the populace of retirees is exploding, not just in the developed world but in the developing world.

Although many put their hopes on robots generating unlimited wealth that will support the elderly and free the working age populace from labor, the more likely prospect is an economy that cannot fulfill the promises made to retirees back when the worker-retiree ratio was 10-to-1 and not the present-day 2-to-1.

Chris Hamilton has written three excellent explorations of demographics that cover the basics. The bottom line is the trend of rapidly-expanding workforces and modest numbers of dependent retirees has reversed:

To underscore this point, chew on this sobering projection: in the US, for the first time ever, retirees will outnumber kids within just 20 years.