Is This Why Deutsche Bank Is Crashing (Again)?

September 26th, 2016

Deutsche's dead-bank-bounce is over. The last few days have seen shares of the 'most systemically dangerous bank in the world' plunge almost 20%, back to record lows as the DoJ fine demands reawoken reality that the €42 trillion-dollar-derivative-book bank is severely under-capitalized no matter how you spin asset values.


Deutsche Bank closes at an all-time record low close...



More questions about DB are appearing, however, as MishTalk.com's Michael Shedlock asks -
Is Deutsche Bank cooking its derivatives book to hide huge losses...

Deutsche Bank's notional derivatives book had huge swings in notional value between its year-end 2014 report and its "passion to perform" year-end 2015 report.

Deutsche Bank did not list the notional value of its derivatives book in its 2016 Quarterly Report.

The bank would like us to take it on faith, that the positive value of its derivatives book is €615 billion while the net positive value of its book is around around €18 billion.

There's just one little problem: the market believes something is wrong. What is it? Derivatives or something else?

Reader Lars writes



Hello Mish,

I'm investigating changes in Deutsche Bank's derivatives book.



At 2014 year end, DB had derivatives which notional value was €52 trillion. The positive value was around €630 billion.



At 2015 year end, DB had derivatives which notional value was €42 trillion. The positive value was around €515 billion on total assets of €1.629 trillion.



So during 2015 derivatives exposure (notional) was reduced by €10 trillion or 19%.



As of June 30th 2016, DB does not give a number for notional value but the positive value has again increased to €615 billion. Total assets are €1.8 trillion.



Meanwhile the the net positive value of DBs derivatives portfolio is stable around €18 billion.


What's Happening?

It is possible that DBs derivatives portfolio has increased in value by €100 billion, roughly 19% in 6 months without the notional amount going up correspondingly?

Did DB offload €10 trillion worth of notional derivatives before year end 2015 only to pad it back later?

Book equity is €67 billion but it's trading at a 75% discount. The market values DB at €16.5 billion.

Tier 1 bond holders say pretty much the same thing. Bonds sell at a 22% discount to par.

Lars

Comments from Matterhorn Asset Management

I was involved in a three-way email conversation on Deutsche Bank with Lars and Egon von Greyerz at Matterhorn Asset Management AG.

Von Greyerz chimed in with …

Thank for this Lars.

I would not be surprised if they are moving balance sheet risk to derivatives. This is a very common trick to reduce official exposure. Greece did this with the help of Goldman Sachs.

Share price confirms something is seriously wrong.

I saw the "Big Short" for the second time on Saturday. It's a great film. I told my wife that what happened in 2007-2009 is a walk in the park compared to what we will see next. It's only a question of when.

Still only 0.5% of world financial assets are insured in the form of physical gold. Investors think that trees will continue to grow to heaven. What a shock they will get.

Kind regards

Egon von Greyerz
Founder & Managing Partner
Matterhorn Asset Management AG
GoldSwitzerland



Accounting Methodology Change

I dove into Deutsche Bank's 4Q/FY2015 Presentation which contained these statements on various pages.
Continued strong de-leveraging in the quarter of EUR 44 billion on an FX neutral basis, principally in derivatives.
Full year 2015 de-leveraging of EUR ~130 billion on an FX neutral basis.
Equity Derivatives significantly lower y-o-y driven by lower client activity exacerbated by challenging risk management in certain areas.
Lower loan loss provisions reflecting portfolio quality and the benign economic environment.
Despite adverse FX impact, non-interest expenses decreased mainly due to lower litigation and performance-related expenses.

De-risking activity was the main driver of Balance Sheet reductions in 4Q2015.

Consolidation & Adjustments



Income before income taxes (IBIT) does not look pretty, to say the least. And what's with these accounting methodology changes?

The Coming Bond Bubble Collapse

September 23rd, 2016

This week, Michael Pento, fund manager explains how the United States is fast approaching the end stage of the biggest asset bubble in history. He describes how the bursting of this bubble will cause a massive interest rate shock that will send the US consumer economy and the US government—pumped up by massive Treasury debt—into bankruptcy, an event that will send shockwaves throughout the global economy:

These are the most dangerous markets I have ever witnessed in my entire life, and I've been investing for over 25 years. Let's go over some numbers to let you know exactly how tenuous this bubble is. Its membrane has been stretched so wide and so tight that it's about to burst, and any semblance of even maybe a little sharp object, something even a hemophiliac wouldn't be afraid of, sends the market careening downward.

Global central bank balance sheets are up from $6 trillion in 2007 to $21 trillion today and they are still being expanded at the pace of $200 billion each and every month. What's happening is that the robotraders, the algorithms, the frontrunners on Wall Street and around the world are just gaming the system, looking for the next increase in central bank credit to take their collateral to the ECB or to the Bank of Japan or to the Fed and buy more stocks and bonds.

That's the game we're playing. Even a hint that it might someday end sends the entire investment community scampering for the door; and that door is very, very narrow and can only fit a few people through it. So let's go through a couple of more data points to emphasize just how big this bond bubble is and why it's so important.

So the European Central Bank is buying corporate bonds. I hope everybody knows that. So much that there's now 30% of investment-grade debt in Europe trading with a negative yield. This is not sovereign debt (as asinine as it is to ever be able as a sovereign nation to issue debt and get paid to do so). Investment grade bonds in Europe now trade with a negative yield.

The Bank of Japan owns 50% of all Japanese government bonds, JGBs.

About 25 percent (and this number vacillates between days where the German tenure goes north or south of the flat line) of global sovereign debt trades with a negative yield.

So what happened on September 8th? Last Thursday, Mario Draghi came out and gave a press conference after leaving rates unchanged in the European Union. The audience was asking questions like: Did you discuss helicopter money? No, we really didn't discuss it. Did you discuss extending the QE program beyond March of 2017? No, we didn't discuss extending the 80 billion purchases of assets beyond March. There was a stirring in the audience, the reporters were beside themselves. They couldn't believe that Mario Draghi, even though he didn't even hint about stopping QE, he didn't extend its duration or its quantity. That sent markets cratering. The Dow fell 400 points. The U.S. 10-year yield jumped from 1.52% to 1.68% in one day.

Now, the market had a bounce back the next day, then was down again more than 200 points on the Dow. So you can tell, anybody with any objective, critical, independent mind can tell this is an unsustainable, very ephemeral rally in stocks that has occurred since 2009. And when the bond market breaks, when that bubble bursts, it will wipe out every asset — everything will collapse together — because everything is geared off of that so-called 'risk free' rate of return.

If your risk free rate of return has been warped down to 0% for 96 months, then everything — and I mean diamonds, sports cars, mutual funds, municipal bonds, fixed income, REITs, collateralized loan obligations, stocks, bonds, everything, even commodities — will collapse in tandem along with the bond bubble burst.

Deutsche Bank: The BoJ is running out of options

September 26th, 2016

The Bank of Japan's recent policy evolution clearly shows that policymakers are running out of options. The BoJ's decision to raise its inflation target beyond 2% and shift from targeting the quantity to the price of money all along the yield curve, reflects a seismic shift in policy at the bank. Unfortunately, this policy change has sent a signal to the markets that the BoJ is running out of options, rather than a proactive shift to new easing — a signal the bank would have preferred to send to financial markets.




The BoJ's shrinking influence and lack of options will lead to further yen strength for three key reasons:

The Bank of Japan is giving up on driving real rates down

By specifically targeting nominal yields the bank is prioritizing financial stability and bank profitability over real rates. In today's world of record low interest rates, central banks have two opposing constraints: keeping real yields low to help the real economy but keeping nominal yields from falling further because they are damaging banks and credit creation.

Policy could lead to a self-fulfilling tightening
The Bank of Japan is relinquishing control of real rates by targeting nominal rates, creating a highly pro-cyclical policy asymmetry. A negative demand shock could raise demand for Japanese government bonds and depresses inflation expectations. In this scenario, the BoJ will end up reducing the amount of JGBs it buys and raising real rates. However, on the other hand, if a huge fiscal stimulus from the government put upward pressure on yields the BoJ would effectively monetize the debt raising inflation expectations even further.

Government invitation for helicopter money

In the past, yield targets have been put in place on sovereign bonds to help finance excessive, one-off spending plans such as wars. By adopting a yield target, the central bank is indirectly funding Treasuries, another form of "helicopter money." By targeting a specific JGB yield, the BoJ is indirectly shifting the onus of a "helicopter drop" to the government. Although Deutsche's analyst believes that until we see more convincing signs of a substantial and credible fiscal easing from the government, the BoJ's inflation target will lack credibility.

The BoJ's policy shift surprised the market initially, but the bank is beginning to lose credibility. Soon after the policy change announcement, the yen gave up most of its gains and started to strengthen, which really shows how little the market trusts the BoJ to hit its targets or reverse the economic stagnation that has plagued Japan for the last two decades.

Monetary policy is at the end of the line

Monday, September 26th, 2016

The last few days have made clear that monetary policy is having less and less impact as time goes along.In particular, the latest salvos from the Bank of Japan smack of desperation, as if BOJ Governor Kuroda has decided to throw everything but the kitchen sink into his grab bag of unorthodox monetary policy. Because the Bank of Japan is so far along the curve toward both secular stagnation and unorthodox policy to counteract that slowing, we should pay attention to how their experiments go. I do not expect good results.

How central banks operate

Let me start off with a baseline on how I think about monetary policy. I apologize if this is a bit wonkish. But I think it's important in understanding why central banks' unorthodox policy tool kits are limited.

The first and main tool in the arsenal of any central bank is interest rate policy. And this is because the central bank is a monopolist. In Japan, for example, the Japanese government is the monopoly issuer of Japanese currency, and has given the Bank of Japan monopoly power as its agent to control the reserve monetary base. The Bank of Japan exercises its monopoly power by targeting the overnight rate for money, currently at zero percent with an added tax on excess reserves to boot.

This is how all modern central banks operate. They have explicit targets or target ranges for the overnight interest rate and act within the reserve market that they control to ensure they hit their targets. The point of course is that modern central banks use a price or interest rate target, not a quantity target like targeting reserves or monetary aggregates. And since a monopolist can only control either price or quantity, not both simultaneously, central banks have to pick one or the other. The Volcker experiment at the Fed in the late 1970s and early 1980s made clear that quantity targets don't work. So central banks target interest rates i.e. price.

Now central banks can't do that unless they supply their banks with all the reserves that those banks desire to make loans at the target interest rate — meaning central banks must be committed to supplying as many reserves as banks want or need in accordance with the lending that they do. Failure to supply the reserves means failure to hit the interest rate target, since banks would bid up the price of reserves above the target.

The transmission mechanism

So how does this help or hurt the economy? First, when an economy is in distress — in recession or headed there — lower interest rates decrease interest payments and help reduce financial distress for the most precarious borrowers. Moreover, other borrowers benefit from lower rates too and are more likely to increase spending because of the increased disposable income. We see that with mortgage refinancing activity in the United States or lower mortgage payments on variable rate loans in the UK, for example.

Moreover, when an economy is in distress, lower base rates help banks by increasing net interest margins through steepening the yield curve. A lower overnight rate means that short-term interest rates are lower relative to long-term interest rates. And that's good for bank net interest margins. That affords banks the chance to build capital buffers. And since banks experience larger loan losses when an economy is in distress and must reserve against those losses, building those buffers is important to banks' willingness to lend as loan loss reserves affect the banks' capital position, which they use as the buffer between assets and liabilities to not only remain solvent but also to make loans. (As an aside, I should also point out that banks are never reserve constrained because the central bank supplies all the reserves banks need in order to hit the overnight interest rate target. They are capital constrained because they can't make loans unless they have enough capital to do so and remain a safe and sound financial institution.)

That's all fine and good. But then economists take it a step further and say that when the central bank lowers or raises interest rates, it raises or lowers demand for borrowing for investment by firms. But this simply isn't true. There is no empirical evidence that lower rates spur capital investment. Even studies by the Federal Reserve note this fact. In fact, as former UBS chief economist George Magnus recently pointed out regarding the Bank of Japan, what really happens with investment as central banks lower rates is that it creates a skew toward high risk investment due to investor's search for higher yield. It's not more investment that we see, but skewed investment toward projects with longer lead times and higher risk. As George puts it, "zombie companies are kept alive perpetuating a misallocation of capital, and retardingnew investment opportunities" (underlining for emphasis added).

What happens when rates are at zero

When the central bank has cut as much as it can i.e. to zero, you've got a big problem. First of all, the central bank can't lower interest rates further to help debtors in distress. It's already as low as it can go. Second, it can't lower them any more to help banks pad their net interest margins because – again – they're at zero. Basically the central bank is stuck. And that's where we  landed everywhere during the most recent financial crisis: in Europe, in Japan, and in the US. The central banks, thus in order to prove their potency, fabricated a bunch of unconventional policy tools they told us were just as good as interest rate policy. And they're using them.

We're talking about:

  1. Forward guidance: where the central bank tells you they will keep rates at zero for longer as a way of keeping long-term rates down too
  2. Quantitative easing (QE): where the central bank buys up financial assets with printed reserve money in order to boost asset prices and maintain lower interest rates. The Bank of Japan is even getting exchange-traded equity funds created to invest in.
  3. Negative interest rate policy (NIRP): where the central bank taxes the excess reserves it has created through quantitative easing in an attempt to make it onerous to have excess reserves in the first place, thinking banks might make more loans than otherwise.
The US has used the first two tools and Japan and Europe have employed all three. Yet growth remains slow, especially in Japan, which has been wracked by deflation for years. So the BOJ has upped the ante this week with two new policies
  1. A higher inflation target: where it has said it would permit inflation to go above its long-term inflation target, in order to get markets to expect higher inflation and, therefore, faster nominal GDP growth
  2. An explicit long-term rate target: where it says explicitly it will not allow the long-term 10-year interest rate to rise above zero, hoping the lower rates in the economy will increase borrowing for investment

It won't work

All of this is destined to fail. And it's clear from the framework I set out to begin with why.

  • Forward guidance and explicit long-term interest rate targets flatten the yield curve and reduce bank net interest margins. That's anti-stimulus. Moreover, lower interest rates reduce savings interest. And since the private sector in every advanced economy is a net receiver of interest, in a normal, growing, non-distressed economic situation, this factor swamps the benefits from relieving financial distress. When the economy is not distressed, net-net lower rates are not stimulative since the private sector is a net receiver of interest. They make it harder to save and could induce more savings and less spending.
  • Quantitative easing is based on quantity target thinking. And we already know that quantity targets don't work.
  • Negative interest rate policy is based on the flawed assumption that banks are reserve constrained when they're not. Nowhere where they have been implemented have negative interest rates resulted in increased lending. They are a tax. And as time goes on, this tax is likely to be passed on to bank customers, reducing aggregate demand.
  • Finally, there's the higher inflation target the Bank of Japan has just set. This won't work either. Just because the Bank of Japan says it is willing to accept higher inflation doesn't mean they will get higher inflation. And higher inflation doesn't mean higher real GDP growth, it could just mean an erosion of purchasing power, which would cause people to retrench.

All of these unconventional policies are poor substitutes for interest rate policy. And the only reason they are being tried is because policy rates around the world are at or near zero. If central banks could cut interest rates and steepen the yield curve, they would. But they can't and they have fallen back on this increasingly desperate set of alternative policy tools.

My view is that in the absence of increases in median wages in advanced economies, we are unlikely to see a meaningful and durable increase in growth in those economies. And the result is going to be not just low short-term interest rates, but low long-term interest rates. When recession hits, yield curves will flatten instead of steepen, since we are at the zero lower bound. And the full measure of loan loss distress will come to bear on bank balance sheets, restricting credit and deepening the downturn. At that point, we will just have to see when and whether we get a fiscal response and how effective that response is. Monetary policy is out of bullets.