venerdì 23 marzo 2018

Wall Street Journal Admits "China Started The Trade War, Not Trump"

If there's a trade war between the U.S. and China, don't blame Donald Trump, says The Wall Street Journal's Greg Ip: China started it long before he became president.



While definitely not toeing the line of the mainstream media's ubiquitous 'Trump is an idiot' narrative, Ip explains below that, if they're honest with themselves, even free traders and internationalists agree China's predatory trade practices - which include forcing U.S. business to transfer valuable technology to Chinese firms and restricting access to Chinese markets - are undermining both its partners and the trading system.

Mr. Trump's China crackdown is risky, but it's on firmer legal, political and economic ground than many of his other trade complaints, for several reasons.

1. These products are different: The classic case for free trade predicts that each country specializes where it has a comparative advantage, lowering costs and raising incomes for everyone. If China subsidizes exports of steel to the U.S., in theory the U.S. still benefits because consumers and steel-using industries will have lower costs, and while some steel jobs will disappear, more productive jobs elsewhere will take their place.

But starting in the 1980s, economists recognized that comparative advantage couldn't explain success in many industries such as commercial jetliners, microprocessors and software. These industries are difficult for competitors to enter because of steep costs for research and development, previously established technical standards, increasing returns to scale (costs drop the more you sell), and network effects (the more customers use the product, the more valuable it becomes).

In such industries, a handful of firms may reap the lion's share of the wages and profits (what economists call rents), at the expense of others. China's efforts are aimed at achieving such dominance in many of these industries by 2025.

"China is undermining or taking away some of our rents, so we are relatively worse off and they are better off," says Douglas Irwin, author of "Clashing over Commerce: A History of U.S. Trade Policy." Unlike Mr. Trump's tariffs on steel and aluminum, "a lot of economists would hold their fire in terms of attacking Trump for his China actions. I don't think anyone can really defend the way China has moved in the past few years, violating intellectual property and forced technology transfer."

2. The WTO isn't enough: When China joined the World Trade Organization in 2001, many advocates thought it would play by the global rules against advantaging its own firms and hurting others. Instead, China does so anyway in ways not easily remedied by the WTO.

Rob Atkinson, president of the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, notes that a WTO case typically requires evidence from an aggrieved company. But many foreign companies are reluctant to complain about their treatment in China for fear of retaliation, such as being investigated for antitrust, consumer abuse, fraud or espionage, or losing sales to state-controlled companies. With no balance of powers or independent courts, "there is no rule of law to constrain Chinese officials from implementing arbitrary and capricious mercantilist policies," Mr. Atkinson and two co-authors wrote in an extensive critique of China a year ago.

It is also difficult to hold China accountable for its WTO obligations because its system is so opaque. Mr. Atkinson says many discriminatory measures aren't published, or published only in Chinese. When the central government, under external pressure, rescinds some discriminatory measures, they reappear at the provincial and local level, he says.

3. The U.S. isn't alone: Mr. Trump's steel and aluminum tariffs were widely panned for hitting both China and law-abiding allies like Canada and western Europe alike.

By contrast, his ire at China is widely shared. French President Emmanuel Macron has called for a unified European Union policy against Chinese corporate takeovers. 

"Everyone who trades with China faces this problem," Peter Navarro, Mr. Trump's trade adviser, told reporters Thursday. "Part of the process that we've undergone … is to have a significant outreach to our like-minded allies and trading partners."

4. China isn't like Japan: For decades, Japan, like China now, sought to help Japanese firms by limiting foreign access to its market, providing direct industrial support, and pushing western companies to license their technologies. Japanese companies did catch up in autos, electronics and computers, but the U.S. leapt ahead in new industries such as software and services. Japan's economy entered a long slump in 1992 and hasn't entirely escaped. Some say the current panic about China is similarly misplaced.

But Japan is different. It is a military ally and is thus sensitive to U.S. pressure on trade. China is a geostrategic rival pursuing and sometimes stealing U.S. secrets for both civilian and military purposes. Where Japan is democratic and transparent, China is authoritarian and opaque.

The scale is also different. Mr. Irwin notes that in 1987, President Ronald Reagan hit $300 million worth of Japanese imports with 100% tariffs for its failure to open its market to U.S. semiconductors. That pales next to the $50 billion worth of damage Trump officials say China's trade practices inflict.

"New plays and musicals are often tried first in Philadelphia or Boston before going to Broadway," says Clyde Prestowitz, president of the Economic Strategy Institute. "Well, Japan was Philadelphia. Now, with China, we're on Broadway."

Japan was reluctant to retaliate because it valued its political and strategic ties with the U.S. China under President Xi Jinping is turning more nationalist and adversarial, making it more willing to retaliate than Japan was.

This, however, means that the collateral damage of a trade war, and thus the risks of Mr. Trump's strategy, are also much greater. The breadth of his action elevates the potential harm to American consumers, supply chains and exporters.

Mr. Irwin says it isn't clear that Mr. Trump's strategy is right. Taking China to the WTO might be a less dangerous approach. But he adds: "No one is saying we shouldn't do anything."

BofA Flips: "The Risk Is That Global Growth Slows A Lot More Than Consensus Believes"

Who would have thought that all it would take for banks to turn from raging permabulls to cautious bears is just a modest 10% drop in the stock market from all time highs.

And yet, in a note today, that's roughly the metamorphosis that Ritesh Samadhiya of BofA's underwent when in a note to client, he puked all over the bank's broader, and bullish economic and market outlook, and instead said that "we think the risk is that nominal global growth SLOWS a lot more than consensus believes." To be fair, Ritesh had been warning about the threat of deflationary forces for a while, so at least since January, his caution has been spot on.

Here are the details:

What we think – slower growth, little inflation

We are NOT buyers of the tight labor markets-higher wages-higher inflation-higher bond yields story (check out insignificant wage growth in Japan and Australia – both with very tight labor markets with very high labor force participation rates as examples of the weakening link between unemployment and wage growth).

We think the microfoundations of the wage setting process are not properly appreciated by macro investors/analysts. (If you work for an industry with just a few, large names, try asking your boss for a substantial bonus.)

We think the risk is that nominal global growth SLOWS a lot more than consensus believes – Three Chinese leading indicators are falling – the Bloomberg China Monetary Conditions index (CHBGMCI)...


... the China credit Impulse 12-month Change (CHBGREVA)...

... and the China Marshallian K (gap between M2 growth and nominal GDP growth).

Global economic surprises are falling, and so are some leading indicators in the US. Asset prices that reflect global growth are stalling (Dr Copper, Dr Halliburton, Dr. Sotheby's etc).

We disagree with the bearish bond consensus.

And now we wait for other internal BofA groups to follow in Ritesh' footsteps, eventually spilling over to other banks who will then be forced to cut their S&P targets, which however may take a while especially since Wall Street "thought leader" Goldman still expects 3 more rate hikes in 2018, a forecast which is imploding before our very eyes with every percent drop in the S&P.


"Baked In The Cake" - Why LIBOR's Blowout Has Already Done Its Damage

The global funding market crisis is getting worse and its contagion is starting to show up in assets that 'mom and pop' care about. Bank stocks are being battered...

Following bank credit risk's spike...

And European High Yield risk has exploded to one-year highs...

European stress is worse than US for now, as Charlie Diebel, head of rates at Aviva Investors, notes:

"The longer it [LIBOR-OIS increase] goes on, the more pronounced the effects are going to be...

It complicates the efforts of policymakers because in Europe we still have QE (quantitative easing), but we have some sort of tightening coming at the same time."

And Investment Grade credit risk is soaring to six-month wides in EU and US...

Simply put, LIBOR doesn't need to blow out any more for the pain to emerge...

As one veteran credit-trader exclaimed: the bank credit pain "is baked in the cake" as the lagged reaction to short-term funding needs (and soaring costs) creeps into those so-called fortress balance sheets.

"A Perfect Storm": Why Are Stocks Crashing

With all due respect to Marko Kolanovic, it appears that it was more than just the "severe snowstorm" that spooked stocks yesterday (and certainly today).


As Nomura's Charlie McElligott writes this morning, a perfect storm (if not of the snow variety) converged and risk-off catalysts abound as "Growth-Scare" murmurs gain further steam, driving not only the Dow Jones nearly 500 points lower, but also a robust UST bull-flattening as duration is grabbed and as Spooz break-below their 100dma.

The Dow has broken below the Fib 38.2% retracement, tested and failed to break its triangle from the February crash, and is at its lowest in almost 6 weeks. The Dow is down 450 points, breaking to the downside of the "triangle formation"....


... and tumbling...


... While the S&P 500 has broken back below its 100DMA:


So what's causing this? Here are the details from McElligott:
Trump / China tariff-hype 'realizes,' trade wars" meme ensues
PBoC decision to piggyback the Fed's hike with their own +5bps reverse repo borrowing-rate increase adds to Asia-ex Japan sentiment swoon
An idiosyncratic placing of mega-long momentum name Tencent Holdings which saw the stock close -5% and dragged-down HSI (a 9.9% weighting) and will negatively impact EEM (largest holding at 5.9%)
While Fed and PBoC hike, the data continues to soften as "growth slowdown" fears mount: Japan PMI miss; French Composite PMIs dropped to a seven-month low; German Composite PMIs missed for the second consecutive month while all three IFO measures of German sentiment fell for March as well; EZ Composite PMIs grew at the slowest pace in 14 months with misses in Manu and Service

Then there was the just announced resignation of Trump's head Mueller-probe lawyer, John Down, which has reignited Trump impeachment jitters, and suggests that the president is becoming increasingly nervous what Mueller can and will do next.

Turning back to Fed, the Nomura derivatives guru reiterates his belief that there was a "high bar" for the market to interpret this meeting as a "hawkish hike" was spot-on.
Powell then actually delivered a de facto "dovish" message, as the optically "hawkish" '19 / '20 dots and terminal rate views were based off of "unprecedented at best" economic projections from the Fed--which Powell himself downplayed as low-confidence forecasts with negligible "predictive" power
Equities instead focused on the near-term "tangibles": by communicating "3 dots only" in '18; by focusing on a willingness to "overshoot on inflation"; by not committing to press conferences at every meeting; by talking-down the neutral-rate etc--equities instead heard a "dovish pivot" from the HH version of Powell and didn't get that "growth confirmation" I believe that many were actually looking-for
Remember, equities bulls have remained of the view that we can handle higher interest rates if "growth" is driving a higher "neutral rate" in conjunction—so in that sense, his lack of "growth conviction" was interpreted as a disappointment
However what the equities audience DID hear was a very pro-cyclical / pro-inflation "dovish" message which helped facilitate the extension of the rally in crude and S&P sector leadership from Energy, Materials, Industrials and Financials
This move in "Deep-Value Cyclicals"—in conjunction with the idiosyncratic Tech sector negative drivers which are being exacerbated by asymmetrically 'crowded' positioning—created a number of outlier "factor" moves below the index-level.

Putting it all together, this fits with the long-term view McElligott has been espousing: a medium-term (3-6m) "cyclical melt-up" as inflation "realizes" (higher commods and breakevens while "Value" outperforms "Growth") before ultimately forcing the Fed to "tighten" at a pace which exceeds market expectations, driving higher UST term premium and "spilling-over" into higher cross-asset vol / lower risk-assets / wider spreads by end of year.

Additionally, some observations on the short-end/funding markets, where tactically-speaking, the "short-squeeze" potential remains a focal-point going-forward, as hawkish Fed expectations were not met, which in conjunction with the scale of the short-positioning and ongoing "softening" in global data COULD set the table for bull-steepening.

Furthermore, today's "disappointing" LIBOR set (was pricing 1.6 yday, fixed today at 1.45--below mkt expectations) may further add to this "squeeze" pressure, especially as recent foreign buying "could embolden" further purchases in the front-end, as well as "lead to the re-emergence of domestic real money buying"

Today we see this acceleration of the rates rally getting folks pretty nervous, along with the USD rallying back near flat—in turn pressuring / reversing some of yday's gains in corresponding "short USD" trades. The good news is that EU and Japan equities longs have been very reduced; the SPX / NDX exposure however remains very high within the macro universe—albeit hedged.

Tactically within equities, the rally in fixed-income should continue the equities 'pain-trade' that is the MTD rally in 'duration-sensitives'—while 'growth' feels tired and crowded right now.

With mega-underweights Energy (best two-month seasonality since '94 = March and April) and Utilities leading S&P performance against Tech's fade, this has been a rough two-week stretch for equities funds, especially heading into the April "momentum unwind" seasonality.

* * *

Finally, some troubling observations on April seasonals from McElligott, who notes the April performance of 'momentum' when it comes into the seasonality with top decile of performance (currently we sit at this +14% band)...


... as both longs and shorts get hit hard: